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I. INTRODUCTION
Underneath the countryside of Switzerland and France is the largest 
machine ever built.1 Seventeen miles around2 and requiring as much electricity 
as a medium-sized city,3 it is designed to create conditions hotter than any star 
in our galaxy.4 The thousands of scientists hovering over the device hope that 
when it reaches full power it will create particles that have not existed since the 
time of the Big Bang.5 Modestly named the “Large Hadron Collider” (“LHC”), 
the machine will be the most ambitious scientific experiment in humanity’s 
history. 
The physics community is abuzz. Scientists everywhere are hoping to see 
something they have never seen before. Some are expecting to find the elusive 
Higgs boson.6 Others are looking for the dark matter that holds together the 
cosmos.7 Still others hope to see, in the tracers of subatomic shrapnel, the 
telltale signs of a microscopic black hole as it evaporates into nothingness.8
 1. CERN, The European Center for Nuclear Research (“CERN”), LHC: Facts and 
Figures, http://public.web.cern.ch/public/en/LHC/Facts-en.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2009). 
 2. Id.
 3. Travis Lupick, B.C. Scientists Aim to Unlock Secrets of Universe, May 15, 2008, 
http://www.straight.com/article-145556/end-world.  
 4. Frank Close, Sharing our Sense of Wonder, TIMES HIGHER EDUCATION, March 17, 
2000, http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/story.asp?storyCode=150713&sectioncode=26.  
 5. See The LHC: A Step Closer to the Big Bang, SCIENCE IN SCHOOL, http://www. 
scienceinschool.org/2008/issue10/lhcwhy (last visited Nov. 30, 2009).  
 6. See CERN, Missing Higgs, http://public.web.cern.ch/public/en/Science/Higgs-en.html 
(last visited Nov. 30, 2009) (“As the Universe cooled [after the Big Bang] and the temperature 
fell below a critical value, an invisible force field called the ‘Higgs field’ was formed together 
with the associated ‘Higgs boson.’ The field prevails throughout the cosmos: any particles that 
interact with it are given a mass via the Higgs boson. The more they interact, the heavier they 
become, whereas particles that never interact are left with no mass at all.”).
 7. CERN, Why the LHC, http://public.web.cern.ch/public/en/LHC/WhyLHC-en.html 
(last visited Nov. 30, 2009) (Approximately 96% of the universe is made up of “dark matter,” 
which is invisible and very difficult to detect and study. Experiments using the LHC “will look 
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Not everyone, however, is giddy with excitement. In particular, it is that 
last bit—about black holes—that has some people worried. An unhappy few 
are concerned that black holes produced by the LHC might not vanish, as 
expected.9 Instead, it is feared, they might linger.10 And grow.  
Our planet, and everyone on it, detractors say, could be reduced to an 
infinitesimal lightless speck.11
Thus, even without producing so much as a single exotic particle for 
physicists to study, the LHC has spawned something singularly exotic for 
lawyers and judges to grapple with—the world’s most extreme application for a 
preliminary injunction.  
Pity the unlucky judge who draws this case on the docket. The case-file is 
replete with the infinite and the unknowable. The facts are, quite literally, more 
complex than anything on Earth. Help is everywhere, but trustworthiness is in 
short supply. For every potential expert witness has a personal stake in the 
matter—whether it is a desire to maintain a viable career in the sciences, or a 
fear of falling into an astronomical abyss. And one can hardly eschew the 
experts in favor of some hard, physical proof. The most relevant evidence, 
being in the physically unknowable center of a black hole, is, quite matter-of-
factly, at the bottom of a bottomless pit.  
Then there are the stakes. Erring on the side of caution would suspend a 
great scientific adventure—our quest for the fundaments of nature.12 On the 
other hand, if we side with the experimenters, and they turn out to be wrong, 
the planet itself will wink out of existence. 
A black hole, according to physics, is created by a “gravitational 
singularity”—a place where the very substance of space itself “suffers a 
devastating rupture.”13 The singularity is not directly observable.14 It remains 
hidden behind an event horizon—a boundary in space beyond which no matter, 
light, or even information can escape.15 In proximity to the singularity, 
conventional equations that describe the fabric of space and time begin to break 
down, and variables approach infinity.16
for supersymmetric particles to test a likely hypothesis for the make-up of dark matter.”). 
 8. Colin Nickerson, Scientists Hope Collider Makes a Big Bang, THE BOSTON GLOBE,
May 12, 2007, at 1A, available at http://www.boston.com/news/world/europe/articles/2007/
05/12/scientists_hope_collider_makes_a_big_bang/. 
 9. Drew Zahn, Fear of Black Hole Machine Triggers Threats to Researchers,
SCIENCENETDAILY, WORLDNETDAILY, Sept. 6, 2008, http://www.wnd.com/index.php?fa= 
PAGE.view&pageId=74461. 
 10. Id.
 11. Id.
 12. CERN, supra note 7.  
 13. BRIAN GREENE, THE ELEGANT UNIVERSE 421 (2003 W.W. Norton & Company Ltd.) 
(1999) (emphasis omitted). 
 14. See John D. Norton, Singularities and Black Holes, Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, June 29, 2009, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/spacetime-singularities/.  
 15. Id.
 16. Id.
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Ironically, the case of the LHC produces an analogous result for the law: a 
jurisprudential singularity. The enormity of the alleged harm and the extreme 
complexity of the scientific factual issues combine to create seemingly 
irreducible puzzles of jurisprudence. Conundrums of equity, legal 
epistemology, jurimetrics, and jurisdiction are all caught up in the vortex: 
Traditional preliminary-injunction analysis begins to unravel when faced with 
the alleged harm of planet-ending calamity. Evidentiary law regarding expert 
testimony collapses in upon itself in the midst of absolutist scientific 
controversy. Moreover, jurists taking their own peek into the science are 
confronted with a kind of knowledge horizon that threatens to make the merits 
of the debate unobservable.  
Can human law survive in a realm “where physical law ends”?17
In this article, I explore the LHC case having two goals in mind. 
My first aim is to fill a gap in the reporter volumes. The black hole case has 
all the makings of a law-school classic. The clash of extremes provides an 
exceptional vehicle for probing our notions of fairness and how we regard the 
role of the courts. But jurisdictional hurdles have prevented any lawsuit from 
progressing to the issuance of an opinion on the merits, and no litigation on the 
horizon appears likely to get there.18 Therefore, I have endeavored to write up 
the case in a way that makes it ripe for review, discussion, and debate. In this 
way, I hope this article may serve some readers in the same way that Lon L. 
Fuller’s “Case of the Speluncean Explorers”19 has served generations of law 
students by teeing up classic questions of legal philosophy. 
My second purpose in writing is less playful. I intend to provide a set of 
analytical and theoretical tools that are usable in the courts for dealing with this 
case and cases like it. If litigation over the LHC does not put a judge in the 
position of saving the world, another case soon might. In a technological age of 
human-induced climate change, genetic engineering, nanotechnology, 
artificially intelligent machines, and other potential threats, the odds of the 
courts confronting a real doomsday scenario in the near future are decidedly 
non-trivial. If the courts are going to be able to play their role in upholding the 
rule of law in such super-extreme environments, then the courts need analytical 
methods that will allow for making fair and principled decisions despite the 
challenges such cases present. 
In the pages ahead, I recount the LHC/black-hole controversy, looking into 
the purely scientific aspects of the debate as well as its social and political 
sides. Then, I review problems that face plaintiffs trying to enjoin the LHC’s 
 17. See David Peat, Black Holes - Where Physical Law Ends, 9 SCI. DIMENSION 281 
(1977). 
 18. See, e.g., Sancho v. U.S. Dept. of Energy, 578 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1269 (D. Haw. 
2008) (suit for injunction to stop the operation of the LHC dismissed for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction). 
 19. See generally Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV.
616 (1949) (marooned cave explorers kill and eat one of their own in order to survive, then face
murder charges).   
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operation. After that, I explore the judicial conundrums inherent in black-hole 
jurisprudence. Finally, I suggest new methods for judging the merits of cases of 
this kind.  
II. THE PHYSICISTS’ PURSUIT
A. The Laboratory 
The European Organization for Nuclear Research, known as “CERN,”20 is 
an intergovernmental organization with 20 member states.21 Founded in 1954,22
CERN occupies land astride the Franco-Swiss border in a valley between the 
Alps and the Jura Mountains.23 CERN’s purpose is to conduct basic science 
research in particle physics, a field also known as “high-energy physics.”24
As a laboratory, CERN is mammoth. CERN’s 2008 operating budget 
topped $900 million USD.25 CERN employs around 2,500 people,26 including 
 20. The “CERN” acronym derives from the entity’s provisional name, “Conseil européen 
pour la Recherche nucléaire.” While the acronym was retained, the entity’s name was changed 
in 1954 to “Organisation européenne pour la recherche nucléaire” or “European Organization 
for Nuclear Research.” CERN, Highlights of CERN History, http://press.web.cern.ch/ 
press/Journalists/CERNHistory.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2009).  
 21. CERN, CERN GENERAL BROCHURE 1 (2008), http://cdsmedia.cern.ch/img/CERN-
Brochure-2008-002-Eng.pdf. CERN’s member states are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. 
CERN, GENERAL INFORMATION 2008 1 (2008), http://cdsmedia.cern.ch/img/CERN-Brochure-
2008-009-Eng.pdf. The United States and other countries have status as observers. Id.
 22. See CERN, CERN FAQ LHC Convention for the Establishment of a European 
Organization for Nuclear Research, art. IX, July 1, 1953, CERN Libraries Geneva CM-
P00047703, available at http://doc.cern.ch/archive/electronic/other/preprints//CM-P/cm-
p00047703.pdf [hereinafter CERN Convention]; Agreement Between the Swiss Federal Council 
and the European Organization for Nuclear Research Concerning the Legal Status of that 
Organization in Switzerland, CERN-Switz., art. 2-4, 6, June 11, 1955, CERN/0115/Rev.3, 
available at http://documents.cern.ch/archive/electronic/other/legal/articles/LSL00000012.pdf 
[hereinafter CERN-Switz] (established legal status in Switzerland); Agreement Between the 
Government of the French Republic and the European Organization for Nuclear Research 
Concerning the Legal Status of the Said Organization in France, CERN-Fr., art. I-III, VI-VIII, 
Aug. 30, 1973, available at http://documents.cern.ch/archive/electronic/other/legal/articles/ 
LSL00000010.pdf [hereinafter CERN-Fr.] (established legal status in France). 
 23. CERN GENERAL BROCHURE, supra note 21, at 1.  
 24. Robert Aymar, Basic Science in a Competitive World, SYMMETRY, Aug. 2006, at 3;
C.H. Llewellyn Smith, The Use of Basic Science, CERN, http://public.web.cern.ch/public/ 
en/About/BasicScience1-en.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2009). 
 25. See CERN GENERAL INFORMATION, supra note 21, at 2 (indicating a 2008 budget 
expenditure of 910.9 million CHF). As of November 2009, a Swiss franc was worth about 0.99 
U.S. dollars. See CoinMill.com: The Currency Converter, http://coinmill.com/CHF_USD.html 
(last visited Nov. 30, 2009). 
 26. CERN, A Global Endeavour, http://public.web.cern.ch/public/en/About/Global-
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more than 1,000 engineers and scientists.27 CERN commands a transcendent 
role within the particle-physics community. Worldwide, nearly 9,000 physicists 
are officially involved in CERN’s experiments.28 CERN brags that “half the 
world’s particle physicists” come to CERN for their research.29
As an intergovernmental organization, CERN enjoys an elevated status in 
the world community. CERN has legal personality in all member states, and it 
enjoys immunity from legal process in its host countries.30 The organization is 
governed by the CERN Council, an assembly of representatives in which every 
member-state gets one vote, with most decisions requiring only a simple 
majority.31 Aiding the CERN Council is the Scientific Policy Committee, which 
passes on questions of scientific merit and makes recommendations regarding 
scientific programs.32 Day to day, CERN is managed by a director-general, who 
is appointed by the CERN Council.33
Work at CERN has garnered two Nobel prizes in physics.34 But CERN’s 
most famous accomplishment was not in physics, per se. In 1989, CERN 
physicist Tim Berners-Lee, an Englishman, invented a system of managing 
information by hyperlinking documents.35 Used on the internet, the system now 
bears the name he coined for it: the World Wide Web.36 Berners-Lee invented 
the Web because he was hoping to create a data-handling system that would be 
en.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2009). 
 27. CERN GENERAL INFORMATION, supra note 21, at 2. 
 28. Id.
 29. See CERN, supra note 26; see also Elizabeth Kolbert, Crash Course, THE NEW 
YORKER, May 14, 2007, at 68 (“Once the collider begins operating at full power . . . nearly half 
the particle physicists in the world will be involved in analyzing its four-million-megabyte-per-
hour stream of data.”). 
 30. See CERN Convention, supra note 22, art. IX; CERN-Switz., supra note 22, art. 2–4, 
6; CERN-Fr., supra note 22, art. I –III, VI–VIII. 
 31. See CERN, CERN’s structure, http://public.web.cern.ch/public/en/About/Structure-
en.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2009). 
 32. Id.
 33. Id.
 34. In 1992, Georges Charpak of CERN won the Nobel Prize in Physics for his inventions 
in the field of particle detectors, particularly the multiwire proportional chamber, and in 1984, 
Carlo Rubbia and Simon van der Meer shared the Nobel Prize in Physics for the discovery of 
the W and Z particles. See CERN, supra note 20; see also The Nobel Prize in Physics 1992, The 
Nobel Foundation, http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/physics/laureates/1992/ (last visited Nov. 
30, 2009); The Nobel Prize in Physics 1984, The Nobel Foundation, http://nobelprize.org/ 
nobel_prizes/physics/laureates/1984/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2009). 
 35. See About W3C History, The World Wide Web Consortium, http://www.w3.org/ 
Consortium (last visited Nov. 30, 2009); Tim Berners-Lee, Information Management: A 
Proposal, The World Wide Web Consortium, March 1989, http://www.w3.org/History/1989/
proposal.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2009).  
 36. About W3C History, supra note 35. 
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capable of managing a gargantuan project: a proposed particle accelerator, the 
LHC.37
B. The Machine 
The LHC has been a long time coming. CERN began drafting plans in the 
early 1980s for a new particle accelerator to succeed its Large Electron–
Positron Collider.38 The new machine would collide protons and lead ions—
collectively known as “hadrons.”39 The fact that hadrons are much more 
massive than the electrons and positrons used in the old machine would allow 
the new accelerators to achieve collisions at the highest energies.40 In 1991, 
CERN made the decision to begin construction.41 The LHC program has 
subsequently consumed CERN, becoming the laboratory’s main focus. Today, 
only a very limited non-LHC program remains at CERN.42
Hopes are that the LHC may answer key unresolved questions in particle 
physics.43 One such question concerns whether there are extra hidden spatial 
dimensions to the universe.44 Another question regards the fundamental nature 
of mass—the secret of which is believed to be held by the Higgs boson, a 
particle predicted by theory but never observed.45 Another aim of the LHC is to 
look for what constitutes the mysterious “dark matter” and “dark energy” that 
makes up 96% of the known universe.46 The LHC project also seeks to unlock 
secrets of the Big Bang by recreating conditions similar to those that occurred 
within the first few moments of time after the universe’s explosive birth.47 As a 
matter of fact, the LHC will create conditions that have not existed in the 
universe for 14 billion years.48
For such big questions, CERN has built a big machine. CERN proclaims it 
is “the largest machine in the world.”49 Indeed, the LHC is unprecedented in 
size, power, and cost. The accelerator is 26.7 kilometers in circumference,50
buried under the land at an average depth of 100 meters.51 Cooled by 60 metric 
 37. See Berners-Lee, supra note 35. 
 38. See CERN, CERN FAQ LHC: THE GUIDE 16 (2008), available at 
http://cdsmedia.cern.ch/img/CERN-Brochure-2008-001-Eng.pdf.  
 39. Id. at 7, 13–19. 
 40. Id. at 19. 
 41. Id. at 16. 
 42. Id. at 4, 15–19. 
 43. See CERN, supra note 7. 
 44. See id.
 45. See id.
 46. See id.
 47. See id. 
 48. DON LINCOLN, THE QUANTUM FRONTIER: THE LARGE HADRON COLLIDER, at xii (2009) 
(quoting Edward “Rocky” Kolb, professor of astrophyics at the University of Chicago). 
 49. CERN, supra note 1. 
 50. Id.
 51. CERN, Journey 100 Metres Towards the Centre of the Earth, http://public.web. 
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tons of superfluid helium,52 the LHC will consume about 120 million watts of 
power—approximately the same amount used by all households in Geneva.53
Two beams of hadrons, one beam going clockwise, the other counter-
clockwise,54 will each be accelerated to 99.9999991% of the speed of light.55
Where the beams cross and hadrons collide, the LHC will produce the hottest 
temperatures in the galaxy.56 Massive detectors, the largest as wide as a 
battleship, half the length of a football field, and as heavy as 40 diesel 
locomotives,57 will measure the resulting subatomic splatter.58 The magnets of 
just one detector contain more iron than the Eiffel Tower.59
As impressive as these facts are, the LHC’s most important superlatives 
relate to its physics power. The machine will achieve much higher collision 
energies than any previous accelerator, leading scientists to talk in terms of a 
new energy range they have termed the “terascale.”60 In fact, the LHC has been 
designed to outperform competing particle colliders in two different 
experimental categories. In the proton-proton mode, the LHC will accelerate 
two beams of protons in opposite directions at 7 teraelectronvolts (“TeV”) 
each.61 The beams will thus collide with a combined energy of 14 TeV, a total 
that is seven times greater than what can be produced by the LHC’s nearest 
rival, the Tevatron at Fermilab in Batavia, Illinois, west of Chicago.62 In the 
other mode of operation, colliding heavy atomic nuclei in its “ALICE”63 heavy-
ion experiment, the LHC will outdo a different accelerator, the Relativistic 
Heavy Ion Collider, or “RHIC” (pronounced “rick”) at Brookhaven National 
Laboratory on Long Island, NY.64 In the ALICE/heavy-ion mode, the LHC will 
cern.ch/Public/en/Spotlight/SpotlightCMS2-en.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2009).  
 52. CERN, supra note 1. 
 53. CERN, supra note 38, at 47. 
 54. CERN, supra note 38, at 15. 
 55. See id. at 52. 
 56. See CERN, supra note 1. 
 57. CERN, supra note 38, at 39; LHC News: Final ATLAS Detector Installation 
Completes World's Largest Jigsaw Puzzle, SCIENTIFICBLOGGING SCIENCE 2.0, http://www. 
scientificblogging.com/news_releases/lhc_news_final_atlas_detector_installation_completes_w
orlds_largest_jigsaw_puzzle (last visited Nov. 30, 2009) (the ATLAS detector is 46 meters long, 
25 meters high and wide, and weighs 7000 metric tons). 
 58. CERN, supra note 38, at 37–46. 
 59. Id. at 52. 
 60. PARTICLE PHYSICS PROJECT PRIORITIZATION PANEL, US PARTICLE PHYSICS: SCIENTIFIC 
OPPORTUNITIES, A STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE NEXT TEN YEARS 2 (2008), http://www.er. 
doe.gov/hep/files/pdfs/P5_Report%2006022008.pdf.  
 61. CERN, supra note 38, at 18. 
 62. Id. at 18, 21; C. Amsler et al., Review of Particle Physics, 667 PHYSICS LETTERS B 3 
(2008), available at http://pdg.lbl.gov/2008/reviews/collidersrpp.pdf. Fermilab is the U.S. 
Department of Energy’s Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory. Fermilab, U.S. Department of 
Energy, http://www.fnal.gov (last visited Nov. 30, 2009). 
 63. ALICE stands for “A Large Ion Collider Experiment.” CERN, supra note 38, at 38. 
 64. Amsler et al., supra note 62, at 3. 
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collide the nuclei of lead atoms to yield 28 times the energy achievable at 
RHIC—a feat eagerly anticipated as the greatest energy leap in the history of 
particle physics.65
The proton-proton mode is the experimental endeavor that is associated 
with the theoretical black-hole disaster.66 The LHC/ALICE experiment and the 
heavy-ion collisions of the RHIC are associated with a distinct doomsday 
scenario, the strangelet catastrophe.67
Putting a price tag on the LHC is difficult to do. Estimates vary, but the 
kind of raw power possessed by the LHC does not come cheap. The LHC 
machine itself, including the accelerator rings and detector arrays—what you 
might call the hardware—represents a cost that appears to be a minimum of 
about $10 billion USD.68 The cost of the full LHC program, which includes 
operating the experiment and analyzing the data, is much greater.69 If one added 
the cost of repurposed infrastructure from the LEP program, which includes the 
tunnel inhabited by the LHC, the cost would be greater still. 
C. The Payoff 
So, with its voracious appetite for electricity, labor, money, and talent, what 
benefit does the LHC promise to deliver?  
CERN supporters would say that the LHC program is part of one of the 
greatest, if not the single greatest, intellectual adventure in human history—the 
quest to understand nature at its most fundamental level. Detractors would say 
that the LHC, despite its enormous expense, is virtually bereft of any practical 
utility. Who is right? Both are.  
As an effort of pure science, the LHC was not designed to have any 
practical utility. In this regard, particle-physics experimentation has much in 
common with space exploration. Historically, human space flight has spun off 
some valuable technologies—as has particle-physics experimentation. Proton 
therapy for cancer patients, for instance, is a particle-physics byproduct.70 And 
then there is the Web.71 But useful spinoffs are the exception rather than the 
 65. See Edwin Norbeck et al., Exotic Physics at the LHC with CASTOR in CMS, 16 INT’L
J. MOD. PHYSICS E 2451, 2452 (2007), available at http://omega.physics.uiowa.edu/HEP/ 
Files/Talks/CR2007_013.pdf.  
 66. See Part IV, infra.
 67. See Part III.A, infra.
 68. See CERN, supra note 38, at 17. But see Sancho v. U.S. Dept. of Energy, 578 F. 
Supp. 2d 1258, 1262 (D. Haw. 2008) (citing affidavit putting cost at $5.84 billion). 
 69. See CERN, supra note 38, at 17; CERN GENERAL INFORMATION, supra note 21, at 2; 
see also Sancho, 578 F. Supp. 2d at 1262. 
 70. Jeremy N.A. Matthews, Accelerators Shrink to Meet Growing Demand for Proton 
Therapy, PHYSICS TODAY, March 2009, at 22, available at http://ptonline.aip.org/journals/doc/ 
PHTOAD-ft/vol_62/iss_3/22_1.shtml. 
 71. See About W3C History, supra note 35. 
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rule. The raison d'être for particle colliders is achieving a better understanding 
of nature—an endeavor that is intended to be its own reward. 
Physics has been described as an effort to “unmask the cosmos.”72 Its 
importance, to its practitioners, is plain. Perhaps the most well-known 
expression of physicists’ sentiment is a quote attributed to Ernest Rutherford: 
“Science is physics; everything else is postage stamp collecting.”73
The “Holy Grail,”74 according to physicists, would be the theory of 
everything.75 Stephen Hawking has explained that a fully realized unified 
theory of nature “may not aid the survival of our species. It may not even affect 
our lifestyle.”76 But, “[h]umanity’s deepest desire for knowledge is justification 
enough for continuing our quest.”77 As physicist and mathematician Henri 
Poincaré pointed out long ago, “The scientist does not study nature because it is 
useful to do so. He studies it because he takes pleasure in it and he takes 
pleasure in it because it is beautiful.”78
While the LHC’s start up is greeted by scientists as “unbelievably 
exciting,”79 there are no guarantees of what will be found. Fermilab physicist 
Don Lincoln wrote that the LHC will make the universe “slightly less 
mysterious.”80 Precisely what knowledge will be gleaned, however, is 
unknown. As Lincoln explained: “We will see what we see. Interesting, 
fascinating, or disappointing.”81
Even supposing the LHC is highly successful and provides a significant 
step on the road to a final theory, the LHC will, nevertheless, not get scientists 
all the way there. According to CERN physicist Michelangelo Mangano, 
“[w]hatever new physics is observed at the LHC, its understanding will require 
higher statistics and higher energies.”82
In sum, the LHC is expected to have a handsome payoff in knowledge of 
fundamental particle physics, but there is no actual chance of hitting the 
 72. See BRIAN GREENE, THE FABRIC OF THE COSMOS 22 (Alfred Knopf 2004) (“[A]s we’ve 
continued to unmask the cosmos, we’ve gained the intimacy that comes only from closing in on 
the clarity of truth. The explorations have far to go, but to many it feels as though our species is 
finally reaching childhood’s end.”). 
 73. Kolbert, supra note 29, at 68 (quoting Ernest Rutherford). 
 74. GREENE, supra note 13, at 15. 
 75. Id.
 76. STEPHEN HAWKING, A BRIEFER HISTORY OF TIME 18 (Bantam Dell 2005). 
 77. Id.
 78. LINCOLN, supra note 48, at xii. 
 79. Id. at 43. 
 80. Id. at 25. 
 81. Id.
 82. Michelangelo L. Mangano, Physics Goals for Future Hadron Accelerators, 2nd HHH 
Workshop, Arcidosso 36 (2005), http://care-hhh.web.cern.ch/care-hhh/lumi-05/Plenary%20 
Talks%20Wednesday/Mangano-HHH05.pdf.; see also LINCOLN, supra note 48, at ix (quoting 
Leon Lederman, winner of the 1988 Nobel prize in physics, “research creates new knowledge, 
which enables the creation of new instruments, which make possible the discovery of new 
knowledge”). 
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physics-theory jackpot. Whatever the outcome, the LHC will not be the final 
word in physics experimentation.  
Unless, of course, it destroys the planet. 
III. FEAR IN MANY FORMS
Understanding the black-hole controversy requires understanding its 
context. Particle physics has faced a long series of public-relations problems—
the concern over synthetic black holes being merely the most recent. Particle 
physicists have worked repeatedly to try to tamp down anxieties about a parade 
of disaster scenarios tied to physics experimentation. At the same time, particle 
physicists have labored to build excitement among politicians and taxpayers for 
a scientific pursuit that is both extremely arcane and wildly expensive. Fear 
abounds on all sides. Critics, of course, fear that particle-physics experiments 
will annihilate humanity. At the same time, particle physicists fear that 
humanity will annihilate their experiments.83
The angst felt by the physics community is not trivial. One top CERN 
physicist said that most of CERN’s member-nation governments are 
“desperately waiting for the right opportunity to shut down the place.”84
“There is nobody fighting for this to survive, to continue,” he said.85 “We 
have to fight ourselves—the physicists.”86
A. The Strange Matter on Long Island 
Besides black holes, the leading disaster scenario for particle-physics 
experimentation is the strangelet scenario. According to theory, a strangelet is 
a tiny, stable chunk of “strange matter.”87 Undoubtedly, a “strangelet” sounds 
much less frightening than a black hole. In fact, it sounds something like a 
benevolent character from the Pokémon anime series. But the cute name belies 
the theorized danger.  
The fear is that if high-energy particle collisions created a strangelet, the 
object would initiate a chain reaction that would convert all of Earth and 
everything on it into “an inert hyperdense sphere about one hundred metres 
across.”88
 83. John Ellis, CERN Colloquium: The LHC Is Safe (Aug. 14, 2008), available at 
http://cdsweb.cern.ch/record/1120625 (beginning at 43 min.).  
 84. Video Recording: Global Catastrophic Risks Conference, Expected and Unexpected 
in the Exploration of the Fundamental Laws of Nature (Michelangelo L. Mangano 2008), 
available at http://vimeo.com/4704040 (address at University of Oxford Future of Humanity 
Institute) (beginning at 41 min.). 
 85. Id.
 86. Id.
 87. See W. BUSZA ET. AL., REVIEW OF SPECULATIVE ‘DISASTER SCENARIOS’ AT RHIC 3
(1999), available at http://www.bnl.gov/rhic/docs/rhicreport.pdf.  
 88. MARTIN REES, OUR FINAL HOUR: A SCIENTIST’S WARNING: HOW TERROR, ERROR, AND 
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Ironically, the strangelet controversy seems to have been touched off by a 
physicist trying to allay fears of a black-hole disaster. In 1999, when the RHIC 
on Long Island was getting ready to start up for the first time, concerns were 
voiced that the RHIC might create black holes.  A Scientific American reader 
named Walter Wagner put these concerns in a letter to the editor.89 The 
magazine then published the letter in the July 1999 issue, along with a response 
by Frank Wilczek, a Princeton physicist who was later awarded the Nobel 
Prize.90 Wilczek opined that it was not credible that the RHIC might produce 
black holes.91 Then, apparently as an afterthought, he went on to say, “On the 
other hand, there is a speculative but quite respectable possibility that 
subatomic chunks of a new stable form of matter called strangelets might be 
produced[.]”92
Although Wilczek concluded in his comment that an actual strangelet 
disaster was “not plausible,”93 questions about the safety of RHIC proliferated 
in the media. 
Before the end of the month,94 the director of the Brookhaven lab asked for 
a report addressing concerns about the RHIC from a committee of four 
scientists—Wit Busza and Robert L. Jaffe of MIT, Jack Sandweiss of Yale, and 
the inadvertent rabble-rouser Wilczek.95 The resulting report, dated September 
28, 1999, concluded that the possibility of a strangelet disaster was “firmly 
excluded” on theoretical grounds.96 Additionally, the report authors found that 
on the basis of empirical evidence they could “decisively rule out” the 
strangelet doomsday scenario.97
That empirical evidence is cognizable through what is called the “cosmic 
ray argument.”98 Cosmic rays, despite their name, are actually particles—ones 
that move at ultra-fast velocities through space as they are accelerated by 
magnetic fields all over the galaxy.99 The RHIC defenders pointed out that 
ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTER THREATEN HUMANKIND’S FUTURE IN THIS CENTURY—ON EARTH AND 
BEYOND 121 (Basic Books 2003). 
 89. Walter L. Wagner, Letter to the Editor, Black Holes at Brookhaven, SCI. AM., July 
1999, at 8.
 90. Id.; Frank Wilczek, Letter to the Editor, reply to Black Holes at Brookhaven, SCI. AM.,
July 1999, at 8; The Nobel Prize in Physics 2001, The Nobel Foundation, 
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/physics/laureates/2004/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2009). 
 91. See Wilczek, supra note 90, at 8. 
 92. Id.
 93. Id.
 94. See Mona S. Rowe, Statement on Committee Review of Speculative “Disaster 
Scenarios” at Brookhaven Lab’s RHIC, Brookhaven National Laboratory (Oct. 6, 1999) http://
www.bnl.gov/rhic/disaster.htm. 
 95. BUSZA ET AL., supra note 87, at 1.  
 96. Id. at 19. 
 97. Id. at 10. 
 98. See generally id. The report argues that if the strangelet disaster were going to destroy 
the earth, then cosmic rays would have produced the theoretical disaster long ago. 
 99. R.A. Mewaldt, Cosmic Rays, CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, http://www. 
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everything in the galaxy is constantly bombarded with huge numbers of cosmic 
rays.100 The defenders reasoned that since cosmic ray collisions mimic what 
particle accelerators do artificially, the survival of the Moon and other 
astronomical objects, despite innumerable cosmic-ray collisions, constitutes 
evidence that accelerators must be safe.101
Around the same time, a separate panel of physicists wrote a paper probing 
the strangelet scenario. They likewise concluded that the RHIC was safe.102
That paper, completed in August 1999 and published as a pre-print in October 
1999, was authored by three theoretical physicists at CERN. They wrote, 
“[O]ur extremely conservative conclusion is that it is safe to run RHIC for 500 
million years.”103
After these reports were circulated, media interest in the question of risk 
from the RHIC died down.  
It was later revealed, however, by a physicist at Cambridge University, that 
both the CERN paper and the Busza report contained serious conceptual 
mathematical errors that unfairly downplayed the risk posed by operating the 
RHIC.104 Media interest, however, did not resurface. 
In 2000, a physicist named Francesco Calogero carefully ventured some of 
his own thoughts on the matter. A theoretician with the University of Roma–La 
Sapienza, Calogero had previously served as Secretary General of the Pugwash 
Conferences on Science and Human Affairs and accepted the 1995 Nobel 
Peace Prize on behalf of the Conference.105 In his paper, Calogero criticized the 
findings of experts on the issues of RHIC safety, pointing to bias, a lack of 
scientific objectivity, and an overarching preoccupation with the public-
relations consequences of what is said.106
Specifically, Calogero wrote that the reports on RHIC safety issues 
occasionally gave him “the impression that they are biased towards allaying 
fears ‘beyond reasonable doubt.’”107 He continued:  
I am also somewhat disturbed by what I perceive to be the lack of candour in 
discussing these matters of many people—including several friends and 
colleagues with whom I have had private discussions and exchanges of 
srl.caltech.edu/personnel/dick/cos_encyc.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2009).  
 100. BUSZA ET AL., supra note 87, at 20. 
 101. Id. at 5, 24.  
 102. Arnon Dar et al., Will Relativistic Heavy-ion Colliders Destroy Our Planet?, 470
PHYSICS LETTERS B 142, 142, 148 (1999) [hereinafter Dar], available at http://arxiv.org/abs/ 
hep-ph/9910471v1.  
 103. Id. at 146.  
 104. See discussion infra Part VII.B. 
 105. See Francesco Calogero, Might a Laboratory Experiment Destroy Planet Earth?, 25
INTERDISCIPLINARY SCI. REVS. 191, 202 (2000); The Nobel Peace Prize 1995, The Nobel 
Foundation, http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1995/index.html (last visited 
Nov. 30, 2009). The prize was awarded for Pugwash’s efforts toward nuclear disarmament. Id.
 106. Calogero, supra note 105, at 198. 
 107. Id. at 192.  
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messages—although I do understand their motivations. Many, indeed most, 
of them seem to me to be more concerned with the public relations impact of 
what they, or others, say and write, than in making sure that the facts are 
presented with complete scientific objectivity.108
Another person who took strangelets seriously was legal scholar and U.S. 
federal appellate judge Richard A. Posner, who wrote about the RHIC at some 
length in a 2004 book, Catastrophe: Risk and Response.109 On the basis of a 
cost-benefit analysis he performed, Posner concluded that the RHIC was likely 
not worth the risk.110
The strangelet controversy is not limited to the RHIC. When CERN 
operates the LHC in heavy-ion mode using its ALICE detector, the triggering of 
a strangelet catastrophe is arguably a possibility there as well. Thus, it should 
be noted that the CERN team’s paper championing the RHIC’s safety was not 
necessarily a transatlantic act of selflessness.  
Whether the LHC’s ALICE/heavy-ion program will put the Earth at 
additional risk of a strangelet conversion is an interesting question, but one that 
is beyond the scope of this article.  
As odd as black holes and strangelets are, they are not the only disasters 
hypothesized by CERN’s detractors. Others are even weirder. 
B. Even Worse Than Destroying the Earth 
Besides black holes and strangelets, there are three other catastrophic 
accident scenarios advanced as reasons to shut down the LHC. They are worth 
mention here because they have all been cited in LHC-injunction litigation.111
Moreover, each of these additional scenarios commands its own share of 
macabre fascination. They are: magnetic monopoles, a bosenova, and a vacuum 
transition. 
The magnetic monopole sounds perhaps even more benign than the 
pluckily named strangelet. But, according to hypothesis, a magnetic monopole 
would be just as lethal to the planet.112 The worry is that a particle accelerator 
might produce a tiny bit of matter that is magnetically active, but only has one 
magnetic pole—that is, it would contain a net magnetic charge.113 Where 
 108. Id. at 198.  
 109. RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE (Oxford Univ. Press 2004). 
 110. Id. at 142. Posner’s economic and mathematical analysis is discussed in some detail in 
Part VI., Section C, infra.
 111. Complaint for Temporary Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction, and Permanent 
Injunction at 3-10, Sancho v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 578 F. Supp. 2d 1258 (D. Haw. 2008) (No. 
00136-HG-KSC Civ. 08) [hereinafter Complaint]. 
 112. CERN, The Safety of the LHC, http://public.web.cern.ch/public/en/LHC/Safety-
en.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2009).  
 113. See Hangwen Guo, Magnetic Monopoles 1, http://moreo.phys.utk.edu/adriana/ 
electro08/guo.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2009). 
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ordinary magnets have both a “north” and a “south” pole, the magnetic 
monopole would, for example, have only a north pole.  
Once produced, the fear is that a magnetic monopole would cause the 
protons in normal atoms to decay, initiating a runaway process that would 
convert and destroy the ordinary matter making up the Earth114—eating it up, in 
the words of a CERN theorist, “Pac-Man style.”115
The argument that we have nothing to worry about from magnetic 
monopoles is the same as that for strangelets: If it were possible for the LHC to 
produce such dangerous particles, cosmic rays hitting the Earth’s atmosphere 
would have produced them long ago.116
The bosenova (pronounced “BOE-suh-NO-vah”) (or “bose-supernova”) 
scenario predicts a lesser harm than destruction of the entire planet. Instead, the 
hypothesized harm would be like a small version of an exploding star, 
destroying only a piece of Switzerland and France.117
The alleged danger in this scenario is not the particle collisions themselves 
but the LHC’s magnet refrigeration system and, in particular, its superfluid 
liquid-helium coolant.118 It is this coolant which would hypothetically blow up 
supernova-style.119 The worry stems from the fact that the ultra-cold helium is a 
kind of Bose-Einstein condensate,120 a form of matter with exotic properties, 
which, when hit with powerful magnetic waves, can be made to explode.121
The bosenova disaster scenario does not have the pedigree of the other 
disaster scenarios; it seems to be almost entirely the work of Alan Gillis, a 
blogger who focuses on science issues.122 In a paper posted in September 2008, 
two theoretical physicists at CERN, Malcolm Fairbairn and Bob McElrath, 
wrote that a bosenova cannot happen at the LHC, in part because rubidium, the 
 114. CERN, supra note 112; Complaint, supra note 111, at 4.  
 115. Ellis, supra note 83 (beginning at 20 min.). 
 116. See CERN, supra note 112. 
 117. Implosion and Explosion of a Bose-Einstein Condensate “Bosenova,” National 
Institute of Standards and Technology, http://www.nist.gov/public_affairs/bosenova.htm (last 
visited Nov. 30, 2009).  
 118. See Malcolm Fairbairn & Bob McElrath, There Is No Explosion Risk Associated with 
Superfluid Helium in the LHC Cooling System, ARXIV:POP-PH/0809.4004v1, Sept. 23, 2008, at 
1, http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/0809/0809.4004v1.pdf. 
 119. Id.
 120. Id.
 121. See Implosion and Explosion of a Bose-Einstein Condensate “Bosenova,” supra note 
117.
 122. See Posting of Alan Gillis, Interview: Professor Otto Rössler Takes on the LHC, to 
Scientific Blogging, http://www.scientificblogging.com/big_science_gambles/interview_ 
professor_otto_rossler_takes_on_the_lhc (Aug. 12, 2008, 8:22 p.m.); Posting of Alan Gillis, 
Superfluids, BECs and Bosenovas: The Ultimate Experiment, to Scientific Blogging, http:// 
www.scientificblogging.com/big_science_gambles/superfluids_becs_and_bosenovas_the_ultim
ate_experiment (July 2, 2008, 10:53 p.m.); Posting of Alan Gillis, The Almost Thermonuclear 
LHC, to Science of Conundrums: The Impact of Megascience, http://bigsciencenews.blogspot. 
com/2008/03/almost-thermonuclear-lhc.html (Mar. 17, 2008, 12:43 p.m.). 
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one substance in which a bosenova has been observed, is too different from 
helium.123
The vacuum transition scenario, also called the “vacuum bubble” or 
“space transition” scenario, has the unique distinction of portending something 
even worse than the annihilation of Earth. Specifically, a vacuum transition 
would destroy the entire universe.124
The possibility of a vacuum transition was suggested in 1984 by Piet Hut of 
Princeton’s Institute for Advanced Study.125 How could such a thing happen? 
Physicists consider empty space—“the vacuum”—to not just be a void, but to 
actually be something.126 With the vacuum being a thing, as opposed to the 
absence of all things, the concern is that it might not be very stable.127 Perhaps 
the vacuum’s stability is, for instance, like a house of cards, stable until some 
movement shifts just one card, at which point the whole structure comes apart. 
The worry with regard to the LHC is that one of the accelerator’s high-energy 
particle collisions might shift the fabric of space and time into a more stable 
state, a “vacuum bubble.”128 The universe would not disappear altogether in 
such an event, but it would cease to survive as we know it, and humanity would 
pop out of existence.129
CERN’s argument against the possibility of a vacuum transition is, once 
again, the same as its argument concerning strangelets and monopoles: natural 
collisions of cosmic rays in our atmosphere would have already triggered such a 
disaster if it were possible for LHC collisions to do so.130
C. The Quiet on the Texas Prairie 
Despite all the doomsday scenarios described above, there is essentially 
only one kind of catastrophe that all particle physicists take seriously. It is a 
disaster of a different sort, where the only death is a figurative one: project 
cancellation.  
No aborted experiment has ever left a deeper scar on the physics 
community than the United States Congress’s abandonment of the 
Superconducting Supercollider (“SSC”).131
 123. Fairbairn & McElrath, supra note 118, at 2–3. 
 124. Piet Hut & Martin J. Rees, How Stable Is Our Vacuum?, 303 NATURE 508, 508 (1983)
(“[The currently prevailing vacuum state] might suddenly disappear if a bubble of real vacuum 
formed which was large enough for the bulk energy gain . . . to exceed the surface energy 
density in walls.”). 
 125. See Piet Hut, Is It Safe to Disturb the Vacuum?, 418 NUCLEAR PHYSICS A301 (1984). 
 126. See, e.g., BUSZA ET AL., supra note 87, at 2. 
 127. Hut & Rees, supra note 124, at 508. 
 128. See Hut, supra note 125, at 301–02; Hut & Rees, supra note 124, at 508.   
 129. See Hut, supra note 125, at 301–02; Hut & Rees, supra note 124, at 508. 
 130. See Hut, supra note 125, at 306–08. 
 131. See Jeffery Mervis, Scientists Are Long Gone, but Bitter Memories Remain, SCIENCE,
Oct. 3, 2003, at 40. 
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Construction on the SSC began in the early 1990s near Waxahachie, Texas, 
just south of Dallas.132
The SSC would have dwarfed the LHC.133 A 52-mile oval tunnel—about 
the size of the Washington Beltway—would have accelerated two streams of 
protons in opposite directions at energies of 20 TeV (20 trillion electron volts) 
each, resulting in a collision energy of 40 TeV.134 The SSC would have had the 
raw power to virtually guarantee big discoveries, including the Higgs boson.135
But in October 1993 Congress cancelled the project, writing off the $2 billion it 
had already spent.136
The former SSC site is now an odd sort of historical monument on the 
Texas scrubland.137 The large buildings left over from the project have found 
employment in a series of odd jobs. At one point, the site served as a warehouse 
for the Ellis County government, storing things like styrofoam cups.138 In 1999, 
the magnet building was used as the setting for a supercomputer that 
commanded a robot army in a movie called Universal Solider II.139 Meanwhile, 
deep underground, some 18 miles of tunnels have presumably flooded with 
groundwater.140 In the future, the site may be used as a remote data storage 
center.141
The SSC episode left particle physicists with “bitter memories and sharp 
recriminations.”142 The cancellation “continues to cast a pall over their field.”143
Even a decade afterward, one particle physicist said graduate students were 
“staying away in droves,” while established researchers were migrating to other 
subject areas.144
One member of the SSC community remarked poignantly on the suffering 
borne by SSC-project scientists:  
These people and their families suffered both financially and emotionally. 
Not only did they have to deal with rather suddenly losing their jobs, they 
also had to deal with the disappearance of most of the jobs in their field, as 
 132. Jeffery Mervis & Charles Seife, Lots of Reasons, but Few Lessons, SCIENCE, Oct. 3, 
2003, at 38. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See STEVEN WEINBERG, DREAMS OF A FINAL THEORY 270 (Pantheon Books 1992); 
Charles Seife, Physics Tries to Leave the Tunnel, SCIENCE, OCT. 3, 2003, at 36 (2003).  
 135. Mervis & Seife, supra note 132, at 39. 
 136. Id. at 38. 
 137. Mervis, supra note 131.  
 138. Id. at 40.  
 139. Id.
 140. Id.
 141. See Christine Perez, GVA Cawley to Market Former Super Collider Site, DALLAS BUS.
J., Aug. 18, 2006, http://dallas.bizjournals.com/dallas/stories/2006/08/21/newscolumn6.html.  
 142. Mervis & Seife, supra note 132, at 38. 
 143. Seife, supra note 134, at 37. 
 144. Id. at 37. 
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universities cut back on their particle physics hiring . . . . The toll on our 
friends demoralized many in the field.145
The SSC’s backers saw several factors that led to the collider’s demise.146
At least part of the blame has been placed on the fact that the physicists did not 
stick together. There were tensions within the physics community,147 and a 
rivalry was kindled with Fermilab.148 Moreover, some non-particle physicists 
spoke out against the SSC with the hope of getting some of the liberated funds 
if the project was cancelled.149 As it happened, they did not.150
The lesson of the SSC was clear. To keep projects safe from cancellation in 
the future, physicists would have to pull together and work to stay one step 
ahead of political threats—lest particle physics be plunged into darkness. 
IV. THE DARK MENACE
The scientific issues at the heart of the black-hole question are exceedingly 
complicated. Particle physicists as much as acknowledge that only particle 
physicists have the training to understand the subject matter.151 But it is 
certainly possible to sketch an outline of the controversy that is readily 
understandable. The scientific aspects are quite interesting—as are the human 
aspects.  
One clear theme in the story is the pitting of insiders against outsiders. All 
particle physicists seem to be united in contending that there is no black-hole 
danger. The critics come from outside that circle, the most prominent of which 
are an astrophysicist, a chaos theoretician, and a mathematics professor.152
The other most salient theme that emerges is the demands of time. Pro-
safety arguments do not evolve independently out of disinterested academic 
discourse; rather, such arguments are commissioned in response to media 
attention and published to meet accelerator-program schedules. Moreover, there 
is a repeating pattern of retreat and refortification in arguing the case for the 
safety of particle colliders. Arguments that are initially offered as unsusceptible 
to doubt are quietly abandoned when weaknesses are exposed. The new 
arguments are offered with the same sense of resolute conviction.  
Understanding the controversy, however, must begin with trying to 
understand the thing at the center of it all—the most terrifying object humanity 
has ever comprehended: the black hole.   
 145. Spencer Klein, Letter to the Editor: The Human Cost of the SSC, SCIENCE, Dec. 12, 
2003, at 1893.
 146. See Mervis & Seife, supra note 132, at 39. 
 147. See id.
 148. See id.
 149. Id.
 150. Id.
 151. Ellis, supra note 83 (beginning at 3 min.). 
 152. See discussion infra Parts IV.D., E., H. 
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A. Behind the Event Horizon 
The idea of an object exerting such enormous gravitational force that light 
could not escape was proposed as far back as 1783, when such a thing was 
referred to as a “dark star.”153 The term “black hole” was coined in the modern 
era by Princeton and University of Texas at Austin physicist John A. 
Wheeler.154 As now understood by modern physics, a black hole is a spherical-
shaped region of space within which the force of gravity is so strong that 
nothing—neither matter, nor light, nor information—can escape.155 The 
overwhelming force of gravity causes all the matter inside a black hole to be 
squeezed down to an infinitely dense point at the dead center of the black hole, 
the “singularity.”156
An object of any mass, if it is made small and dense enough, can form a 
black hole. The nine-pound, four-volume set of Blackstone’s Commentaries on 
the Laws of England would form a black hole if reduced to about 10 
septillionths the size of a grain of sand.157
Black holes have unique effects on the matter that comes their way. If you 
were to jump into a black hole feet first, your feet would feel the force of 
gravity more strongly since your feet would be closer to the singularity than 
your head.158 These differential effects of gravity at varying distances, called 
“tidal forces,” would force your feet to fall faster than your head.159 Eventually, 
the tidal forces would become so great that you would be stretched out like 
spaghetti, your body ripped vertically into shreds.160
 153. See John Michell, On the Means of Discovering the Distance, Magnitude, &c. of the 
Fixed Stars, in Consequence of the Diminutions of the Velocity of Their Light, in Case Such a 
Diminution Should be Found to Take Place in Any of Them, and Such Other Data Should be 
Procured From Observations, as Would be Farther Necessary for that Purpose, 74 PHIL. PROC.
OF THE ROYAL SOC’Y 35 (1784); see also LEONARD SUSSKIND, THE BLACK HOLE WARS 24-49 
(Little Brown & Co. 2008). 
 154. See KENNETH W. FORD, THE QUANTUM WORLD: QUANTUM PHYSICS FOR EVERYONE 
233 (Harvard Univ. Press 2004); Dennis Overbye, Physicist Who Coined the Term ‘Black Hole,’ 
Is Dead at 96, N.Y. TIMES, April 14, 2008, at B7, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/
04/14/science/14wheeler.html.  
 155. But see infra Part IV.D. 
 156. See Norton, supra note 14. 
 157. You can calculate the Schwarzschild radius, i.e., the black hole’s radius from the 
singularity to the event horizon, for any object for which you know the mass. Where M is the 
mass of the object, RSch is the Schwarzschild radius, c is the speed of light, and G is Newton’s 
gravitational constant, the radius is found with the equation: RSch = (2MG) / c2. See Mario 
Rabinowitz, Black Hole Paradoxes, in TRENDS IN BLACK HOLE RESEARCH 6 (Paul V. Kreitler 
ed., 2006). Here is the equation with the constants filled in, where M is expressed in kilograms 
and RSch is in meters: RSch = (2M (6.67 × 10í11)) / (3.00 × 108)2. See Jearl Walker, 
FUNDAMENTALS OF PHYSICS A-3 (8th ed., 2008) (listing values for physical constants).  
 158. GREENE, supra note 13, at 80. 
 159. Id.
 160. Id.; HAWKING, supra note 76, at 81. 
838 TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:819 
The idea of black holes is so horrifying that, in the beginning, physicists 
were skeptical that black holes might actually exist outside the imaginations of 
theorists.161 Einstein famously refused to believe in their existence, even though 
it was his theory of special relativity that predicted them.162
But black holes do exist. Astronomers have now found black holes all over 
the universe.163 Of course, the evidence is indirect. Because they do not allow 
light to escape, black holes cannot be seen directly.164 What astronomers do see, 
however, is the intense light and x-rays generated as a black hole shears off the 
outer layers of a nearby star, accelerating the gas to nearly the speed of light 
while squeezing it into the gyre.165
B. For the Foreseeable Future 
In 1999, when questions floated in the media about accelerator-produced 
black holes, physicists issued an assurance that no particle collider in the 
foreseeable future would have enough power to accomplish such a feat.166
That conclusion came out of analysis performed by the authors of the 
Busza report, which was done in anticipation of the commencement of RHIC 
operations.167 The report did a rough analysis of the particle collisions that 
would occur at RHIC and the gravitational effects that might result.168 The 
Busza team found that the forces created by the RHIC were orders of 
magnitude too small to possibly create a black hole.169 The differentials were so 
large, the authors said it would be “pointless to attempt refinements” of their 
admittedly “rough” estimating.170 For the “foreseeable future,” they wrote, an 
accelerator with enough power to be even remotely dangerous was “a pipe 
dream.”171
Even Francesco Calogero, who expressed so much concern with regard to 
strangelets, was not similarly aroused with regard to black holes. Those 
concerns, he said, “can be allayed by simple, hence quite reliable, order of 
magnitude calculations, which definitely exclude any such possibility.”172
 161. GREENE, supra note 13, at 80. 
 162. See WALTER ISAACSON, EINSTEIN: HIS LIFE AND UNIVERSE 250-51 (Simon & Schuster 
2007); TOM SIEGFRIED, STRANGE MATTERS: UNDISCOVERED IDEAS AT THE FRONTIERS OF SPACE 
AND TIME 191 (Joseph Henry Press 2002). 
 163. See ISAACSON, supra note 162, at 251. 
 164. GREENE, supra note 13, at 80. 
 165. Id. at 80-81. 
 166. BUSZA ET. AL., supra note 87, at 7. 
 167. See id. at 1–2, 7. 
 168. Id. at 7. 
 169. Id.
 170. Id.
 171. Id.
 172. Calogero, supra note 105, at 192. 
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But the Busza team, Calogero, and the rest were making an assumption in 
their calculations, an assumption that just about anyone would think is entirely 
reasonable. They assumed that we live in a four-dimensional world—with three 
dimensions of space (length, width, and height) and one dimension of time. 
No one would have expected what happened next. In a plot twist worthy of 
The Twilight Zone, a problem arrived straight out of the fifth dimension. 
Literally. 
C. A Problem of Many Dimensions 
In 2001, a new theory concerning black holes emerged. Steven B. 
Giddings, a physicist from the University of California, Santa Barbara, wrote a 
paper with the rather provocative title, “High energy colliders as black hole 
factories: The end of short distance physics.”173 The paper suggested that if 
space had extra hidden dimensions—beyond the familiar four—then the power 
to make black holes might well be within grasp.174 In particular, Giddings 
suggested that the LHC, when it comes online, might be able to produce black 
holes at the rate of one every second.175
Around the same time, Savas Dimopoulos of Stanford and Greg Landsberg 
of Brown made similar predictions in a paper called “Black Holes at the Large 
Hadron Collider.”176
The idea that there might be more than three spatial dimensions may sound 
outlandish, but it is one of the most salient features of string theory—a 
burgeoning field within theoretical physics that was, in the early 2000s, gaining 
popularity among lay audiences. When Giddings’s article came out, Columbia 
University physicist Brian Greene had recently published his popular, 
bestselling book on string theory, The Elegant Universe,177 and filming was 
underway for a companion three-part television miniseries for NOVA, PBS’s 
popular science television series.178
CERN had a problem. The black-hole argument used to provide cover for 
the RHIC was seriously undermined. A new safety rationale was needed.  
 173. Steven B. Giddings & Scott Thomas, High Energy Colliders as Black Hole 
Factories: The End of Short Distance Physics, 65 PHYSICAL REV. D 056010, at 1 (2002); see
also Steven B. Giddings, Some Background on the Present Work, http://www.physics.ucsb. 
edu/~giddings/background.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2009) (Giddings own characterization 
of the paper) [hereinafter Giddings’s website]. 
 174. Giddings & Thomas, supra note 173, at 1. 
 175. Steven B. Giddings, Black Hole Production in TeV-scale Gravity, and the Future of 
High Energy Physics ARXIV:HEP-PH/0110127v3, Nov. 1, 2001, http://arxiv.org/abs/hep-
ph/0110127v3. 
 176. Savas Dimopoulos & Greg Landsberg, Black Holes at the Large Hadron Collider, 87 
PHYSICAL REV. LETTERS 161602, at A1 (2001). 
 177. GREENE, supra note 13. 
 178. See The Elegant Universe Behind the Scenes (PBS television broadcast Oct. 28, Nov. 
4, 2003), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/elegant/maki-nf.html (last visited Nov. 30, 
2009). 
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At some point prior to June 2002, CERN’s director-general instructed an 
ostensibly “independent” panel of scientists179—though one of the six was a 
CERN physicist180—to conduct a comprehensive study regarding the safety of 
heavy-ion collisions at the LHC.181
The panel found a safety rationale that promised to cause worries about the 
LHC to evaporate into thin air. 
D. Black Holes that Radiate Charm 
CERN published its safety study in 2003.182 The study acknowledged that 
in the wake of advances in theory suggesting extra dimensions of space, there 
was a need for a “new examination of potential hazards.”183 Embarking on that 
examination, the report conceded that, under the new theory, black holes “will
be produced.”184 Nonetheless, the study reported that LHC-produced black 
holes could not be dangerous because they would rapidly evaporate.185 Thus, 
the report concluded, “black hole production does not present a conceivable 
risk at the LHC.”186
Black holes evaporating? According to the classical account of black holes, 
evaporation is impossible—a black hole ingests everything and allows nothing 
out.187 But in 1974, a young physicist at Cambridge University upended that 
notion. At the time, he was not well known. But he is now. The man’s name is 
Stephen Hawking.188
In the work that established him as a giant in theoretical physics, Hawking 
argued that because of certain effects of quantum mechanics, black holes were 
not—and could not be—entirely black.189 Hawking showed, mathematically, 
 179. See JOHN ELLIS, GIAN GIUDICE, MICHELANGELO MANGANO, IGOR TKACHEV, AND URS 
WIEDEMANN (“LHC Safety Assessment Group” or “LSAG”), REVIEW OF THE SAFETY OF LHC
COLLISIONS (2008), http://arxiv.org/vc/arxiv/papers/0806/0806.3414v1.pdf [hereinafter LSAG] 
(original version of the report that reviews and confirms the conclusions of 2003 LHC Safety 
Study Group). 
 180. See J.-P. BLAIZOT, J. ILIOPOULOS, J. MADSEN, G.G. ROSS, P. SONDEREGGER, H.-J.
SPECHT (“LHC Safety Study Group” or “LSSG”), STUDY OF POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS EVENTS 
DURING HEAVY-ION COLLISIONS AT THE LHC: REPORT OF THE LHC SAFETY STUDY GROUP, at 
cover page (2003), http://doc.cern.ch/yellowrep/2003/2003-001/p1.pdf [hereinafter LSSG]. 
181. Id. at iii.  
 182. Id. at cover page.  
 183. Id. at 2.  
 184. Id. at 11.  
 185. Id.
 186. Id. at 12. The report uses the term “decay . . . through thermal processes.” Id.  
 187. See Stephen W. Hawking, Particle Creation by Black Holes, 43 COMMS. IN 
MATHEMATICAL PHYSICS 199 (1975). 
 188. See id.
 189. Stephen W. Hawking, Black Hole Explosions?, 248 NATURE 30, 30 (1974); Hawking, 
supra note 187, at 1. 
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that black holes must emit some form of radiation.190 Moreover, since energy 
and mass are two sides of the same coin, as Einstein showed in the famous 
equation E=mc2, then a black hole emitting radiation is a black hole that is 
losing mass.191 Moreover, black holes have a temperature that varies inversely 
with their mass.192 Big black holes would be extremely cold and would radiate 
extremely slowly.193 Conversely, the smaller the black hole, the hotter it would 
be and the faster it would radiate.194 As black holes lose mass and get ever 
hotter, they would start throwing off particles.195 It is even figured that black 
holes that are hot enough could throw off big particles such as heavy quarks—
meaning black holes would literally radiate “beauty” and “charm” particles.196
Given enough time, Hawking said, a black hole will heat up and evaporate 
right out of existence.197
Hawking’s work has been hailed as “a brilliant tour de force” and even “the 
beginning of a great scientific revolution.”198
The black-hole radiation predicted by Hawking remains theoretical—it has 
never been observed or experimentally confirmed.199 Nonetheless, so-called 
“Hawking radiation” has reached the status of scientific orthodoxy. Few have 
risen to challenge it. 
One of those who did was Adam D. Helfer, a mathematician at the 
University of Missouri.200 In 2003, Helfer acknowledged in a paper that the 
prediction of black-hole radiation “is often considered one of the most secure” 
in its subfield of physics.201 Nonetheless, Helfer offered his view that the 
prediction is based on “dubious assumptions” with unresolved difficulties.202
“The possibility that non-radiating ‘mini’ black holes exist should be taken 
seriously,” Helfer wrote.203
 190. Hawking, supra note 189, at 30; Hawking, supra note 187, at 199. 
 191. See Hawking, supra note 187, at 1.  
 192. Id. at 201–02. The temperature of a black hole, TBH, based on its mass, M, is expressed 
by the following equation, where h is Planck’s constant, G is the gravitational constant, k is the 
Boltzmann constant, and c is the speed of light: TBH = (1/16S2) × (c3h/GMk). See SUSSKIND,
supra note 153, at 173. 
 193. Hawking, supra note 187, at 201–02.
 194. Id.
 195. See id. at 202 (“As the temperature rose, it would exceed the rest mass of particles 
such as the electron and the muon [type of elementary particle] and the black hole would begin 
to emit them also.”). 
 196. See Giddings & Thomas, supra note 173, at 9; FAYYAZUDDIN & RIAZUDDIN, A
MODERN INTRODUCTION TO PARTICLE PHYSICS 259, 265–66 (World Scientific 2000).  
 197. See Hawking, supra note 189, at 30; Hawking, supra note 187, at 199. 
 198. SUSSKIND, supra note 153, at 174. 
 199. See LSAG, supra note 179, at 7.  
 200. See Adam D. Helfer, Do Black Holes Radiate?, 66 REPS. ON PROGRESS IN PHYSICS
943, 943 (2003). 
 201. Id.
202. Id.
 203. Id.
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But few did take it seriously.  
“Every so often, a physics paper will appear claiming that black holes don’t 
evaporate,” wrote Leonard Susskind, an elite physicist at Stanford. “Such 
papers quickly disappear into the infinite junk heap of fringe ideas.”204
Besides, Susskind noted, black-hole radiation had been “proved” by 
physicist William Unruh at the University of British Columbia.205
Unruh’s role in establishing the orthodoxy of black-hole radiation made it 
ironic that, after Helfer’s effort, Unruh himself wrote a paper theorizing that 
black holes might not evaporate.206 In 2004, Unruh, along with co-author Ralf 
Schützhold of the Technische Universität Dresden, concluded that “whether 
real black holes emit Hawking radiation remains an open question.”207
The debate as to whether black-hole evaporation is real suddenly went from 
the fringe to the mainstream.  
In their discussions of black-hole evaporation, neither Helfer, nor Unruh 
and Schützhold mentioned the safety of the LHC. But the implication for the 
LHC debate was clear. Walter Wagner—the same Scientific American reader 
who stirred the pot on strangelets and the RHIC—seized on the Unruh paper as 
undermining CERN’s assurances of safety.208
Interviewed by the New York Times about the use of his work by LHC 
critics, Unruh said that the critics had missed his point.209 For black holes to not 
evaporate, Unruh said, physics “would really, really have to be weird.”210
But “weird” is not “impossible.” The damage was done. While the particle-
physics community might have been able to brush off most papers questioning 
black-hole evaporation, the paper coming from Unruh and Schützhold raised 
questions about the stability of LHC-produced black holes that could not be 
ignored.211 That meant that to have a convincing safety rationale, CERN would 
have to dig deeper.  
In the meantime, a new personality appeared on the side of the critics. 
 204. SUSSKIND, supra note 153, at 185.  
 205. Id.
 206. See William G. Unruh & Ralf Schützhold, On the Universality of the Hawking Effect,
71 PHYS. REV. D. 024028-1, at 1 (2004), available at http://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/Phys 
RevD.71.024028.  
 207. Id.
 208. See Dennis Overbye, Asking a Judge to Save the World, and Maybe a Whole Lot 
More, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/29/
science/29collider.html. 
 209. Id. at A14. 
 210. Id.
 211. Unruh & Schützhold, supra note 206, at 1 (“[w]hether real black holes emit Hawking 
radiation remains an open question”). See Steven B. Giddings & Michelangelo L. Mangano, 
Astrophysical Implications of Hypothetical Stable TeV-scale Black Holes, 78 PHYSICAL R. D
035009-1, 1 (2008), available at http://scitation.aip.org/getpdf/servlet/GetPDFServlet?filetype= 
pdf&id=PRVDAQ000078000003035009000001&idtype=cvips&prog=normal (responding to 
concerns of “threat[s] to the Earth” posed by tiny black holes).  
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E. Doom, Gloom, and Smiley Faces 
No one within the particle-physics community proper ventured the explicit 
opinion that the LHC might be unsafe. But one scientist with considerable, if 
unconventional credentials did sound an alarm: Otto E. Rössler of the 
University of Tübingen.212 One CERN scientist later fingered Rössler as the 
driving force behind efforts in Switzerland and Germany to oppose the LHC.213
Originally trained in immunology,214 Rössler eventually became an 
acknowledged pioneer in chaos theory.215 Over the course of his career, Rössler 
has authored more than 300 scientific papers, and he has held professorial 
appointments in mathematics, chemistry, theoretical biology, theoretical 
biochemistry, nonlinear studies, chemical engineering, and, most relevant to 
this context, theoretical physics.216 Reading about him, you begin to wonder if 
he wasn’t the inspiration for the fictional Dr. Ian Malcolm, the eccentric chaos 
theorist who predicts disaster in the dinosaur thriller Jurassic Park. 
Some measure of the man’s want of conformity is found in the typography 
of his seminal paper on LHC safety issues: It contains three smiley-face 
icons.217
If black holes do not evaporate, as some suggested, that left open the 
question of how quickly they might grow—and it was this question that 
interested Rössler. 
One might imagine that a black hole, if it does not disappear instantly, 
would proceed immediately to vacuum up everything nearby, quickly 
snowballing in size so that within a few minutes it would have consumed the 
entire planet. But, in fact, the growth of an accelerator-produced black hole 
wouldn’t happen nearly so fast.218 The most obvious thing that would hold back 
the growth of synthetic black holes is their initial size. Such black holes would 
be not just tiny, but absurdly tiny—so small, in fact, that the interior of an atom 
would be vast in comparison.219
Although counterintuitive to our everyday experience, an atom—and the 
tangible matter it makes up—is almost entirely empty space.220 Electrons 
appear to have no size at all, and the nucleus in the middle fills about one 
 212. Otto Rössler’s name sometimes appears as “Otto Rossler” or “Otto Roessler.” 
 213. Ellis, supra note 83 (beginning at 51-52 min.). 
 214. Christohpe Letellier, Rössler Otto, Atomosyd (Nov. 1, 2008), 
http://www.atomosyd.net/spip.php?article6; Featured Author: Otto E. Rossler, Scholarpedia, 
http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/User:Rossler (last visited Nov. 30, 2009).  
 215. PÉTER ÉRDI, COMPLEXITY EXPLAINED 92 (Springer 2007). 
 216. See Letellier, supra note 214; Featured Author, supra note 214.  
 217. OTTO E. RÖSSLER, ABRAHAM-SOLUTION TO SCHWARZSCHILD METRIC IMPLIES THAT 
CERN MINIBLACK HOLES POSE A PLANETARY RISK 6 (2007), http://www.wissensnavigator.com/ 
documents/OTTOROESSLERMINIBLACKHOLE.pdf.  
 218. Id. at 1–2. 
 219. Id. at 1–2. 
 220. LINCOLN, supra note 48, at 8. 
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trillionth of the volume of an atom.221 Picture a single atom as a giant sphere 
about two miles across, big enough to put a medium-sized airport inside.222 The 
nucleus of such a magnified atom would be the size of a ball placed in the 
middle of all that emptiness.223 For an element with a large nucleus, such as 
uranium, picture a basketball.224 For an element with a small nucleus, such as 
hydrogen, picture a golf ball.225 This illustrates how alone the nucleus is within 
the void of empty space in the atom’s interior. Yet, such a picture does not fully 
explain the emptiness of an atom, because the nucleus itself is not solid; 
instead, it is composed of a swarm of impossibly tiny quarks and gluons that 
whiz about.226 A quark is at least 1,000 times smaller than a proton—that is, if 
it has any size at all.227
Thus, a subatomic-sized black hole, even traveling through solid rock, 
would sail virtually unimpeded through the great voids of subatomic space, 
rarely encountering anything it could eat. As small as it would be, its gravity 
would be far too weak to attract anything. Instead, to grow, the little black hole 
would need to run directly into a quark, an electron, or some other elementary 
particle of exceedingly miniscule size. 
Bearing this in mind, Rössler ran some numbers to calculate how long it 
would likely take black holes to grow to the point where they would be a threat. 
According to his calculations, LHC-produced black holes might grow fast 
enough that the world might end slightly more than five years after the LHC’s 
first full-energy collisions.228 This conclusion of Rössler’s is certainly creepy. It 
means that people nervous about the black-hole scenario will not be able to 
breathe a sigh of relief even after the LHC goes to full power. The persistence 
of solid ground underfoot will not, unfortunately, do anything to exclude the 
possibility of cataclysm.229
One of the most interesting aspects of Rössler’s paper is an espoused self-
awareness of how his ideas were likely to be received. Apparently referring to 
himself and Helfer, the mathematician whose work he cites, Rössler said that 
because the LHC-risk argument “comes from a group almost devoid of 
credentials in the field . . . it could take years until the idea is given the benefit 
of the doubt.”230
 221. Id. at 44. 
 222. FORD, supra note 154, at 10–11 (describing airport example). 
 223. Id. at 10. 
 224. Id.
 225. Id. at 11. 
 226. Id.
 227. LINCOLN, supra note 48, at 45. 
 228. See OTTO E. RÖSSLER, A RATIONAL AND MORAL AND SPIRITUAL DILEMMA 4 (2008), 
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 229. Id. at 2.  
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Consistent with prophecy, Rössler’s work was in due course rejected by 
two major science journals.231
CERN scientists never responded formally to Rössler’s papers, and they 
chose not to cite him in later papers on LHC safety.232 Mindful of the public-
relations implications of responding to Rössler directly, CERN arranged for a 
physicist at the Max Planck Institut für Graviationsphysik in Germany, 
Hermann Nicolai, to provide comments on Rössler’s argument.233 Nicolai 
dismissed Rössler’s argument as invalid and internally inconsistent.234 The 
comments of Nicolai and Nicolai’s colleague, Domenico Giulini, were put into 
two informal documents, which then CERN made available on the web.235
Perhaps wanting to keep Rössler’s fingerprints as far from the LHC science 
program as possible, CERN did not post the comments in the science or safety 
sections of its website; instead, the comments were posted on a website devoted 
to showing CERN’s commitment to environmental friendliness.236
F. Eight White Dwarfs and Two Heroes 
Even if Rössler’s writings were not taken seriously, Unruh’s recent 
writings still weakened the original safety argument of the 2003 LHC safety 
study. In 2007, with the LHC getting closer to completion, media and citizen 
inquiries into the LHC’s safety led CERN management to set up the LHC 
Safety Assessment Group, known as “LSAG.”237 Unlike the 2003 panel, the 
LSAG was never presented as being independent. All five members of the 
group were physicists from CERN’s Theory Division.238
 231. See id. at 1. 
 232. See LSAG, supra note 179 (Rössler’s work not listed in bibliography); Giddings & 
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Braun-Munzinger, Matteo Cavalli-Sforza, Gerard ‘t Hooft, Bryan Webber, & Fabi Zwirner 
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visited Nov. 30, 2009).  
 236. See Giulini & Nicolai, supra note 235; Nicolai, supra note 235.  
 237. Ellis, supra note 83 (beginning at 6 min.). 
 238. See LSAG, supra note 179, at cover page. Note that “v2” of the report, dated 
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OF THE SAFETY OF LHC COLLISIONS ARXIV:HEP-PH:0806.3414v2, CERN at cover page (2008), 
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In the later half of 2007, LSAG member Michelangelo L. Mangano began 
collaborating with Steven B. Giddings of the University of California, Santa 
Barbara on an in-depth theoretical treatment of LHC safety issues.239 Giddings 
explained that he was motivated to work on the project after his “Black Hole 
Factories” paper stirred up so many questions.240 CERN’s Mangano then 
volunteered to join in on the project.241
Giddings and Mangano’s work does not report Giddings’s affiliation with 
CERN.242 Indeed, in 2007 and 2008, when he was actually working on the 
paper, Giddings was not officially affiliated with CERN. But in 2006, CERN 
granted Giddings’s application for a visiting position as a scientific associate, a 
position Giddings then held in 2009.243
As they are central figures in the black-hole case, it is interesting to get a 
little of the flavor of Giddings and Mangano. Both seem a good deal more hip 
than the stereotypical theoretical physicist, albeit in quite different ways.  
Steven Giddings enjoys escaping his beach-front college campus to head 
up to snow-covered mountain tops; indeed he has climbed several mountains in 
the vicinity of CERN’s base near Geneva.244 The avid alpinist was even 
profiled in a New York Times article accompanied by a picture of him scaling a 
shear wall of ice.245 In warmer locales, he has been known for his propensity to 
wear shorts.246
Michelangelo Mangano, for his part, is the picture of approachability. Most 
particle physicists are notoriously sloppy dressers,247 but Mangano knows how 
to put on a smart suit and stylish tie and look good.248 Speaking softly in a 
delightfully bouncing accent from his native Italy, Mangano is warm and 
relatable. It makes sense that one of Mangano’s jobs at CERN is an outreach 
program that connects scientists with high-school physics teachers.249 In point 
http://arxiv.org/abs/0806.3414v2 [hereinafter LSAG Version 2]. But cf. Gary Felder and Igor 
Tkachev, LATTICEEASY: A Program for Lattice Simulations of Scalar Fields in an Expanding 
Universe, 178 COMPUTER PHYSICS COMMS. 929, 929 (2008) (listing Tkachev’s institution as 
CERN Theory Division). 
 239. See Giddings’s website, supra note 173. 
 240. Id.
 241. Id.
 242. See Giddings & Mangano, supra note 211 (listing only Giddings’s affiliation with the 
University of California, Santa Barbara). 
 243. See Giddings’s website, supra note 173. 
 244. See Steve Giddings, Climbing Highlights, http://members.cox.net/sbgiddings/ 
climbres.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2009) (listing ascents).  
 245. George Johnson, A Passion for Physical Realms, Minute and Massive, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 20, 2001, at F5. 
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of fact, no one could look less like a mad scientist hell-bent on building a 
doomsday machine than Mangano. When Oxford University’s Future of 
Humanity Institute hosted a conference on global risks, it was Mangano who 
went to argue that the LHC wasn’t one.250
After several months of work, Giddings and Mangano completed a very 
long and very detailed paper titled “Astrophysical Implications of Hypothetical 
Stable TeV-Scale Black Holes.”251 They ultimately concluded that we have 
nothing to worry about from the LHC.252
Giddings and Mangano began their work to exclude disaster scenarios by 
calculating how long it would take a stable microscopic black hole to grow.253
According to their analysis, the answer depends on how many hidden 
dimensions there are in the universe.254 Giddings and Mangano figured that if 
there are more than eight dimensions, it would take many billions of years for 
any black hole to accrete enough matter to be a problem.255 For seven 
dimensions, they estimated the soonest the end of the Earth could come is six 
billion years.256 And since the Sun is set to bloat and likely engulf the Earth 
within the next six billion years,257 there would seem to be little cause for 
concern in a seven-dimensional universe.  
But once the calculations are scaled down to a universe with six 
dimensions, there is a problem.258 In a 5-D or 6-D reality, though the accretion 
times are still extremely long by human standards, they are much shorter than 
the life expectancy of the Sun. Therefore, according to Giddings and Mangano, 
the accretion times are “too short to provide comfortable constraints.”259
For the 5-D scenario, Giddings and Mangano calculated a lower bound, a 
minimum time that would elapse before the Earth is overcome, of 300,000 
years.260 It should be noted that the 5-D scenario is certainly not implausible.261
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In 2000, Giddings, along with renowned Harvard physicist Lisa Randall and 
MIT physicist Emanuel Katz, wrote a paper that provided an in-depth treatment 
of gravity and black holes in a five-dimensional universe, arguing that the 5-
dimensional arrangement is possible.262
Faced with this potential gap in their safety argument, Giddings and 
Mangano went back to the drawing board to find empirical evidence of the 
LHC’s safety. Specifically, Giddings and Mangano sought to bolster the 
cosmic-ray argument.263
To reiterate, the cosmic-ray argument provides that since high-energy 
cosmic-ray collisions have been happening in Earth’s atmosphere throughout 
the planet’s history, anything dangerous that the LHC could create would 
already have been produced by cosmic rays.264
There was, however, a problem with this argument for the purpose of 
allaying fears about LHC-produced black holes. Since the Earth is mostly 
empty space, it could well be incapable of stopping any black holes that are 
produced by cosmic rays.265 Thus, cosmic-ray-produced black holes might exit 
Earth as fast as they were created.266 LHC-created black holes, on the other 
hand, would not necessarily evacuate instantaneously.267 Because protons in the 
LHC are propelled around the ring in opposite directions and collide nearly 
head-on, the momentum of each proton will largely cancel out that of the 
opposite proton, meaning that any resulting black holes could end up loitering 
in the vicinity.268
Thus, the old argument—that the Earth is still here despite all the cosmic 
rays, so we must be safe from the LHC—failed in the view of Giddings and 
Mangano to provide adequate assurances of safety. Even an analysis of regular 
stars, made of regular atomic matter that is mostly empty space, would not do 
the trick.269 To make the argument work, Giddings and Mangano needed to find 
something in the heavens capable of stopping cosmic-ray-produced black holes.  
Giddings and Mangano found what they were looking for in neutron stars 
and white dwarfs—special kinds of stars that are so dense, most of the empty 
space occurring in normal atomic matter is squeezed out.270 For example, 
 261. See Steven B. Giddings, Emanuel Katz & Lisa Randall, Linearized Gravity in Brane 
Backgrounds, 3 J. OF HIGH ENERGY PHYSICS 23, 23 (2000), available at http://www.iop.org/ 
EJ/article/1126-6708/2000/03/023/jhep032000023.pdf?request-id=224e5329-6e8f-4308-b363-
c3c1da3dffdd.  
 262. Id.
 263. Giddings & Mangano, supra note 211, at 14. 
 264. Id.
 265. Id. at 14, 16. 
 266. Id.
 267. Id. at 16. 
 268. Id. at 14–16.  
 269. Id. at 16. 
 270. SUSSKIND, supra note 153, at 30. 
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because the matter in a neutron star is squeezed together so tightly, a tablespoon 
of it would weigh more than 10 trillion pounds.271
As it turned out, neutron stars were helpful but not definitive. Giddings and 
Mangano found that the persistence of neutron stars could not convincingly 
eliminate all LHC/black-hole scenarios because neutron stars’ strong magnetic 
fields could slow down cosmic rays so much that, by the time the cosmic rays 
collided with particles inside the neutron star, the effective energy of the 
collision would be less powerful than the collisions planned for the LHC.272
Thus, it appeared that only white dwarfs could provide Giddings and 
Mangano with the empirical evidence they needed to close the gap and make 
the foolproof case that the LHC must be safe. But there are problems with the 
white dwarfs as well. First, white dwarfs are not nearly as dense as neutron 
stars.273 Therefore, it cannot be safely assumed that any given white dwarf 
would trap a cosmic-ray-produced black hole.274 Second, white dwarfs also 
have strong magnetic fields that could lower the energy of cosmic-ray collisions 
to the point where they are no longer comparable to collisions at the LHC.275
Thus, not every observed white dwarf is an argument that the LHC is safe. 
Nonetheless, Giddings and Mangano identified eight observed white dwarf 
stars that appear to have the right properties of mass, magnetic-field strength, 
and age such that they present a form of living evidence that the LHC must be 
safe.276
Bottom line, Giddings and Mangano found “no basis for concerns” about 
black holes produced by the LHC and concluded that “there is no risk of any 
significance whatsoever from such black holes.”277
LSAG was pleased. CERN’s John Ellis, an LSAG member, commented in 
a presentation to other CERN scientists that Giddings and Mangano had done a 
“heroic” job.278
G. The Rise of Certitude 
When they completed their paper in 2008, Giddings and Mangano 
submitted it to CERN’s ad hoc LSAG group279 but, in the meantime, did not 
disclose the paper to the public or to the broader scientific community.280
 271. Id.
 272. Giddings & Mangano, supra note 211 , at 23–24. 
 273. Id. at 23 (“[Neutron stars] represent the highest known densities of matter that have 
not undergone gravitational collapse to a black hole.”). 
 274. See id. at 16–17. 
 275. See id. at 19–23. 
 276. See id. at 22–23. 
 277. Id. at 27. This gives rise to the question, what do Giddings and Mangano consider 
significant in terms of risk? I will return to this question later in Part VI.C. 
 278. Ellis, supra note 83 (beginning at 24 min.).  
 279. Id. (beginning at 3 min.).  
 280. See id. (beginning at 4 min.); Giddings & Mangano, supra note 211.
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Relying on the Giddings and Mangano paper then in hand, LSAG 
proceeded to write a report issuing the conclusion that the LHC was safe.281
The LSAG Report claimed to follow on from the work of the 2003 LHC 
Safety Study Group.282 In that sense, LSAG purported to “confirm, update and 
extend” the 2003 findings “in light of additional experimental results and 
theoretical understanding.”283
But the LSAG Report’s self-characterization was misleading: LSAG did 
not attempt to rely on the arguments from the 2003 report to justify the 
conclusion that the LHC is safe. The 2003 report had rested its case for safety 
on black-hole evaporation.284 The 2008 LSAG report instead relied on the 
cosmic-ray argument as developed by Giddings and Mangano.285
Why did the LSAG Report retreat almost entirely to the cosmic-ray 
argument? Although the report doesn’t say, it is not hard to guess. By 2008, the 
black-hole-evaporation argument had taken a bad beating. While most 
physicists seemed to continue to regard black-hole radiation as theoretically 
sound, the fact that Unruh himself began questioning black-hole radiation 
clearly made it less persuasive as the basis of the safety argument.286
What the LSAG Report did do, in lieu of arguing evaporation, was puff up 
the cosmic-ray argument well beyond the conclusions of the Giddings and 
Mangano paper.  
For example, Giddings and Mangano conceded, “[W]e cannot guarantee 
that Earth is an efficient target for trapping hypothetical [cosmic-ray]-produced 
black holes in all scenarios.”287 LSAG, on the other hand, presented Earth’s 
continuing existence as ruling out any danger: “Nature has already conducted 
the equivalent of about a hundred thousand LHC experimental programmes on 
Earth already—and the planet still exists.”288
Additionally, while the safety argument of Giddings and Mangano 
ultimately funneled down to eight particular white dwarfs, the LSAG report 
was less discriminating. It declared that worries about “possible new particles” 
could be constrained or excluded by “the continued existence of the Earth and 
other astronomical bodies.”289
 281. See LSAG, supra note 179, at cover page. Note that the report was later issued in a 
revised version on September 18, 2008, which included an addendum on strangelets and an 
updated bibliography. See LSAG Version 2, supra note 238.  
 282. LSAG Version 2, supra note 238, at 1.  
 283. Id. at 1. 
 284. See LSAG, supra note 179, at 12 (“Thus we conclude that black-hole production does 
not present a conceivable risk at the LHC due to the rapid decay of the black hole through 
thermal processes.”) (emphasis added). 
 285. LSAG Version 2, supra note 238, at 3–4. 
 286. See supra Part IV.D. 
 287. Giddings & Mangano, supra note 211, at 14. 
 288. LSAG Version 2, supra note 238, at 4. 
 289. Id. at 5. 
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The LSAG Report’s bottom-line assessment of LHC safety also went 
considerably further than Giddings and Mangano did. Giddings and Mangano 
concluded that there is “no risk of any significance whatsoever from such black 
holes”290—a statement that clearly admits of some possibility of disaster, albeit 
one that is insignificant.  
The LSAG Report, on the other hand, used words purporting to extinguish 
all risk that could be imagined, saying that black holes from the LHC “present 
no conceivable danger.”291
In May 2008, CERN’s Scientific Policy Committee (“SPC”) received the 
LSAG Report along with the Giddings and Mangano paper.292 The SPC was 
pleased with what they saw, telling Giddings and Mangano that they had done a 
“fantastic job,” and telling LSAG that they too had done a “fantastic job.”293
The SPC then drafted its own document assessing the matter.294 The SPC’s 
document went further rhetorically than even LSAG was apparently willing to 
go. The SPC statement referred to LSAG’s work as “proof” of the LHC’s 
safety.295 This proof, according to the SPC, relied “only on solid experimental 
facts and firmly established theory.”296
The SPC’s summary description of LSAG’s work was favorable to the 
point of mischaracterization:  
For black holes, the LSAG report goes much beyond previous reports, on the 
basis of the GM paper. Replacing some highly plausible theoretical concepts 
of the previous reports with irrefutable observational data on cosmic rays and 
on astronomical bodies such as the Sun or compact stars, interpreted using 
firmly established theory, further layers of safety are added to the previously 
existing ones, excluding any possibility that the highly hypothetical 
production of black holes at the LHC could create a danger of whatever 
kind.297
This, of course, is wrong. The Giddings and Mangano paper never 
purported to exclude risk based on the existence of bodies such as the Sun, 
doing so instead on the basis of white dwarfs and neutron stars.298 It is also 
dubious to conclude that “any possibility” of disaster was excluded when the 
Giddings and Mangano paper claimed only to exclude “risk of any 
significance.”299 Moreover, the characterization of the observational data as 
 290. Giddings & Mangano, supra note 211, at 27.  
 291. LSAG Version 2, supra note 238, at 1. 
 292. Ellis, supra note 83 (beginning at 12 min.). 
 293. Id. (relaying what the SPC said) (beginning at 33 min.). 
 294. See CERN Scientific Policy Committee, supra note 232, at 1. 
 295. Id.
 296. Id. (The phrase “experimental facts” may appear to some readers as oxymoronic, 
though it is clear that the SPC meant “experimentally verified facts.”).  
 297. Id. at 4. 
 298. Giddings and Mangano, supra note 211, at 19–24. 
 299. Id. at 27. 
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“irrefutable” came from the SPC.300 The word Giddings and Mangano used to 
characterize the astronomical data was “solid.”301
Thus, having ascended through the CERN hierarchy, the likelihood that the 
LHC was dangerous went from insignificant to inconceivable to impossible.
After the SPC favorably reviewed the Giddings and Mangano article and 
the LSAG report, the papers were then disclosed to the public in 2008.302 At 
that point, one individual took up the task of lending the Giddings and 
Mangano paper a critical eye. 
H. The Polite Outsider 
Rainer Plaga is an astrophysicist, formerly of the Max-Planck Institute and 
currently working for the German federal government as a civil servant.303 In 
August 2008, Plaga completed a paper—in his capacity as an individual and 
not on behalf of the government—that took issue with the conclusions of 
Giddings and Mangano. The approach Plaga took differed significantly from 
that of Rössler. Plaga’s paper was less alarmist, more deferential, and much 
more carefully presented.304 The paper was also instantly visible to the particle-
physics community because Plaga posted it online on the arXiv, a hotbed for 
developing scholarship in physics and mathematics that functions as a self-
publication method for pre-prints of articles not yet published in a conventional 
print journal.305
Plaga’s approach was also different in that it focused specifically on the 
latest definitive treatment of LHC safety: the Giddings and Mangano paper, 
which he referred to respectfully, complimenting it as “excellent.”306 Plaga’s 
paper, published only seven weeks after Giddings and Mangano’s paper, 
presented two independent arguments against the conclusion that the LHC is 
 300. CERN Scientific Policy Committee, supra note 232, at 4. 
 301. Giddings and Mangano, supra note 211, at 1. 
 302. See Ellis, supra note 83 (beginning at 11–12 min.); Giddings and Mangano, supra 
note 211, at 1. 
 303. See Rainer Plaga, Astrophysics: Rays from the Dark, 453 NATURE 48, 49 (2008) 
(“Rainer Plaga is in the Department for New Technologies and Scientific Foundations, Federal 
Office for Information Security.”); Max-Planck-Institut Für Physik Werner-Heisenberg-Institut
Jahresbericht Annual Report 2000, available at http://www.mppmu.mpg.de/english/jbericht-
00.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2009).  
 304. Rainer Plaga, On the Potential Catastrophic Risk from Metastable Quantum-black 
Holes Produced at Particle Colliders, ARXIV:GEN-PH/0808.1415v2 (Sept. 26, 2008), available 
at http://arxiv.org/abs/0808.1415v2. Note that the first version of the paper was published on 
August 10, 2008, and can be found at http://arxiv.org/abs/0808.1415v1. Citations herein are to 
the second version unless noted. 
 305. See arXiv.org, Cornell University, http://arxiv.org/ (“arXiv is an e-print service in the 
fields of physics, mathematics, non-linear science, computer science, quantitative biology and 
statistics.”). 
 306. Plaga, supra note 304, at 8.  
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safe.307 Optimistically, Plaga did not predict that the LHC would destroy the 
world; instead, he argued that Giddings and Mangano’s paper did not exclude 
all possibilities of disaster—that is, that it left “a residual catastrophic risk” on 
the table.308
Plaga’s first argument was based on an alternative model of microscopic 
black holes, one previously advanced by Roberto Casadio and Benjamin Harms 
in 2002.309 On this basis, Plaga concluded that growth of microscopic black 
holes might not be slow and that black-hole behavior that would destroy the 
Earth might not have the same effect on white dwarfs.310 Thus, the eight white 
dwarfs pointed to by Giddings and Mangano might not be conclusive empirical 
evidence of the LHC’s safety. Plaga then made the eye-opening suggestion that 
as a consequence of the alternative black-hole model, a fast-growing black hole 
could cause the release of an amount of energy equal to 12 megatons of TNT 
per second, appearing “like a major nuclear explosion in the immediate vicinity 
of the collider.”311
Plaga’s second argument, independent of the alternative-model argument, 
took issue with a mathematical assumption made by Giddings and Mangano 
regarding the size of the black holes.312 Specifically, Giddings and Mangano 
assumed that the black hole would have a certain minimum size—three times as 
large as the “Planck scale.”313 Plaga suggested that while this might be a good 
assumption for pure research purposes, such as analyzing data collected from a 
particle accelerator detector, it is not an appropriate assumption for purposes of 
disaster-risk analysis.314
So, what is the significance of the Planck scale? The Planck scale defines a 
realm of the incredibly tiny.315 Distances measured in terms of the Planck scale 
are small even by particle-physics standards. 
 307. See id. at 1–3. 
 308. Id. at 11. 
 309. Robert Casadio & Benjamin Harms, Can Black Holes and Naked Singularities be 
Detected in Accelerators?, 17 INT’L J. OF MOD. PHYSICS A 17 4635, 4635 (2002) (“We study the 
conditions for the existence of black holes that can be produced in colliders at the TeV-Scale if 
the space-time is higher dimensional. On employing the microcanonical picture, we find that 
their life-times strongly depend on the details of the model. If the extra dimensions are compact, 
microcanonical deviations from themality are in general significant near the fundamental TeV 
mass, and tiny black holes decay more slowly than predicted by the canonical expression but 
still fast enough to disappear almost instantaneously. However, with one warped extra 
dimension (RS model), microcanonical corrections are much larger and tiny black holes appear 
to be (meta)stable.”). 
 310. See Plaga, supra note 304, at 7–8. 
 311. Id. at 7. 
 312. Id.
 313. Id. The “Planck scale” or “Planck length” is “an unimaginably small distance studied 
by theorists . . . . about 10–35 . . . a hundred billion times smaller [] than the already miniscule 
proton.”). FORD, supra note 154, at 13. 
 314. Plaga, supra note 304, at 7–8. 
 315. FORD, supra note 154, at 13. 
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Below the Planck scale, in the words of renowned physicist Brian Greene, 
“quantum uncertainty renders the fabric of the cosmos so twisted and distorted 
that the usual conceptions of space and time are no longer applicable.”316 The 
Planck scale “describes an unfamiliar arena of the universe in which the 
conventional notions of left and right, back and forth, up and down (and even 
of before and after) lose their meaning.”317 According to Greene: 
Physicists believe . . . the smooth portrayal of space and time is an 
approximation that gives way to another, more fundamental framework when 
considered on ultramicroscopic scales. What that framework is—what 
constitutes the “molecules” and “atoms” of space and time—is a question 
being pursued with great vigor. It has yet to be resolved.318
With specific reference to black holes, Plaga, citing prior work by 
Giddings, contended that contemporary physics is unable to reliably predict the 
behavior of smaller black holes; thus, one cannot logically rule out the 
possibility that such black holes can be produced.319 Further, Plaga claimed that 
smaller black holes are not excluded by Giddings and Mangano’s white-dwarf 
analysis.320 Why not? The problem with smaller black holes is that they might 
be able to slip through white dwarfs without being trapped, Giddings and 
Mangano’s analysis notwithstanding.321 If that is true, then the existence of 
white dwarfs does not prove that cosmic-ray collisions do not produce black 
holes. If cosmic-ray collisions do, in fact, produce black holes, so could the 
LHC, and LHC-produced black holes could remain Earth-bound.322
In closing, Plaga offered some compromises, which he called “feasible 
measures for risk mitigation” that would not force a total shutdown of the LHC 
program.323 He proposed that the LHC ramp up slowly, proceeding 
incrementally, rather than going immediately to full power.324
While Rössler was mostly ignored, Plaga was not. Within 19 days after 
Plaga posted his paper—and a little more than a week before the LHC’s 
planned start up—Giddings and Mangano posted a paper on the arXiv
disputing Plaga’s alternative-model argument.325
Giddings and Mangano’s reply paper was interesting in both tone and 
content. The tone was confrontational and decidedly icy. In terms of content, 
 316. GREENE, supra note 72, at 334.  
 317. GREENE, supra note 13, at 129. 
 318. Id. at 335.  
 319. Plaga, supra note 304, at 7–8. 
 320. Id. at 8. 
 321. Id.
 322. Id. at 7–8. 
 323. Id. at 9. 
 324. Id.
 325. See STEVEN B. GIDDINGS AND MICHELANGELO L. MANGANO, COMMENTS ON CLAIMED 
RISK FROM METASTABLE BLACK HOLES, ARXIV:HEP-PH/0808.4087v1, CERN-PH-TH-2008-184, 
CERN (CERN Rep. No. CERN-PH-TH/2008-184) (2008), http://arxiv.org/abs/0808.4087v1. 
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Giddings and Mangano responded to only some of Plaga’s arguments, 
declining to discuss or even mention others.326
With regard to Plaga’s argument based on the Casadio and Harms model, 
Giddings and Mangano first claimed that Plaga applied a formula 
inconsistently.327 Next, they offered two more arguments to refute Plaga’s 
conclusions but provided only a single sentence of explanation for each, saying 
they would “defer further explanation for future comment.”328 First, they 
argued that an approximated equation provided in their appendix can be 
applied to exclude the risk Plaga discussed.329 Their second argument was that 
the underlying basis of Plaga’s paper “appears implausible.”330
Giddings and Mangano ended their comment by accusing Plaga of 
misquoting their paper and selectively quoting from the available literature.331
The accusations are worth scrutinizing. For the misquote, Giddings and 
Mangano recited the correct text, but did not provide the context of Plaga’s 
misquote or explain its significance.332 The result was that Giddings and 
Mangano created the impression that the misquote was material, when in fact, it 
was quite insignificant.333 It turns out that all Plaga did was drop an “or” in a 
sentence, which had the effect of making Giddings and Mangano’s paper look, 
if anything, slightly more persuasive than it would have appeared otherwise.334
Even more interesting was the accusation that Plaga was selectively quoting 
from the available literature. Where Plaga cited to Unruh’s 2004 paper 
questioning the existence of Hawking radiation,335 Giddings and Mangano 
suggested he should have provided “the more recent citation to Unruh’s work,” 
which “reflects more up-to-date comments by Unruh on the support of his work 
for Hawking radiation.”336
 326. Id. at cover page (“In a recent note . . . it was argued that a hypothetical metastable 
black hole scenario could pose collider risk not excluded by our previous study. We comment 
on inconsistency of this proposed scenario.”). 
 327. Id. at 1–2.  
 328. Id. at 2. 
 329. See id.
 330. Id.
 331. Id.
 332. See id.
 333. See id.
 334. Plaga’s misquote: “at each point where we encountered an uncertainty, we have 
replaced it by a conservative ‘worst case’ assumption.” Plaga, supra note 304, at 3 n.3 (First 
version). The correct quote is: “at each point where we encountered an uncertainty, we have 
replaced it by a conservative or ‘worst case’ assumption.” Giddings and Mangano, supra note 
211, at 2 (emphasis added). The misquote made the statement more plausible because, where 
someone is arguing the case for safety, it is more persuasive to utilize only conservative worst-
case scenarios rather than some scenarios that are not worst case, but are, at least, conservative.
Plaga corrected the misquote in the second version of his paper. Plaga, supra note 304, at 3 n.3.  
 335. Unruh & Schützhold, supra note 206. 
 336. GIDDINGS & MANGANO, supra note 325, at 2. 
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The “more up-to-date” citation to which Giddings and Mangano referred 
was not a paper at all, but an abstract of a talk Unruh gave in 2007.337 In fact, it 
does not repudiate Unruh’s prior work.338 It is also hardly a ringing 
endorsement of Hawking radiation. In favor of Giddings and Mangano’s case, 
the abstract says, “Analog models of gravity have given us a clue that despite 
the shaky derivation, the effect is almost certainly right.”339 But the abstract also 
says, “Black Hole evaporation is one of the most puzzling features of gravity 
and quantum theory.”340 The abstract goes on to say that the theory’s derivation 
by Stephen Hawking is “nonsense, in that it uses features of the theory in 
regimes where we know the theory is wrong.”341
There remains one more aspect to discuss about the Giddings and Mangano 
rebuttal—something that is rather remarkable: Giddings and Mangano offered 
no response at all to Plaga’s second line of argument, which took issue with 
Giddings and Mangano’s mathematical assumptions regarding black-hole 
size.342 Thus, Plaga’s argument regarding black-hole size in relation to the 
Planck scale stands as a level of uncertainty about LHC safety to which CERN 
has made no response. 
Plaga posted a sur-reply to Giddings and Mangano in an appendix to a 
second version of his paper, which corrected the misquote.343 Plaga also 
insisted that he did not employ the equations inconsistently, and Plaga argued 
that Giddings and Mangano criticized him for making mathematical moves he 
never employed.344
The debate with Plaga ends there. Giddings and Mangano left Plaga’s most 
recent points without a response. Perhaps Giddings and Mangano judged that, 
given his marginalized outsider status, engaging in further dialog with Plaga 
would only bolster the case that his arguments should be taken seriously. 
I. Warped in the Brane 
After the release of “Astrophysical Implications” and the LSAG Report, 
physicists piled on with concurrences that the LHC was safe. 
 337. See Bill Unruh, Where Do the Particles Come From? Abstracts, Perimeter Institute for 
Theoretical Physics, http://www.perimeterinstitute.ca/fr/Events/Effective_Models_of_Quantum 
_Gravity/Abstracts/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2009).  
 338. See id.
 339. Id.
 340. Id.
 341. Id.
 342. See Plaga, supra note 304, at 7 (First version) (making argument); id. at 11 (noting 
lack of response). 
 343. See id. at 10 n.3.  
 344. Id. at 10 n.1. 
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The Executive Committee of the Division of Particles & Fields of the 
American Physical Society endorsed the LSAG Report, as did the UK Institute 
of Physics.345
Michael E. Peskin of Stanford offered a viewpoint piece on the Giddings 
and Mangano article, praising it for taking doomsday hypotheses “as a 
challenge” and using them to launch “a new and fascinating investigation.”346
With the stated aim of assuaging “public alarm” about the LHC, Benjamin 
Koch, Marcus Bleicher, and Horst Stöcker of the Johann Wolfgang Goethe–
Universität in Frankfurt published a paper that summarized existing safety 
arguments and added new ones.347 The paper lauded the LHC and concluded 
that there was no logically possible black-hole evolution path that could be 
dangerous.348 The paper’s acknowledgement section was noteworthy for its 
marked duo-tone contrast: “The authors thank Michelangelo Mangano for 
fruitful discussions and his helpful comments. We also acknowledge discussion 
with Rainer Plaga.”349
Sergio Fabi and Benjamin Harms of the University of Alabama and 
Roberto Casadio of the Università di Bologna published a paper from a string-
theory perspective, arguing against the possibility of danger at the LHC.350 The 
paper, titled “On the possibility of Catastrophic Black Hole Growth in the 
Warped Brane-World Scenario at the LHC,” was based on their “previous 
study of black holes in the context of the warped brane-world scenario.”351
While the talk of “warped branes” sounds like an ad hominem attack on LHC 
detractors, it is not. The word “brane” is a term of art in string theory referring 
to a kind of cosmological structure existing in a higher-dimensional universe, 
and “warped” describes a geometric quality, not a psychological one.352
Yet there were ad hominem attacks. John Ellis of CERN referred to LHC 
detractors as “nuts” and insinuated that one of them, Walter Wagner, was only 
 345. See generally Press Release, Division of Particles & Fields of the American Physical 
Society, Statement by the Executive Committee of the DPF on the Safety of Collisions at the 
Large Hadron Collider, http://www.aps.org/units/dpf/governance/reports/upload/lhc_saftey_ 
statement.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2009); Press Release, The Institute of Physics, LHC Switch-
on Fears are Completely Unfounded (Sept. 5, 2008), http://www.iop.org/Media/Press%20 
Releases/press_31275.html. 
 346. Michael E. Peskin, The End of the World at the Large Hadron Collider?, 1, 14 
PHSYICS 1 (2008), available at http://physics.aps.org/pdf/Physics.1.14.pdf.  
 347. See Benjamin Koch et al., Exclusion of Black Hole Disaster Scenario at the LHC,
ARXIV:HEP-PH/0807.3349v2, Sept. 27, 2008, http://arxiv.org/abs/0807.3349v2. 
 348. Id. at 13. 
 349. Id.
 350. See Roberto Casadio et al., On the Possibility of Catastrophic Black Hole Growth in 
the Warped Brane-World Scenario at the LHC, arXov:0901.2948v2, Feb. 17, 2009, 
http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/arxiv/pdf/0901/0901.2948v2.pdf (accepted for publication in Physical 
Review D on August 14, 2009).  
 351. Id. at 1.  
 352. GREENE, supra note 13, at 414. 
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pursuing a lawsuit against CERN to make money.353 Yet Wagner was suing for 
an injunction, not damages.354 Another CERN physicist referred to LHC critics 
as “crazy people.”355 Much more blunt was renowned University of Manchester 
physicist Brian Cox: 
“Anyone who thinks the LHC will destroy the world,” he said, “is a 
twat.”356
J. The Best Answer 
In August 2008, with the public opening of the LHC coming within weeks, 
John Ellis gave a talk in the CERN auditorium in which he sought “to provide 
the ammunition” that CERN people could use to convince others that the 
collider poses no danger.357
After reviewing the scientific arguments that the LHC is safe, Ellis 
explained that a question that worried him more than whether humanity was 
safe from the LHC, was the opposite—whether the LHC was safe from 
humanity.358
Ellis then briefed the audience on unfavorable press reports, the various 
lawsuits filed to stop the LHC, and a public opinion poll indicating that most 
people thought the LHC was not worth the risk.359 Ellis also introduced the 
audience to Richard Posner, whom Ellis said he found “really worrying.”360
Wrapping up, Ellis came to what his presentations slides labeled “The Best 
Answer.”361
“So, to finish,” Ellis said, “the way to stop all this argument about whether 
the LHC is going to destroy the planet is to get the LHC working.”362
“Within a few weeks time, we will know that LSAG was right.”363
Of course, in making such a statement, Ellis either showed that he 
misapprehends the relevant physics, which seems highly doubtful, or he 
revealed himself to be disingenuous. As the Giddings and Mangano report 
acknowledged, black-hole disaster scenarios provide for long incubation times, 
during which microscopic black holes may reside in the Earth unnoticed, 
 353. Ellis, supra note 83 (beginning at 38, 49 min.). 
 354. Sancho v. U.S. Dept. of Energy, 578 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1258 (D. Haw. 2008). 
 355. Ellis, supra note 83 (an audience member refers to detractors as “crazy people” while 
posing a question to Ellis) (beginning at 68 min.).  
 356. Posting of Ian O’Neill to AstroENGINE, http://www.astroengine.com/?p=1240 (Sept. 
4, 2008, 10:02 p.m.) (The post is titled, “Anyone Who Thinks the LHC Will Destroy the World is 
a Twat”); Posting of Ian O’Neill to AstroENGINE, http://www.astroengine.com/?p=1255 (Sept. 
6, 2008, 5:46 a.m.) (The post is titled, “A Statement By Professor Brian Cox”).  
 357. Ellis, supra note 83 (beginning at 70 min.). 
 358. Id. (beginning at 44 min.). 
 359. See id. (beginning at 43–59 min.). 
 360. Id. (beginning at 54 min.). 
 361. Id. (presentation graphic reading, “The Best Answer . . .”) (beginning at 62 min.). 
 362. Id. (beginning at 62 min.). 
 363. Id. (beginning at 63 min.). 
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slowly gaining mass.364 Therefore, starting the LHC would actually do nothing 
to prove that the LHC was safe. Of course, it might well end the debate by fait 
accompli.
At any rate, as it turned out, CERN came up short of providing this “best 
answer.” In the ensuing weeks, CERN was unable to get the LHC working.365
During testing and before particle collisions began, a faulty electrical 
connection caused an electrical arc, puncturing the LHC’s superfluid helium 
enclosure and releasing a large amount of helium coolant into the LHC 
tunnel.366 The accident was violent enough to rip a portion of the LHC out of its 
anchors in the concrete floor.367 The necessary repairs have required the LHC’s 
first collisions to be pushed back more than full year.368 CERN also had to 
downgrade its initial expectations for the machine, opting to begin operating at 
reduced energies in order to get started collecting at least some data.369
Ultimately, CERN decided that over the 2009-2010 run, the LHC would 
collide particles at a maximum energy of 7 TeV370—half the machine’s 
designed strength of 14 TeV.371
In mid-October 2009, the LHC was finally cooled down to its ultra-
refrigerated operating temperature,372 and in mid-November, CERN succeeded 
in steering particles half-way around the LHC ring.373 As of late November 
2009, CERN’s plan is to commence particle collisions before Christmas.374
 364. See Giddings & Mangano, supra note 211, at 8–14. 
 365. See Press Release No. PR14.08, CERN, CERN Releases Analysis of LHC Incident 
(Oct. 16, 2008), http://press.web.cern.ch/press/PressReleases/Releases2008/PR14.08E.html. 
 366. Id.
 367. Id.
 368. Press Release No. PR02.09, CERN, CERN Management Confirms New LHC Restart 
Schedule (Feb. 9, 2008), http://press.web.cern.ch/press/PressReleases/Releases2009/ 
PR02.09E.html.  
 369. See Posting of John Matson to 60-Second Science Blog, http://www.sciam.com/ 
blog/60-second-science/post.cfm?id=lhc-org-nixes-rumors-of-delay-says-2008-12-02 (Dec. 2, 
2008, 3:00 p.m.) (The post is titled “LHC org nixes rumors of delay, says collider set to go next 
year.”).  
 370. See Press Release No. PR13.09E, CERN, LHC to Run at 3.5 TeV for Early Part of 
2009-2010 Run Rising Later (Aug. 6, 2009), http://press.web.cern.ch/press/PressReleases/ 
Releases2009/PR13.09E.html.
 371. CERN, supra note 38, at 18. 
 372. CERN, The Latest from the LHC: The LHC is cold! (Oct. 19, 2009), 
http://cdsweb.cern.ch/journal/CERNBulletin/2009/43/News%20Articles/1212977?ln=en (last 
visited Nov. 30, 2009). 
 373. CERN, Particles Have Gone Half Way Round the LHC (Nov. 9, 2009), 
http://user.web.cern.ch/user/news/2009/091109.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2009); CERN, supra
note 368. 
 374. CERN, CERN Bulletin, The Way to Collisions, Step by Step (Oct. 19, 2009) 
http://cdsweb.cern.ch/journal/CERNBulletin/2009/43/News%20Articles/1212968?ln=en (last 
visited Nov. 30, 2009). 
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In the meantime, the litigation to stop the LHC continues to simmer in the 
courts. 
V. PROBLEMS FOR PLAINTIFFS
Suing to stop the LHC is a unique litigation endeavor. Problems abound. 
The only thing that seems straight-forward is the prayer for relief. But what is 
the claim? In what court do you file it? And how do you get personal 
jurisdiction over CERN? 
A. The Litigants’ Attempts 
Multiple suits to stop the LHC have been initiated by a colorful assortment 
of plaintiffs. An action was brought in the Swiss courts in 2008, but it was 
dismissed because of CERN's treaty-based immunity from process in 
Switzerland.375 A lawsuit in Germany seeking to force the German government 
to use its membership in CERN to prevent full-power operation has also been 
unsuccessful—as of early 2009, the case was still alive, as the plaintiffs had 
appealed to Germany’s Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional 
Court).376 A third action was instituted in the European Court of Human Rights 
(“ECHR”), seeking “interim measures” to halt the LHC’s planned operation.377
The ECHR dismissed the interim-measures request with a brief e-mail, which 
stated no reasons for the decision.378
In Hawaii, Walter Wagner, along with Luis Sancho, a self-described 
“leading researcher in the field of Time Theory,”379 filed a pro se complaint in 
the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii.380 The plaintiffs 
attempted to bridge the transoceanic divide and reach CERN by invoking the 
National Environmental Policy Act381 (“NEPA”).382 Through NEPA, the 
 375. See Klage betreffend Gefährdung meines Lebens, Bezirksgericht Zürich, June 3, 2008
(Schröter v. CERN) at 1, 3 (on file with author). 
 376. See Verfassungsbeschwerde, Antrag auf Erlass einer einstweiligen Anordnung und 
Prozesskostenhilfegesuch, Bundesverfassungsgericht, Jan. 21, 2009 (Schröter v. Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland); In dem Verfassungsbeschwerdeverfahren und Verfahren auf Erlass einer 
einstweiligen Anordnung, Bundesverfassungsgericht, Mar. 10, 2009 (Schröter v. 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland) (on file with author). 
 377. See Vorab Per E-mail, European Court of Human Rights, Beschwerde Nr. 41028/08, 
Aug. 29, 2008 (Goritschnig v. Österreich) (on file with author). 
 378. See id.
 379. See Affidavit of Luis Sancho in Support of TRO and Preliminary Injunction at 2, 
Sancho v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 578 F. Supp. 2d 1258 (D. Haw. 2008) (No. CV08-00136-HG-
KSC). 
 380. See Sancho v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 578 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1259 (D. Haw. 2008). 
 381. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347 (2006).
 382. See Sancho, 578 F. Supp. 2d at 1259, 1265.  
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plaintiffs sought to require an environmental impact statement from the U.S. 
government in its role of funding and participating in the LHC project.383
While Sancho v. Department of Energy had all the hallmarks of a case that 
would not be taken seriously by the court, Judge Helen Gillmor, as indicated by 
her opinion, handled the case conscientiously and thoughtfully.384 Notably, she 
did not disparage the merits of the plaintiffs’ claim, writing, “It is clear that 
Plaintiffs’ action reflects disagreement among scientists about the possible 
ramifications of the operation of the Large Hadron Collider. This extremely 
complex debate is of concern to more than just the physicists.”385
Yet the outcome was still what one would tend to expect—the case was 
dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.386 The federal government’s funding and 
involvement did not provide a sufficient nexus for substantive jurisdiction 
under NEPA.387 Gillmor’s opinion suggested that the political process was the 
appropriate forum for airing what it characterized as a policy disagreement.388
Thus, in American courts, the question remains: What cause of action could be 
used to force CERN to defend a suit on the merits? 
B. Stating a Claim 
If the LHC destroyed the planet, there would be no legal problem (though 
the practical problem is plain) with suing CERN for damages. Getting an 
injunction ahead of time, however, requires a bit more thought.  
The case for an injunction would be easy, of course, if CERN explicitly 
threatened to intentionally destroy the Earth. Threatening an illegal act is 
grounds for an injunction,389 and compacting the Earth down into a marble-
sized black hole would involve a significant amount of trespass, battery, and 
conversion, not to mention the violation of an impressive array of regulations, 
ordinances, and criminal statutes. But the only action CERN has signaled it will 
intentionally do is turn on the LHC. Thus, to get an injunciton on the basis of a 
threat of illegal action, plaintiffs would have to show that CERN, or some other 
necessary party, would be violating a law merely by starting up the LHC.  
Suppose there were a Worldwide Accelerator Safety Administration that 
promulgated safety standards having the force of law.390 If the LHC violated 
 383. See id. at 1262–63, 1265. 
 384. See generally id. at 1258. 
 385. Id. at 1269.  
 386. See id. at 1268. 
 387. See id.
 388. Id. at 1269 (quoting Metro. Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 
766, 777 (1983)). 
 389. Threatening an illegal act is grounds for an injunction if the harm is irreparable and 
the other requirements are met. See, e.g., Hurley v. Bd. of Miss. Levee Comm’rs, 23 So. 580, 
581 (Miss. 1898); Smart v. Hart, 44 N.W. 514, 514 (Wis. 1890). 
 390. Euan MacDonald suggested, in response to my PrawfsBlawg posts about the LHC, 
that a global administrative law regime would be well-suited to dealing with particle accelerator 
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one of those standards, an injunction would be a slam dunk. There being no 
such thing, the Sancho plaintiffs tried using NEPA to fill the gap, but the 
attenuated nature of the U.S. government’s involvement stretched the claim too 
far.391 Besides, even if a NEPA violation were found, the statute would only 
require a pause in the LHC program while an environmental-impact statement 
was prepared.392 Perhaps such a delay might provide time to galvanize public 
opposition and bring about a permanent shut down of the LHC through 
political means. But in such a case, the ultimate authority would not lie with the 
courts. From a legal standpoint, the more compelling question to consider is 
whether the courts, by themselves, have the inherent power to enjoin an activity 
solely on the basis of a perceived risk. 
There are at least two common contexts in which such injunctions 
frequently arise: domestic violence and trade secrets. Domestic-violence 
injunctions, usually termed “restraining orders” or “orders of protection,” are an 
everyday occurrence.393 Authorized by statute, such injunctions do not require 
that physical injury has been previously suffered or even specifically 
threatened.394 Thus, such injunctions have an independent legal existence in 
that they do not depend upon the violation or the explicitly threatened violation 
of any law. Trade-secret injunctions are also an unremarkable occurrence. 
Courts may issue prophylactic injunctions where there is a danger that trade 
secrets may be misappropriated in the future—even where it is stipulated that 
safety issues. Posting of Euan MacDonald to Global Administrative Law, 
http://globaladminlaw.blogspot.com/2009/01/global-administrative-law-and-end-of.html (Jan. 
20, 2009, 13:47 EST). 
 391. See Sancho, 578 F. Supp. 2d at 1266–67. 
 392. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(i) (requiring an environmental impact statement 
for “major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment”); 
COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ACITIZEN’S GUIDE 
TO THE NEPA: HAVING YOUR VOICE HEARD 2 (2007), http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa/Citizens_ 
Guide_Dec07.pdf (noting that “NEPA requires agencies to undertake an assessment of the 
environmental effects of their proposed actions prior to making decisions”). 
 393. See, e.g., Beth I.Z. Boland & Susan M. Finegan, Survey of Key Developments in the 
SJC’s Recent Approach to Domestic Violence Issues: Jacobsen, Frizado, Kwiatkowski, and 
R.H. v. B.F., BOSTON B. J. 10, 10, Jan.–Feb. 1996 (finding that 46,265 restraining orders were 
issued in Massachusetts during a one-year period in 1994 and1995); John W. Fountain & 
Joseph Kirby, Stalking Victims Find Laws Are Little Help, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 5, 1992, at D1 
(reporting that 35,346 violations of orders of protection occurred during a five-month period in 
1992); Record Number of Restraining Orders Issued in S. Florida, PALM BEACH POST, Mar. 17, 
1992, at 4B (stating that, in a three-county area of Florida, 8,224 restraining orders were issued 
in 1991); Lisa Redmond, When Dating Goes Bad, Teens Seek Date in Court, LOWELL SUN 1,
Aug. 17, 2006, available at http://www.ncdsv.org/images/When%20Dating%20Goes%20Bad_ 
Teens%20Seek%20Date%20in%20Court.pdf (noting that there were in excess of 32,000 
restraining orders issued yearly in Massachusetts in 2001, 2002, and 2003). 
 394. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 4-501(b)(1)(ii), 4-505, 4-506 (West 2006); 
W.VA. CODE ANN. §§ 48-27-101, 48-27-202, 48-27-501, 48-27-502 (Lexis 2004); WYO. STAT.
ANN. §§ 35-21-102(a)(iii)(B), 35-21-104, 35-21-105 (2009). 
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the defendant has not used and does not intend to use certain confidential 
information.395
Outside of these specific contexts, injunctions against a mere chance of 
future injury are rare. The question for the black-hole case is: Do the courts 
have the general power to enjoin conduct simply because it is adjudged to be 
unreasonably unsafe—in other words, can courts enjoin negligence?
Issuing an injunction against negligence—as such, and without more—is a 
concept that is largely foreign to American jurisprudence. One commentator 
has remarked, “It is well settled that equity will not interfere when the 
apprehended injury or harm is doubtful or speculative.”396 But such a statement 
goes too far. Under the right circumstances, though they are quite infrequent, 
the courts will indeed enjoin negligence. It is, however, doubtlessly fair to say 
that it is generally the case that the courts will not use equity where the harm is 
speculative. But why? 
The first reason has to do with where the uncertainty lies in the injunction 
case. In the most ordinary sort of injunction case, uncertainty arises with regard 
to the law. But when negligence is to be enjoined, the uncertainty arises with 
regard to the facts—specifically, future facts. For example, when a group of 
homeowners seeks to enjoin an airport from extending its hours of operation, 
the question is not whether extended operation will produce additional noise—
that much is clear—the question, instead, is whether the homeowners have a 
legal right that will be violated by the additional landings and take-offs. Courts 
can easily solve legal uncertainty—that is their forte.  
Resolving factual uncertainty, however, is more difficult. Moreover, the 
factual uncertainty that must be wrestled with when considering an injunction 
against negligence is more challenging than that which must be dealt with when 
deciding an ex post397 negligence case as a matter of law. This additional level 
of difficulty arises because of the particular kind of factual uncertainty 
involved. Where factual uncertainty exists in an ex post negligence case, it will 
not regard whether or not an injury was suffered. With rare exceptions, the 
injury in an ex post negligence case is undisputed fact. But in an ex ante398
negligence injunction case, the injury itself is uncertain, and injury is an 
indispensable element of a negligence cause of action.399
 395. See, e.g., Uniform Trade Secrets Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.2 (2008); Illinois Trade 
Secrets Act, 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1065/3 (2009); PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 
1263, 1270–72 (7th Cir. 1995) (issuing a preliminary injunction preventing the defendant’s 
employment of a person having knowledge of another company’s trade secrets because of the 
danger of misappropriation). 
 396. See JAMES M. FISCHER, UNDERSTANDING REMEDIES 245 (2d ed. 2006). 
 397. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 620 (8th ed. 2004) (defining ex post as: “Based on 
knowledge and fact; viewed after the fact, in hindsight; objective; retrospective.”). 
 398. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 601 (8th ed. 2004) (defining ex ante as: “Based on 
assumption and prediction, on how things appeared beforehand, rather than in hindsight; 
subjective; prospective”). 
 399. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 258 (2000). 
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Allowing a cause of action for an unaccrued injury is troublesome because 
even if a court were to decide that a particular course of action is negligent—
that is violative of a standard of reasonable care with regard to a plaintiff to 
whom the defendant owes a duty—it then remains forever uncertain as to 
whether a protectable interest would have been invaded. For instance, a 
plaintiff may drive negligently all day long without causing any damage or 
injury. In such a case, we would agree that no legal interest has been invaded—
unless and until someone actually gets injured as a result of the negligent 
driving. 
The second reason that negligence generally is not proscribed by injunction 
is that the type of situation that would present such a claim almost never arises. 
In reality, there is seldom an occasion to ask a court to use its equity powers to 
enjoin negligence. When people desire safety—negligence’s antonym—
regulations and legislative solutions are the habitual resort. Even people who 
anticipate injury do not generally know who will injure them. A driver 
prospectively fearful of injury from vehicular negligence, for example, would 
not know whom to sue. Thus, traffic policing and vehicle safety codes are the 
usual legal means for decreasing the chance of injury on the road.  
Even in those instances where a particular defendant is identifiable, 
criminal and regulatory schemes almost always fill the need. Imagine having a 
next-door neighbor who drinks heavily at night and discharges firearms in his 
front yard while your kids are playing outside. Is your neighbor acting 
negligently? Yes. But is an injunction is necessary? Hardly. A simple call to the 
police will take care of the problem. The police have at their disposal a myriad 
of ordinances and state laws to use in charging the miscreant. 
Relatedly, where safety is concerned, those agitating for change ordinarily 
take on their task for the benefit of the general public against a multiplicity of 
actors. Aggrieved parents or loved-ones often seek regulatory or statutory 
reform that will, in their view, prevent the kind of accident that caused their 
suffering. Thus, safety concerns generally translate into work for lobbyists 
rather than courtroom lawyers. In other words, ex-ante concern often makes for 
agitants, but it rarely makes for litigants. 
Thus, cases which can be said to establish grounds for enjoining negligence 
in the rarefied air of pure equity—and not within a statutory or regulatory 
framework—are sparse.400 When posited, the question of enjoining negligence 
puts in conflict two important sets of values. On the one hand, the law has a 
general disinclination to injunctions. As restrictions on liberty, American law 
finds injunctions inherently uncomfortable. On the other hand, the courts are 
loathe to gamble with human life and limb. In considering these values, it 
follows that courts must, despite discomfort, enjoin negligence on those 
occasions when equity requires.  
 400. It should be noted that the rarity of reported cases does not necessarily mean that 
grants of equitable relief in the trial courts are nearly so uncommon. 
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Indeed, the reporter volumes contain several examples where courts have 
done so. Courts have approved injunctions where the where a dangerous child 
sought to attend school,401 and where a telephone-company employee with 
health issues sought to avoid the hazard of other employees smoking tobacco 
near her.402 In one case, a federal district court enjoined the proposed placement 
of a homeless shelter next to a psychiatric hospital on the basis that it put 
patients at significant risk, writing, “Activities which threaten human life are 
cognizable and may be enjoined even before the threat matures to result in 
physical injury or death.”403
A case that is closer to the facts of the black-hole cases—though one that 
ultimately resulted in the denial of an injunction—is Brennan v. Gellick.404
Decided in 1892, it is a case of its era, one that would almost certainly not come 
to court today, since modern safety regulations would render it pointless. In 
Brennan, the court declined to enjoin the continued blasting of bedrock, even 
though the blasting that had already been done had caused considerable damage 
to the plaintiff’s neighboring property.405 The court identified powerful policy 
interests against such an injunction, figuring that “[t]o hold that blasting in the 
City of New York is intrinsically dangerous and unlawful would be to put an 
end to all public improvements.”406 But Brennan does not stand for the 
proposition that negligence cannot be enjoined. To the contrary, the court left 
open such a possibility using analysis quite compatible with an injunction in the 
black-hole case.407 The Brennan court found that on the facts before it, the 
plaintiff actually was without “adequate cause to fear irreparable injury,” 
therefore making an injunction unwarranted.408 The plaintiff was invited to re-
apply if sufficient evidence eventually accumulated.409
The right set of facts for an injunction arrived more than 50 years later in 
the case of Harris Stanley Coal & Land Co. v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway 
Co.410 The dispute arose in mountainous eastern Kentucky, with the plaintiff 
 401. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 327 (1988) (recognizing “the equitable powers of 
district courts [to] temporarily enjoin a dangerous disabled child from attending school.”).  
 402. Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 368 A.2d 408 (N.J. Super. Ch. 1976) (recognizing 
a “common-law right to a safe working environment” and finding that “such work area was 
unsafe due to a preventable hazard which the court had power to enjoin.”); see also Smith v. 
Western Elec. Co., 643 S.W.2d 10 (Mo. App. 1982).  
 403. Seide v. Prevost, 536 F. Supp. 1121, 1133 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (denying a request for an 
injunction, made by patients at a psychiatric hospital to prevent the erection of a homeless 
shelter next to the hospital, because the patients did not meet their burden of proof). 
 404. See French v. Vix, 21 N.Y.S. 1016, 1023 note (N.Y. Ct. Com. Pl. 1893) (discussing 
Brennan v. Gellick, a case decided in the superior court of New York City on April 28, 1892). 
 405. See id.
 406. See id.
 407. See id. 
 408. Id.
 409. See id.
 410. Harris Stanley Coal & Land Co. v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 154 F.2d. 450 (6th 
Cir. 1946). 
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railroad suing for an injunction to stop the defendant coal mine from 
underground pillar-pulling operations, which, according to the railroad’s 
allegations, would cause surface subsidence and landslides that would injure 
railroad property and operations.411 Notably, the case arose during World War 
II, a time of increased demand for coal-based energy.412
The district court heard testimony from expert witnesses offered by both 
sides, with like numbers attesting to and denying the alleged danger.413 The 
district court ruled in favor of the coal company, reasoning “that the issuance of 
the injunction would cause great injury to the coal company, [and] confer no 
comparable benefit on the railroad.”414 Slipping and subsidence caused by the 
pillar pulling, the court found, was possible and even probable, but there was 
some doubt as to whether railroad property would in fact be damaged.415
Regardless, property damage could be remedied with money damages, the 
district court reasoned.416 As to the prospect of a landslide occurring at a 
precise time and place so as to kill people, the district court reasoned that such 
an outcome “would require a coincidence of events that can hardly be raised to 
the status of probability.”417
The Sixth Circuit reversed.418 The appellate court emphasized that the 
primary test in equity for an injunction was whether the remedy at law—money 
damages—would be adequate.419 Acknowledging low odds of disaster, the 
court emphasized the magnitude of the possible harm at issue.420 The court’s 
analysis is highly applicable to the black-hole case: 
If the threatened injury to the railroad right-of-way be envisioned merely as 
the sliding of some of the surface material of the mountain upon the railroad 
right-of-way necessitating some expense in its removal and in the repair of 
the roadbed, we might well say that recovery of damages in a suit at law 
provides adequate remedy. We have here, however, a railroad over which 
pass trains bearing passengers and freight. Their daily number is not 
disclosed by the record, and being but a branch line it may be assumed that 
the traffic is not heavy. Nevertheless, traffic there is, and the effect of a 
substantial mountain slide upon a passing train might well be catastrophic. It 
may be that such disaster could occur only upon a concatenation of 
circumstances of not too great probability, and that the odds are against it. It 
is common experience, however, that catastrophies occur at unexpected times 
and in unforeseen places . . . . A court of equity will not gamble with human 
 411. See id. at 452. 
 412. Id. at 451. 
 413. See id. at 452. 
 414. See id.
 415. See id.
 416. See id.
 417. Id.
 418. See id. at 454. 
 419. Id. at 453. 
 420. Id. 
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life, at whatever odds, and for loss of life there is no remedy that in an 
equitable sense is adequate.421
The last three sentences seem particularly fitting to the black-hole case—
especially when one considers that the factual context is subsiding earth. Thus, 
although perhaps quite unusual, courts clearly have the power to enjoin conduct 
where human life is at issue. What is more, Harris Stanley Coal indicates that 
declining to do so may be reversible error.422
C. Getting Jurisdiction 
Getting jurisdiction over CERN in Switzerland or France, where CERN’s 
campus is located, would be elementary—except for the treaties CERN has 
established with its host states.423 The treaties guarantee CERN immunity from 
legal process,424 inviolability of its grounds and buildings,425 and inviolability 
of its documents and archives.426
As is the norm for intergovernmental organizations, CERN is required to 
make provisions of some kind for settling disputes with private parties.427 To 
meet its obligation, CERN is not required to submit to the jurisdiction of any 
court; instead, CERN is merely required to provide for arbitration or something 
similar.428 There are no detailed requirements. The Swiss treaty requires only 
that CERN “make provision for appropriate methods of settlement of . . . 
disputes in private law to which the Organization is a party.”429 The French 
treaty requires CERN to “lay down appropriate rules” for contract disputes and 
to submit other disputes to arbitration.430
Thus far, it appears that no plaintiffs have attempted to avail themselves of 
an opportunity to undertake arbitration by serving a demand upon CERN. With 
the laboratory in control of the form of such arbitration, such a demand might 
well be pointless for objectors. 
CERN’s immunities do not, however, extend globally. Specifically, no 
immunities would protect CERN in a U.S. court. Instead, the problem with 
filing suit in the United States is getting personal jurisdiction.  
 421. Id.
 422. Id. at 454–55.  
 423. See CERN-Fr., supra note 22, art. I–III, VI–VIII; CERN-Switz., supra note 22, art. 2-
4, 6.
 424. See CERN-Fr., supra note 22, art. VI; CERN-Switz., supra note 22, art. 6. 
 425. See CERN-Fr., supra note 22, art. III; CERN-Switz., supra note 22, art. 3. 
 426. See CERN-Fr., supra note 22, art. VIII; CERN-Switz., supra note 22, art. 4. 
 427. See Nathalie Hornbach & Pieter Bekker, The Concept of Sovereignty Within Nuclear 
Energy Law, STATE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 427, 449 (Gerard Kreijen 
ed., 2002). 
 428. See CERN- Fr., supra note 22, art. XIX; CERN-Switz., supra note 22, art. 24. 
 429. CERN-Switz., supra note 22, art. 24; see also Hornbach & Bekker, supra note 427, at 
449.
 430. See CERN-Fr., supra note 22, art. XIX. 
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The most fascinating question in this regard is whether a state could 
exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant whose only connection to the 
state was the hypothetical injury from an anticipated tort. For example, could 
Hawaii exercise jurisdiction over CERN, even if CERN had no Hawaii 
contacts, solely on the basis that the apprehended harm, should it come to 
fruition, would obliterate Hawaii? There are strong arguments that jurisdiction 
should work this way, especially in cases where lack of such jurisdiction would 
leave the case wholly injudicable. 
In reality, however, no such legal machinations are necessary when it 
comes to the LHC because CERN has left itself open to suit in U.S. courts. In 
CERN’s desire to cut costs for the LHC program, CERN has established 
sufficient contacts with the United States to provide for personal jurisdiction.  
In Illinois, for example, the jurisdiction issue would be clear-cut. Illinois’s 
long-arm statute provides for in personam jurisdiction to the full extent allowed 
by the U.S. Constitution.431 The Constitution permits a state to exercise 
jurisdiction over a defendant even if the defendant does not reside in that state, 
so long as the defendant has “certain minimum contacts with it such that the 
maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.’”432 Sufficient minimum contacts requires that the defendant 
has “purposely avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within 
the forum State.”433 That availment has occurred in Illinois, because although 
the collider itself resides in Europe, an important portion of LHC operations are 
conducted in Illinois434—more than enough to satisfy the requirements of 
minimum contacts and purposeful availment.  
One aspect of CERN’s Illinois contacts is the LHC Computing Grid 
(“LCG”). A worldwide network of computers, the LCG is to be used to process 
and analyze the data gathered by LHC experiments.435 The LCG is crucial to 
the LHC project because the LHC’s mission of scientific discovery is possible 
only through the analysis of the enormous amounts of data gathered by the 
LHC detectors.436 The primary reason CERN created the LCG was money.437
When CERN began working on the design for the LHC computing systems in 
 431. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-209(c) (West Supp. 2009). 
 432. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
 433. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). 
 434. See Erik Sofge, Large Hadron Collider Turns on Sept. 10, Tests Beam on Weekend,
POPULAR MECHANICS, Aug. 7, 2008, http://www.popularmechanics.com/science/extreme_ 
machines/4276847.html. 
 435. See Memorandum of Understanding for Collaboration in the Deployment and 
Exploitation of the Worldwide LHC Computing Grid CERN-C-RRB-2005-01 2 (Apr. 4, 2008), 
available at https://lcg.web.cern.ch/LCG/MoU/Template%20blanks/WLCGMoU_4April2008_ 
blank2.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum of Understanding]. 
 436. See CERN, Aims of the WLCG Project, http://lcg.web.cern.ch/lcg/public/aims.htm 
(last visited Nov. 30, 2009). 
 437. See CERN, Distributed Computing, http://lcg.web.cern.ch/lcg/public/distributed.htm 
(last visited Nov. 30, 2009). 
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1999, CERN realized that the necessary computer capacity was far beyond its 
funding abilities.438 Some measure of the LHC’s computing needs is found in 
the amount of data it will generate. When active, the LHC will produce about 
15 petabytes of data per year.439 If put on CDs, 15 petabytes require a stack 
more than 12 miles high.440
Thus, the LCG exists to utilize computer capacity at sites around the world. 
Assets and personnel in the United States are slated to handle a quarter of the 
full nominal data rate, and half of that will be handled by Fermilab in Batavia, 
Illinois.441 CERN has also formed a relationship with several American 
universities for computing services, including the University of Chicago.442
CERN provides overall management and coordination for the LCG,443 while 
receiving around-the-clock grid operations support from Fermilab and the 
Brookhaven National Laboratory in New York.444 Stateside staff, though 
technically employed by their American institutions, are granted the status of 
“Associate Member of the Personnel of CERN” to the extent they are required 
to perform work on the CERN site in Europe.445
Much less has been found to provide personal jurisdiction. In Verizon 
Online Services, Inc. v. Ralsky, for example, a federal district court held that 
using a computer network within Virginia was enough for jurisdiction in that 
state.446
Other than the LCG, additional aspects of CERN’s operations would 
provide for jurisdiction as well, including travel by CERN personnel to the 
United States for various collaborations, such as the fabrication of LHC 
components in American laboratories.447
 438. See id.
 439. See CERN, WLCG Worldwide LHC Computing Grid, http://lcg.web.cern.ch/lcg/ 
public/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2009). 
 440. See CERN, supra note 38, at 45 (“The data flow from all four experiments will be 
about 700 MB/s, that is around 15 000 000 (=15 PB) per year, corresponding to a stack of CDs 
about 20 km tall each year.”). 
 441. See Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 435, at A8.2 (noting that the target 
data rate at FNAL is 200 megabytes per second). FNAL is the standard acronym to represent 
Fermilab in Batavia, Illinois. See generally Fermilab, http://www.fnal.gov (last visited Nov. 30, 
2009).  
 442. See id. at A2.4, A2.5.  
 443. See id. at A3.2.  
 444. See id. at A6.12. BNL is the standard acronym to represent Brookhaven National 
Laboratory in Upton, New York. See generally Brookhaven National Laboratory, 
http://www.bnl.gov/world (last visited Nov. 30, 2009).  
 445. See id. at 9.  
 446. See Verizon Online Servs., Inc. v. Ralsky, 203 F. Supp. 2d 601, 604 (E.D. Va. 2002).  
 447. See, e.g., International Co-operation Agreement Between the European Organization 
for Nuclear Research (CERN) and the Department of Energy of the United States of America 
and the National Science Foundation of the United States of America Concerning Scientific and 
Technical Co-operation on Large Hadron Collider Activities 1997, U.S.-CERN, art. IV, Dec. 8, 
1997, 1997 U.S.T. LEXIS 32 [hereinafter U.S.-CERN]. 
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VI. CONUNDRUMS FOR COURTS
Although the LHC provides some unique problems for plaintiffs, the most 
mind-bending challenges are those that await a judge.  
So far, no LHC litigation has reached the merits of the controversy. Perhaps 
none will. Many courts, perhaps most, would be predisposed to clear such a 
case off the docket through jurisdictional or procedural means, to the extent 
doing so is plausible.  
Nonetheless, the question of how a court could or would tackle the merits is 
a fascinating inquiry. The effort creates several puzzles.  
Especially intriguing, I think, is to consider how the legal problems posed 
by black holes mirror the problems they create for physics. Physicists relate that 
in the vicinity of a gravitational singularity, equations break down, and the 
known laws of physics seem to fail.448 Below, with reference to American law, I 
discuss three lines of legal doctrine that suffer similarly: preliminary-injunction 
analysis, expert-testimony gatekeeping, and cost-benefit analysis. Developed 
for a world of automobile accidents, toxic waste, and teratogenic 
pharmaceuticals, these doctrines all start to break down when confronted with 
the extreme facts of the black-hole case. 
A. The Preliminary Injunction Puzzle 
Under American law, a preliminary injunction is a way for a court to order 
an immediate halt to a specified activity, without the necessity of going through 
a full course of discovery and trial. The hearing can be held as quickly as 10 
days after the defendant has been given notice, and the injunction will last until 
the completion of a trial on the merits—a process that can take years. 
Preliminary-injunction requests are common in intellectual-property cases, 
environmental cases, and with certain other fact patterns, such as impending 
plans to demolish buildings of historical significance. 
To get a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must make a certain showing 
under a certain preliminary injunction standard.449 Different courts articulate 
the standards differently, and generally speaking, a given court will enunciate 
alternative formulations, with plaintiffs being the beneficiary of whichever 
formulation best fits the facts of their case.450 Across the sundry modes of 
preliminary injunction analysis, there are two essential lines of inquiry: (1) how 
likely it is that the plaintiffs will ultimately prevail at trial and (2) how much of 
a need there is for the requested preliminary relief.451 There is an inverse 
 448. See GREENE, supra note 13, at 337. 
 449. See Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence v. Salazar, 612 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D. 
D.C. 2009). 
 450. See id. 
 451. See id. 
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relationship between the two factors: the more required under one line of 
inquiry, the less required under the other.452
One of the formulations, which allows for a preliminary injunction even in 
very speculative cases, requires a showing (1) that “serious questions are 
raised” and (2) that the hardships that would be caused by the injunction tip 
“sharply” in favor of the plaintiff.453 Let us examine the LHC case under this 
standard.  
First, compare the hardships. Granting the requested relief would shut 
down, possibly for years, one of the most expensive, complex, and ambitious 
scientific undertakings in human history. Further, the discoveries the LHC 
could enable, which might alter and greatly expand our understanding of the 
universe, would be removed years into the future. Finally, a preliminary 
injunction would idle thousands of workers at CERN. That is a lot of hardship.  
On the other side of the scales is the Earth and everyone on it being 
devoured by a black hole.454
Result? The black-hole disaster tips the scales well beyond “sharply.” No 
doubt about that. 
Now we just need to consider whether “serious questions” are raised. This 
is where the analysis gets difficult. Human extinction is certainly “serious” in 
one sense of the word, but this is not, of course, the sense with which we are 
concerned. What the court must do is determine whether there are questions 
which ought to be taken seriously.
So, should a court take these questions seriously? The plaintiffs say there is 
a significant chance the world might end. The defendants say the LHC presents 
“no conceivable danger.”455
Who is right? Who is wrong? Let us put ourselves in the position of the 
judge. Our first instinct is to make an independent evaluation of the matter. So, 
what result do we get when we check the calculations for ourselves? 
Of course, that is precisely the problem. We can do no such thing. The 
subject is utterly recondite. The few people on Earth who are capable of 
intimately understanding the subject matter form a very exclusive club. Judges 
and lawyers are not members. 
“Modern particle physics is, in a literal sense, incomprehensible,”456 wrote 
David Lindley, a former research fellow with the Theoretical Astrophysics 
 452. See id. at 11–12 (discussing the “sliding scale”). 
 453. Charlie’s Girls, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 483 F.2d 953, 954 (2d Cir. 1973) (emphasis 
added); see also Freecycle Network, Inc. v. Oey, 505 F.3d 898, 902 (9th Cir. 2007); Earth 
Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 442 F.3d 1147, 1158 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 454. One might object that the gross amount of hardship weighed by the court on behalf of 
the plaintiffs should be discounted by the probability that a black-hole disaster will not come to 
pass. For a discussion of this kind of mathematical manipulation, see discussion infra Part VI.C. 
The upshot is that the harm of a black-hole disaster is so great, it tends to swamp even 
tremendous probability discounting. 
 455. LSAG, supra note 179, at cover page. 
 456. DAVID LINDLEY, THE END OF PHYSICS: THE MYTH OF A UNIFIED THEORY 18 (1993). 
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Group at Fermilab.457 “It is grounded,” he wrote, “in a sophisticated and 
indirect mathematical language of fields and interactions and wave-
functions.”458 Particle physicists speak, according to Lindley, “in a private 
gobbledygook understandable only to those similarly initiated.”459
In particular, the Giddings and Mangano article,460 the “mammoth”461 paper 
at the heart of the scientific controversy, is so complex that CERN’s Ellis 
seemed to think it might not be understandable “even to reasonably well-
educated physicists” who were not trained in particle physics.462 What chance, 
then, does a judge have of thoroughly understanding the matter when 
considering the matter on a motion for preliminary injunction?463 Keep in mind 
that the hearing for a preliminary injunction might be set for 10 days after the 
commencement of the lawsuit.  
Perhaps I might be a kind of yardstick. My ability to pick up and 
understand the physics in the black-hole case is probably about what one would 
find on the bench. In the course of writing this article, I have had a great deal of 
time to educate myself about the science—probably much more time than a 
judge would have. But while I am now able to follow along with much of the 
scientific argumentation, that capacity is far short of what would be required for 
me to comfortably step in and say that one scientific contention is right and 
another is wrong. 
Thus, with the scientific controversy before us, we lawyers are sent looking 
for our old fallback in such a situation—the place we knew we were headed all 
along: expert testimony. 
 457. See id. on book jacket. 
 458. Id. at 18. 
 459. Id. at 19. 
 460. See generally Giddings & Mangano, supra note 211. 
 461. Ellis, supra note 83 (beginning at 2 min.). 
 462. Id. (explaining that the LSAG distilled down the key arguments of the Giddings and 
Mangano paper to a level similar to the magazine Physics Today so that any reasonably well-
educated physicist, even if not trained in particle physics, could understand it) (beginning at 3 
min.).  
 463. To be precise, I should note that under some hypothetical facts, one can imagine that a 
judge might indeed quickly uncover physical questions that could be judged as “serious,” and 
on that basis issue an injunction. But if the scientific arguments of CERN were so transparently 
unpersuasive, one imagines that public opinion could likely, if not certainly, shut down the LHC 
without the court’s help. Otherwise, one could imagine that a court might judge a question to be 
serious in the event that CERN simply neglected to respond to some critique that is simple 
enough to be comprehensible to the layman. Indeed, that has arguably happened with regard to 
Plaga’s paper. See discussion supra Part IV.H. Barring such scenarios, we are left with the great 
likelihood that if there were “serious questions” within the equations and data, a judge, even if 
able to perceive such questions, would not be independently able to decide that they were 
serious, regardless of how skillfully the plaintiffs’ lawyers endeavored to explain them. 
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B. Expert Testimony at the Edge  
LHC defender and theoretical physicist Brian Cox wrote, “Whilst I 
understand that much of the language of particle physics is opaque, there does 
come a time when it is worth accepting the views of experts.”464
That sounds reasonable, but, unfortunately, there is a problem with experts. 
While one expert will generally give you information you can use, in an 
adversarial proceeding, you will generally get at least two experts—one on 
either side of the case. The sum of the testimony then becomes much less 
helpful. The point was made in a funny sort of way in a note in the Albany Law 
Journal in 1872: “The summoning of expert witnesses by plaintiff and 
defendant, like the collision of opposing rays of light, ends only in utter 
darkness.”465
One way to choose between dueling teams of experts is to identify the 
experts on one side as having bias. That can be a good tack generally, but it is 
problematic in the black-hole case: Every expert has a very personal stake in 
the matter. Generally speaking, the experts are either afraid for their livelihoods 
or afraid for their lives.  
There is, however, another option. Expert testimony can be weeded out 
before it is even heard. The U.S. Supreme Court has created an entire 
framework for judges to use when litigants attempt to bring science into the 
courtroom through expert testimony. Propitiously for the LHC case, the high 
court’s Daubert trilogy466 was formulated specifically to guide trial courts in 
how to sift out unreliable scientific opinion.  
Daubert provides that in making a threshold determination of scientific 
validity, the courts should look to various factors.467 One consideration is 
whether the expert’s asserted theories are testable, falsifiable, and refutable.468
A moment’s thought reveals that this takes us immediately to a logical 
absurdity, for it is the testing itself that hangs in the balance of the injunction 
determination. The theories of Rössler469 and Plaga470 can only be confirmed 
through the obliteration of the court, the parties, and the planet. The theories of 
 464. See O’Neill, Anyone Who Thinks the LHC Will Destroy the World is a Twat, supra
note 356. (noting that Brian Cox is “often referred to as the ‘rockstar of physics’”); O’Neill, A
Statement By Professor Brian Cox, supra note 356. 
 465. Juries of Experts, 5 ALB. L.J. 227, 227 (1872), quoted in DAVID H. KAYE ET AL., THE 
NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: EXPERT EVIDENCE § 10.2.2, at 336 (2004). Light does 
not behave this way—the technical explanation is that photons do not obey the Pauli exclusion 
principle. See P.C.W. DAVIES, THE FORCES OF NATURE 79 (2d ed. 1986). The author’s sentiment 
about expert testimony, however, is highly accurate. 
 466. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 
522 U.S. 136 (1997); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1992). 
 467. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593. 
 468. See id.
 469. See generally RÖSSLER, supra note 217. 
 470. See generally Plaga, supra note 303. 
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the CERN scientists cannot, in the strict sense, be confirmed at all, since 
incident-free operation of the LHC, even for a period of years, does nothing to 
confirm its safety on a continuing basis. Of course, CERN’s theories are, 
technically speaking, falsifiable—but only in the unhelpful event that the Earth 
is destroyed, which renders any hypothetical falsifiability illusory, making it 
useless as an indication of scientific validity. 
Yet the problems of testability, falsifiability, and refutability go even 
deeper—beyond the work of Giddings and Mangano471 and straight to the heart 
of contemporary particle physics. Unlike other fields of modern science, such 
as cell biology or organic chemistry, particle physics has reached a level of 
theoreticalization such that it is substantially divorced from real-world concepts 
of testability.  
Lindley describes “the inexorable progress of physics from the world we 
can see and touch into a world made accessible only by huge and expensive 
experimental equipment, and on into a world illuminated by the intellect 
alone.”472 Even some within the particle-physics community think that “the 
trend toward increasing abstraction is turning theoretical physics into 
recreational mathematics,”473 an effort that is becoming “ultimately 
meaningless because the objects of the mathematical manipulations are forever 
beyond the access of experiment and measurement.”474
While reproducibility is a hallmark of validity in most scientific disciplines, 
particle physicists have exempted themselves from its stringent requirements. 
Experiments are not duplicated in any normal sense because of the expense of 
the experimental apparatuses.475 As anthropologist Sharon Traweek explains:  
The meaning of the word reproducible here is problematic: no two detectors 
are alike. No one could get funding to build a copy of another detector and no 
one would want to try: there would be no credit and influence to be gained. 
Furthermore, only the group that built the original would have the knowledge 
to build the copy.476
In discussing the indirect evidence relied upon by Carlos Rubbia and 
CERN physicists in 1981 for claiming discovery of the W and Z bosons, 
science historians Lloyd Motz and Jefferson Hane Weaver wrote, “One cannot 
avoid a feeling of uneasiness about this kind of physics, since so much of it is 
based on the assumed existence of particles that cannot be observed.”477
Given such a state, it is not clear that any particle-physics testimony should 
be allowed in the courtroom. The singular and perhaps dubious methodological 
 471. See generally Giddings & Mangano, supra note 211. 
 472. LINDLEY, supra note 456, at 19. 
 473. Id.
 474. Id.
 475. See TRAWEEK, supra note 247, at 159. 
 476. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 477. LLOYD MOTZ & JEFFERSON HANE WEAVER, THE STORY OF PHYSICS 354–55 (1989). 
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pedigree of the particle-physics discipline might require its exclusion from the 
courtroom if it were somehow offered as proof of causation in a personal injury 
case or to identify the assailant in a murder trial. But the black-hole case is 
different. Drawing a line in the sand against all particle-physics testimony 
would be equivalent to judicial abstention. The lack of traditional scientific 
rigor does not merely cut against the testimony of pro-LHC experts; it cuts 
against the plaintiffs’ experts as well. That is because the only way to make the 
argument that a particle accelerator could destroy the planet is to do so on the 
basis of modern physical theory. 
Daubert instructs that another pertinent, though not dispositive 
consideration is whether the scientific theory at issue has been subjected to peer 
review and publication.478 At first blush, this would seem to favor CERN’s 
experts heavily. The Giddings and Mangano article was published by Physical 
Review D, a peer-reviewed journal.479 Rössler’s paper, as he predicted, was 
rejected by the usual journals.480 Plaga’s paper481 has not been printed in a 
journal either. Yet looked at a little bit more carefully, we see that CERN is not 
really gaining ground here. First of all, Rössler’s and Plaga’s papers have been 
published and submitted to peer-review in the sense that they have been made 
available on the internet, and the internet enables the scientific community to 
discuss and scrutinize, as well as to memorialize the resulting dialectic. Indeed, 
that is precisely what happened to Rössler’s and Plaga’s papers—they were 
scrutinized and discussed at length.482 One might argue that this is not the 
authentic kind of peer review and publication that Daubert is talking about. But 
that is not true. Daubert does not extol peer-review and publication because 
they serve as stamps of approval.483 Blackmun’s opinion lauds peer review and 
publication because “submission to the scrutiny of the scientific community is a 
component of ‘good science,’ in part because it increases the likelihood that 
substantive flaws in methodology will be detected.”484 It is important to point 
out that the Court in Daubert actually overturned a lower-court decision that 
excluded testimony on unpublished science that was not subjected to peer 
review.485 Moreover, Daubert does not refer to “peer-reviewed publication,” 
but rather “peer review and publication.”486 Rössler and Plaga did exactly that. 
Whether flaws have indeed been revealed is a question that just circles us back 
to the recondite issue of who is correct on the science.  
 478. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593. 
 479. See Giddings & Mangano, supra note 211. 
 480. Note, however, that Rössler has published a related paper in a journal concerned with 
fractals and chaos theory. See Otto E. Rossler, A New Test for E-Infinity Fractal-Spacetime 
Theory, 41 CHAOS, SOLITONS & FRACTALS 2291 (2009). 
 481. See generally Plaga, supra note 303. 
 482. See, e.g., Giddings & Mangano, supra note 211. 
 483. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593. 
 484. Id.
 485. See id. at 584. 
 486. See id.
876 TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:819 
A final consideration from Daubert is the notion of “general 
acceptance.”487 Daubert teaches that general acceptance among the scientific 
community, or the lack of such acceptance, may have a bearing on the 
admissibility inquiry.488 Here, the “general acceptance” factor heavily favors 
CERN. Rössler’s and Plaga’s theories are not generally accepted by the 
scientific community; CERN’s are. So does that end our inquiry? It cannot. The 
problem is that general acceptance, in this case, causes us to run headlong into 
a problem of bias that has the effect of rendering general acceptance to be 
unprobative. All the experts testifying in the LHC cases are going to have 
demonstrable bias—those in CERN’s favor will tend to fear for their 
livelihoods should they testify against CERN. General acceptance, or the lack 
thereof, from a community of particle physicists means next-to-nothing when 
that community itself has a stake in the matter. 
Moreover, considering general acceptance in the LHC case, we encounter 
circularity. If the Rössler and Plaga theories were generally accepted, and 
CERN’s were not, there would be no litigation in which to consider the issues, 
since LHC construction would have been halted long ago. It is the very fact that 
the theories are not generally accepted that gives rise to the litigation. 
Since it is the conduct of the scientists themselves that is at issue, requiring 
scientific-expert opinion to be “generally accepted” would be tantamount to 
making consensus decisions of the scientific community on laboratory-safety 
issues unsusceptible to judicial review. The very gravamen of the complaint is 
that the particle-physics community has improperly assessed the risk of that 
selfsame community’s great scientific experiment. General acceptance loses its 
validatory power when the community is presumptively biased. 
It should also be noted that Daubert was a repudiation of Frye v. United 
States,489 in which “general acceptance” was the sine qua non of expert 
admissibility.490 Especially when considered together with Daubert’s rejection 
of Frye, the logical inappropriateness of the general-acceptance factor makes it 
clearly unhelpful for sifting through expert testimony in the LHC case. 
In the end, doctrine regarding expert-testimony gatekeeping does nothing to 
help us resolve the dispute. 
C. Cost–Benefit Analysis Blows Up 
To illuminate certain legal questions, such as liability for negligence, there 
is a modern tendency for judges and legal scholars to sometimes undertake the 
task of using cost–benefit analysis to characterize the facts before them.491 The 
 487. Id. at 594. 
 488. See id.
 489. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923); see also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 
589 (noting “[t]hat the Frye test was displaced by the Rules of Evidence”). 
 490. See id. at 1014. 
 491. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS 129 (1999). For a renowned example of such a case, 
see Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1180 (7th 
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exercise is generally traced back to Judge Learned Hand’s opinions in two 
cases involving tugboats: T.J. Hooper492 and United States v. Carroll Towing 
Co.493 The cases involved questions of, respectively, whether the reasonable 
tugboat operator would equip each boat with a radio to receive warnings of 
coming storms494 and whether the reasonable shipping line would keep a bargee 
in attendance to mind a moored barge.495 Hand suggested an algebraic-type 
analysis for precaution-taking in accident cases,496 an endeavor that has come to 
be known as the “Hand formula.”497
According to the Hand formula, a precaution should be undertaken when 
the cost of the burden is less than the probability of accident multiplied by the 
potential loss.498 Hand’s formulation is often expressed symbolically as B < PL,
where B is the burden, P is the probability, and L is the loss.499 If, after 
plugging in the numbers, this inequality is true, then the precaution is 
reasonable, and the defendant who fails to undertake it will bear the liability 
under common-law negligence, admiralty law, or the like.  
The same sort of analysis translates easily to an injunction context, in 
which we can ask whether the benefits outweigh the costs. We can calculate the 
price of risk in a particular endeavor, and then add that to the costs in order to 
compare the sum to the expected benefit. Using P and L from the Hand 
formula, the price of risk, R, is calculated as: 
R = PL            (Eq. 1) 
Let’s try plugging in a few numbers to see what turns up in the black-hole 
case. First, let us assume that since the Earth and everything on it is the sum of 
all value for humanity, there is no price worth paying to absorb that loss. Thus, 
the value of L is infinite.  
Next we need to assign a numerical value for the probability. Let us take, 
for the sake of argument, Giddings and Mangano’s assessment that there is “no 
risk of any significance whatsoever” from the LHC in terms of a planet-
devouring black hole.500 What number do those words suggest? One sensible 
interpretation is that their numerical equivalent is zero. In that case: 
Cir. 1990) (opinion by Judge Richard A. Posner, fashioning liability rule under Illinois law on 
the basis of cost–benefit analysis). 
 492. T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 737 (2d Cir. 1932). 
 493. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 170 (2d Cir. 1947).  
 494. Hooper, 60 F.2d at 737. 
 495. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d at 173. 
 496. Id. 
 497. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 
85 (1987). 
 498. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d at 173; see also Hooper, 60 F.2d at 739. 
 499. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d at 173; see also LANDES & POSNER, supra note 497, at 85. 
 500. See Giddings & Mangano, supra note 211, at 53. 
878 TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:819 
R = 0 ×            (Eq. 2) 
R = 0   
This math tells us that the price of risk is zero. This would mean the LHC is 
a no-lose proposition, and we would not even need to analyze the LHC’s 
benefits to reach the conclusion that no injunction should be issued.  
Of course, another sensible interpretation of the phrase “no risk of any 
significance whatsoever” is that the risk is not quite zero, but is rather a number 
that is incredibly close to zero. After all, Giddings and Mangano qualified the 
words “no risk” with the words “of any significance whatsoever.”501 So let’s 
insert an incredibly tiny number in there—something that, in terms of human 
experience, has “no . . . significance whatsoever.”502 Let’s try one in one 
trillion. In that case: 
R = (1 × 10-12 ) ×          (Eq. 3) 
R =    
As you can see, we have obtained a radically different result. By varying P
by just the tiniest bit—from zero to very-nearly-almost-but-not-quite-exactly 
zero, the price of risk has shot up from nil to infinity. Note that we are not using 
a different assumption for P. Quite to the contrary, in both Equation 2 and 
Equation 3, P equals “no risk of any significance whatsoever.” The only 
difference is in how we translate these words into numbers. In either case, we 
are taking Giddings and Mangano at their word. 
The insertion of infinity into the risk equation causes it to blow up. So, with 
the goal of getting some usable results, let’s reconsider our assumption that the 
destruction of Earth and the killing of every living thing on it is actually an 
infinite loss. Judge Richard A. Posner has analyzed the RHIC/strangelet 
scenario with cost–benefit analysis in the context of whether the U.S. Congress 
or a hypothetical regulatory regime should shut down the RHIC.503 In this 
endeavor, Posner estimated the cost of human extinction, “very conservatively” 
he emphasized, at $600 trillion.504 He arrived at this number by starting with a 
value of $50,000 per life and grossing it up.505 We will come back to scrutinize 
this estimate in a few moments, but for now, let’s fill in the rest of the numbers 
so that we can compare the costs to the benefits. 
Determining the benefits that particle accelerators will provide, Posner 
wrote, is “difficult, maybe impossible.”506 This is the case, he explained, 
because particle accelerators are not designed to provide monetary benefit—
 501. Id.
 502. See id.
 503. See POSNER, supra note 109, at 187–96. 
 504. Id. at 141. 
 505. See id. at 168. 
 506. Id. at 142. 
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rather, they are designed to discover the laws of the universe.507 Nonetheless, he 
concludes, they have, historically, resulted in some useful technological 
spinoffs.508 In consideration of this, Posner “plucked the figure of $250 million 
a year out of the air,” a number which Posner regards as “a gross exaggeration,” 
but one that gives the RHIC the benefit of the doubt.509
We can determine the net benefits of the RHIC according to the following, 
where BR&D is the earned research-and-development benefit ($2.1 billion over 
10 years according to Posner, which is discounted to present value),510 CC&O is 
the costs of construction and operation over the RHIC’s 10-year lifespan 
(Posner’s discounted number is $1.7 billion),511 P is the probability of 
catastrophe (Posner uses 1 in 10 million per year, multiplied by 10 years),512 L
is the price of extinction ($500 trillion after discounting), and Bnet is the net 
benefit. The equation is: 
Bnet = BR&D – CC&O – PL        (Eq. 4)513
With Posner’s numbers plugged in, we can calculate the result: 
Bnet = $2.1 billion – $1.7 billion – (((1 in 10 million)  u 10 years) u $500 
trillion)             (Eq. 5) 
The net benefits calculate out to a negative net benefit of $100 million.514
On this basis, Posner suggests the RHIC experiment may not be worth 
running.515
Posner’s analysis is problematic for several reasons. First, it lacks any 
robustness. The fragile nature of the analysis is easy to demonstrate. Note that 
Posner’s value for yearly research and development gains was plucked “out of 
the air,” and his value for human lives is derived from layers of assumption.516
Thus, it seems entirely fair to pick out somewhat different, though similar, 
numbers and solve the equation again. The result should be just as meaningful.  
For R&D, let us suppose that the gains from the RHIC will be $350 million 
per year—another number plucked out of the air, but with no lesser claim to 
validity. After all, one good patented invention can be worth billions. That fixes 
BR&D at about $3.0 billion, after being multiplied by 10 years and discounted. 
 507. See id. at 143. 
 508. See id.
 509. Id. at 142–43. 
 510. Id. at 142.  
 511. Id.
 512. Id. at 141. 
 513. Posner’s calculations are done in a table, something like a balance sheet. See id. at 
142. I have recast the calculations into the equations represented here. 
 514. Id.
 515. Id. at 197. 
 516. Id. at 143, 168. 
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For human lives, let us pick $35,000 per life—a number that is entirely within 
the same realm of supposition. Grossed up in the same way Posner did with 
$50,000 and discounted, we get around $180 trillion.517 Using these numbers:  
Bnet = $3.0 billion – $1.7 billion – (((1 in 10 million) u 10 years) u $180 
trillion)             (Eq. 6) 
The net benefits calculate out to $1.1 billion in positive gains for the RHIC 
program. That makes it look like a smashing success. Not a boondoggle in the 
slightest. Using equally reasonable numbers, the result came out wildly 
different than Posner’s. How did that happen?  
In Posner’s defense, what he was trying to do was show that even using 
estimates that gave RHIC the benefit of the doubt and then some, the RHIC 
revealed itself to be a waste of money. Regardless, however, our re-running of 
the calculations has shown that the number-crunching lacks meaningfulness. If 
attention is paid to the significance of the numbers chosen, taking into account 
a reasonable margin of error for each, it becomes clear that the values are 
entirely inadequate for the task of deriving any kind of significant result.  
Now, let us come back to Posner’s estimate of the value of cost of human 
extinction at $600 trillion.518 Is this absurd? Posner does not think so. 
According to him, “Valuing human lives is not . . . quite so arbitrary a 
procedure as it may seem. It sounds like an ethical or even a metaphysical 
undertaking, but what actually is involved is determining the value that people 
place on avoiding small risks of death.”519
Working with people’s willingness to pay to avoid low-probability risks of 
death, Posner arrives at a price per human life of $50,000.520 That number in 
hand, he then multiplies it by the world population of six billion.521 This would 
give us a human-extinction cost of $300 trillion, but since Posner has not 
otherwise accounted for future lives, he provides for this omission with a 
“crude adjustment” of doubling the product. The result is $600 trillion.522
Now, wait a minute. Why did Posner calculate the worth of a human life 
based on a person’s willingness to pay for low-probability risks of death? Why 
not high-probability risks? Posner notes that economists have looked at data on 
wages for various occupations with differential risks of death, and, based on 
that data, calculated the premiums demanded by workers for hazardous jobs.523
This exercise shows that workers tend to value their own lives at something 
around $5 million.524 So why did Posner take it down to $50,000? He notes that 
 517. Posner’s calculation in this regard is discussed a few paragraphs below. 
 518. POSNER, supra note 109, at 141. 
 519. Id. at 165. 
 520. Id. at 166–68. 
 521. Id. at 169. 
 522. Id. at 169–70. 
 523. Id. at 165. 
 524. Id. at 166. 
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willingness to pay to avoid risks does not appear to be related in a linear way to 
the probabilities of risk.525 For instance, he notes, if the risk of death were not 
one in a thousand but one in two, people might well demand an infinite amount 
of money to be exposed to such a risk.526
By the same token, Posner figures, at the other end of the asymptotic curve, 
willingness to pay will fall faster than probabilities of death, to the point where, 
he conjectures, people might demand zero compensation for bearing truly 
miniscule risks.527 Thus, Posner picks $50,000 as what he considers to be a 
likely value based on the order of magnitude of risk involved in a planet-ending 
particle-accelerator catastrophe.528
But there is a serious problem with Posner’s argument. It makes no sense to 
scale up from $50,000 for one person to $600 trillion for everyone. Why not? It 
is as simple as this: A human life does not vary in value with the probability 
that it will be extinguished. Indeed, how can it? Dead is dead. The quality of 
death is precisely the same whether a person dies from a low-probability 
accident or a high-probability accident.  
This point is easy to understand if we pause to reflect that probability itself 
is only a mathematical way of representing ignorance.529 Suppose you pick up a 
peach and mull over whether or not to eat it. Let us say there are stated odds of 
one in one billion that the peach is contaminated with a lethal strain of E. coli. 
Now, those may be the odds, but in reality, the peach either has the E. coli, or it 
doesn’t. Once it is tested or eaten, the probability will become either 100% that 
it is contaminated or 100% that it is not. Whether the ex ante odds of E. coli 
contamination were stated at one in a billion or one in three, once you’ve died 
from eating a contaminated peach, you are 100% dead. 
The case of the LHC and black holes is the same. The physical laws of the 
universe are either configured in such a way that proton-proton collisions at 14 
TeV can create dangerous black holes, or the universe is not so configured. The 
probability—to the extent anyone would venture to posit it—would only be a 
representation of our relative ignorance on the subject. 
The fact that an individual’s compensation demands might decrease in a 
non-linear way with decreasing risk—a supposition I am not taking issue 
with—does not indicate that resulting deaths are any more or any less costly; it 
only shows that people are irrational in valuing risk. Irrationality in dealing 
 525. Id.
 526. Id.
 527. Id.
 528. See id. at 166–68. 
 529. Since the instant subject matter concerns particle physics, I should mention that while 
probability is, in the general case, a mathematical way of representing ignorance, that is not the 
case in quantum mechanics. According to quantum theory, the probability of events such as 
radioactive decay or atomic photon emission is one that is described by probabilities that are 
fundamental, not based on human ignorance of underlying conditions. See FORD, supra note 
154, at 114. 
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with risk is nothing new. Posner, himself, has acknowledged it.530 And it has 
been the subject of lengthy treatment by Cass Sunstein.531 A great advantage of 
cost–benefit analysis is that it helps us to analyze choices in some degree of 
shelter from irrationality.532 We lose that advantage by using differential life-
valuation for differential probabilities of harm. The adjustment only 
incorporates the irrationality into the equations.  
Undoing that part of Posner’s analysis, let us go back and take a standard, 
non-adjusted value for human life based on economists’ work: $5 million.533
Now let’s try the calculation again, multiplying the value of one human life, 
Vlife, by the human population of Earth, H.
L = Vlife × H          (Eq. 7)  
L = ($5 × 106)(6 × 109 people) 
L = $30 × 1015
The value of $5 million multiplied by a population of six billion people is 
$30 quadrillion. This cost–benefit analysis looks extremely unfavorable for 
particle-accelerator projects. 
But wait—we have not valued future lives. Let us use a recently calculated 
value for the worth of one additional year of human life for one person: 
$129,000.534 We have roughly five billion years to go until the Sun expands 
into Earth’s orbit and cooks the planet.535 Assuming the population stayed at 
around six billion people,536 we can calculate human-extinction damages, or 
loss, L, where Vyr is the value of one human life per year, H is the human 
population of Earth, and Y is the number of years the Earth has left, as 
follows:
L = Vyr × H  × Y         (Eq. 8)  
L = ($1.29 × 105)(6 × 109 people)(5 × 109 yr) 
L = $3.87 × 1024
 530. See POSNER, supra note 109, at 11. 
 531. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT
28–52 (2002). 
 532. See, e.g., id. at 39, 49, 292. 
 533. POSNER, supra note 109, at 166; see SUNSTEIN, supra note 531, at 222, 224. 
 534. See Kathleen Kingsbury, The Value of a Human Life: $129,000, TIME, May 20, 2008, 
http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1808049,00.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2009); 
Chris P. Lee et al., An Empiric Estimate of the Value of Life: Updating the Renal Dialysis Cost-
Effectiveness Standard, 12 VALUE IN HEALTH 80, 86 (2009) (valuing one year of human life at 
$129,090). 
 535. See Appell, supra note 257, at 24. 
 536. Various scholars have reckoned that Earth’s natural carrying capacity for humans is 
higher than six billion, and various scholars have reckoned it lower. Thus six billion is a 
reasonable number to use here.  
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The result is $3.87 septillion. A very large amount of money indeed.  
But hold on, there is a big gap in our analysis. What if many of those 
people are and will be completely miserable? Just because we spend money to 
avoid death does not mean, in the grand scheme of things, that life provides a 
net benefit. If the Earth suddenly collapsed into an infinitely dense point, there 
would be no more pain, no more suffering, no more hunger, and no more 
grieving. Depression and anguish are, of course, reasons people commit 
suicide. It is often the case that if someone commits suicide, there are people 
left behind who grieve. Thus, there is a social cost to death.537 But in the future, 
if what is left of Earth lies at the center of a marble-sized black hole, there will 
be no soul left to shed a tear. 
This conception of human death as essentially lossless may sound heartless, 
but it is an idea that is enshrined in the American common law of torts. The 
estate of a dead person who is killed by negligence is entitled to no damages—
at least not on account of the person being dead. There are wrongful-death 
statutes that may allow suffering family members to recover.538 There are also 
survival actions whereby the estate may recover for pain and suffering 
experienced by the decedent in the moments before death.539 But there are no 
damages for death itself. In fact, it is generally the case that if someone kills a 
person who has no family or loved ones, provided the person’s death is 
instantaneous, the wrongdoer will not end up liable for even a single penny. 
Absent special circumstances, death is simply not a redressable injury under 
American tort law.  
Thus, maybe the downside of a particle-accelerator disaster that destroys 
the planet—assuming it is quick—is nothing. 
Although Posner said that valuing human lives was not “an ethical or . . . 
metaphysical undertaking,”540 in fact, it is—at least when it comes to the end of 
the world.541
The bottom line? Cost–benefit analysis sheds little light on the situation. To 
illuminate our way out of the black-hole case, we will need something new. 
VII. ESCAPING THE VORTEX
For courts, the challenges in providing fair and meaningful adjudication in 
a particle-physics doomsday-injunction case are legion. But if the judiciary 
surrenders to these difficulties and refuses to involve itself in such disputes—
for instance, by giving short shrift to plaintiffs’ claims or using discretionary 
aspects of civil procedure as a pretext for bowing out—then the judiciary 
 537. Posner acknowledges this. See POSNER, supra note 109, at 166 . 
 538. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-21-01 (1996). 
 539. See, e.g., Nelson v. Dolan, 434 N.W.2d 25, 26, 30 (Neb. 1989). 
 540. See POSNER, supra note 109, at 165. 
 541. There are good arguments—which I do not discuss here—for assigning monetary 
values to lives for the purposes of regulatory trade-offs and budgeting government spending. 
But such arguments do not apply to balancing prospects for the extinction of humanity. 
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renders a class of consensus judgments within scientific communities 
effectively injudicable. In that event, the rule of law is lost. Such a result seems 
especially unacceptable when the alleged harm is the destruction of the Earth.   
Yet if the judiciary plows ahead and issues an injunction in such cases—
deciding that we are better safe than sorry when the merits of a case are 
obscured by mathematical or scientific complexity—then courts would be 
transformed into marionettes—manipulable by frivolous objectors into halting 
any scientific undertaking that is complicated enough to be opaque to the 
layperson. That seems unacceptable as well. 
Resolving this quandary is important. As humankind continues to advance 
in scientific and technological achievement, there will be more and more 
opportunities to consider what exotic dangers might be lurking around the 
corner. If and when the titans of science and industry find themselves at odds 
with bystanders about what constitutes acceptable risk to the environment and 
the human species, lawyers and judges are the citizens’ bulwark. When it is up 
to judges and lawyers to save the world, will they be ready? 
In this portion of the article, I suggest analytical methods that will allow 
courts to deal meaningfully and responsibly with the surreal challenges of 
having Armageddon on the docket. 
But let us pause for a moment for a reality check: Is it really plausible that a 
group of extremely smart, highly trained, non-sociopathic scientists and 
engineers could overlook fatal flaws in a wildly expensive, high-stakes project 
and thus cause a deadly catastrophe? Of course it is. It is not only plausible, but 
it has already happened multiple times. Examples include the space shuttle 
Columbia disaster, the space shuttle Challenger disaster,542 and the disastrous 
Castle Bravo thermonuclear bomb test.543 Non-lethal examples include many 
unmanned space-program mishaps, such as the Mars Climate Observer and 
Europe’s heavy-lift Ariane 5 rocket.544 In the realm of biology and medicine, 
there are numerous examples of drugs that were once deemed safe, only to be 
later removed from the market.545
What these and other examples teach us is that there are ways that courts 
can evaluate seemingly recondite technologies and scientific controversies. The 
trick is to focus on the comprehensible factors—namely, the human factors. 
This is possible because every scientific failure takes place within a human 
context. A powerful example comes from the Columbia disaster. In its final 
 542. See 1 COLUMBIA ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD, COLUMBIA ACCIDENT 
INVESTIGATION BOARD REPORT 200 (2003) [hereinafter CAIB]. 
 543. See Toby Ord, Rafaela Hillerbrand, & Anders Sandberg, Probing the Improbable: 
Methodological Challenges for Risks with Low Probabilities and High Stakes 9,
http://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/4020/probing-the-improbable.pdf. 
 544. See id. at 7. 
 545. See, e.g., Joel Lexchin, Drug withdrawals from the Canadian market for safety 
reasons, 1963–2004, 172 CMAJ 765 (2005) (available at: http://www.cmaj.ca/cgi/reprint/ 
172/6/765.pdf) and online appendix (available at: http://www.cmaj.ca/cgi/data/172/6/765/
DC1/1). 
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report, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board concluded that foam debris 
from the external tank, which fatally punctured the orbiter’s heat shield, was 
only part of the cause: “In our view, the NASA organizational culture had as 
much to do with this accident as the foam.”546
While courts may not be well equipped to settle scientific disputes on the 
scientific merits, courts are quite well equipped to look at the human aspects in 
a prospective catastrophe and render a decision on an injunction request on the 
basis of those factors. 
Human failings in science come in many sorts. Many species of error may 
be quite innocent, such as those caused by faulty data, miscalculations, 
mistaken scientific theory, or conceptual blunders. In addition, well-meaning 
people may be subject to psychological effects and aspects of organizational 
culture that cause flawed decision-making in scientifically complex contexts. A 
variety of behavioral schema may help to explain such shortcomings, including 
groupthink, cognitive dissonance, confirmation bias, and unavailability bias.  
At other times, the sources of scientific error are less innocent and may be 
rooted in willful blindness or conscious self-interest. There are several 
historical examples. An icon of corrupt science is the cigarette industry’s 
history of bold assertions that its products were not addictive and did not pose 
health hazards. Global climate change is another relevant example. Today, 
global warming is no longer the object of serious controversy, but political 
pressure and industry self-interest arguably had a hand in delaying consensus 
about the existence of a real threat, thus putting the project of abating 
greenhouse gas emissions years behind where it would have been otherwise. 
Let me be clear that my point in providing these examples is not to suggest 
anything about the probability of a black-hole disaster. For instance, I am not 
contending that a black-hole disaster is as likely as a space shuttle mishap. 
Rather, my point is that society’s experience with disastrous scientific and 
engineering failures shows that deciding an LHC-injunction request, or a 
similar hypothetical case, may be done fairly if we avail ourselves of the right 
analytical tools. 
Thus, in evaluating whether there are the sort of “serious questions” that 
justify a preliminary injunction, and whether there is the requisite sort of risk so 
as to justify a Harris-Stanley-type finding of negligence,547 courts should 
conduct analysis on a higher level. Using a kind of meta-analysis, courts should 
gauge the risk that scientific judgments are wrong. Relevant subjects of inquiry 
include organizational culture, group politics, and psychological context. The 
particular aspects of scientific arguments should also be scrutinized on a meta 
level. Relevant issues here include the newness of underlying theory, the 
complexity of the chain of argument, the likely reliability of underlying data, 
and so on. Also relevant is what history has to say about the durability of 
pronouncements made in the field. 
 546. CAIB, supra note 542, at 97. 
 547. See discussion supra Part V.B. 
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Below, I discuss four categories of meta-analysis that could be applied to 
the LHC case. These categories are not strictly distinct—there is considerable 
overlap among them—but the breakdown should be helpful for approaching the 
problem juristically. The first two categories focus on the scientific work. The 
second two categories focus on the scientists.  
Defective theoretical groundings—This category concerns the potential 
that the scientific theory upon which the safety assurances are based may be 
defective. This is macro-scale scientific error—the kind of failing that inures to 
the scientific enterprise as a whole, in its current state of knowledge, with 
regard to its capacity to provide a reliable basis for accurate risk assessments. 
Faulty scientific work—This category regards micro-scale scientific error: 
miscalculations, inaccurate observations, flawed assumptions, conceptual 
mistakes, and the like. This is error that is attributable to the work of individual 
scientists or research groups. 
Credulity and neglect—This category encompasses innocent or at least 
unintentional mistakes in decision-making and risk assessment because of 
cultural, psychological, or sociological factors. Relevant concepts here include 
groupthink and various cognitive biases.  
Bias and influence—This category concerns the potential for non-innocent 
errors motivated by self-interest and ambition. 
These categories are meant only to carve up the analysis into workable 
portions. In a case presenting the question of prospective injury from a complex 
scientific or technological undertaking, a judge could decide on the basis of any 
one of these categories, or some combination of more than one, that an 
injunction is warranted.  
Below, I describe these categories in some detail. Also, I do some 
preliminary work of applying them to the facts of the LHC case.  
As will become clear, my preliminary assessment looks unpromising for 
CERN. While it seems absurd, in the abstract, that a group of apparently 
normal people could risk the entire planet in the course of carrying out a 
science experiment, the prospect does seem distinctly plausible once one takes 
a look at the details.  Such a disaster is not likely, to be sure, but it does appear 
plausible enough to give one pause. When it comes to the ultimate question—
whether the LHC be stopped—I am agnostic. That decision, to my mind, 
should be for a judge—one with the benefit of being able to take testimony, 
compel discovery, review evidence, and hear carefully presented argument 
from both sides. Society is well served by courts that can undertake these 
means to settle controversies. Using the tools of civil procedure, courts can 
command a far superior vantage point on the controversy than I can by 
reviewing published papers and publicly available documents. Nonetheless, my 
preliminary review does, in my view, suggest that the controversy deserves 
sober consideration. 
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A. Analyzing the Potential for Defective Theoretical Groundings 
Sometimes, despite their best efforts, scientists just turn out to be wrong. In 
making this observation, we should distinguish between two sorts of scientific 
failings. One, which is a necessary part of progressing science, is a knowing 
failure to comprehend something. This is a situation in which science does not 
know the answer to a certain question, and science knows that science does not 
know the answer. As an enterprise starting from ignorance and seeking 
knowledge, science must, necessarily, encounter questions to which, at least at 
some early point, it does not have the answer. Such a situation is non-
problematic. 
A second kind of failing is the one that we are interested in here, which I 
am calling “defective.” In this situation, science thinks it knows the answer, but 
the answer is wrong. Such error is not a necessary element of the scientific 
enterprise, but it happens nonetheless. 
Applying this line of analysis to the black-hole case, we should consider 
whether state-of-the-art theoretical physics is inadequate to the task of making a 
trustworthy prediction that the LHC is safe. In other words, we need to try to 
gauge the possibility that the science underlying the exclusions of disaster at the 
LHC may ultimately be wrong.  
Outside of the context of accelerator-safety issues, physicists can be quite 
candid about science’s ability to get things wrong. In describing what 
theoretical physics has to say about some of the discipline’s most fundamental 
questions, Stephen Hawking wrote, “Someday these answers may seem as 
obvious to us as the earth orbiting the sun—or perhaps as ridiculous as a tower 
of turtles. Only time (whatever that may be) will tell.”548
It is important to note that in saying this, Hawking was not speaking about 
the science underlying the conclusion that the LHC is safe. Quite to the 
contrary, Hawking, a staunch supporter of the LHC, has stated a firm belief that 
the LHC is “absolutely safe.” In fact, he has gone even further, saying the LHC 
is vital to the survival of human race.549 Speaking plainly, he also predicted that 
the production of black holes at the LHC would net him a Nobel Prize.550 But 
Hawking’s statement about the fallibility of science reflects a broader truth—
one that is inescapable: Scientific theory that seems unassailable in one era may 
seem naïve in the next. 
 548. HAWKING, supra note 76, at 5. 
 549. Id. (“Prof[essor] Hawking said the £4.4bn machine, in which scientists are about to 
recreate conditions just after the Big Bang, is ‘vital if the human race is not to stultify and 
eventually die out.’”). But cf. HAWKING, supra note 76, at 18 (saying that a fully realized unified 
theory of nature “may not aid the survival” of the human species or “even affect our lifestyle”).  
 550. Jon Swaine, Stephen Hawking: Large Hadron Collider Vital for Humanity, THE 
TELEGRAPH, Sept. 9, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2710348/Stephen-Hawking-Large-
Hadron-Collider-vital-for-humanity.html (quoting Hawking as saying, “If the LHC were to 
produce little black holes, I don’t think there is any doubt I would get a Nobel Prize, if they 
showed the properties I predict”). 
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Arguments made from this premise of skepticism could, of course, quickly 
get out of hand. It would not be defensible, for instance, to argue that because 
scientists once thought the Sun revolved around the Earth, today’s scientists 
might be just as mistaken about the LHC. Such an argument proves too much. 
Not only would it permit a total halt to any challenged experiment, it would 
reduce all of science to a pile of distrusted mush. In such a case, there would be 
no point in taking any arguments seriously, whether they are for or against LHC 
operation.  
If an analysis of the fallibility of scientific theory is to be of use to a court, 
then what we need are ways to bring some principled, discriminating 
skepticism to bear. 
A good starting place is the temporal dimension of scientific theory. The 
longer a theory persists, the more confidence it deserves. Conversely, if theory 
is new, it should be afforded less confidence. A matter related to the longevity 
of theory is the pace of relevant theoretical work. If a theory is the direct subject 
of back-and-forth papers arguing its merits, the theory deserves, for the time 
being, less confidence. That is, in so far as the theory is the topic of an active 
debate, outside observers of that debate, such as courts, should remain 
skeptical. Thus, a court evaluating the LHC case, or a similar case, should 
consider the newness of theory upon which the safety analysis is based and the 
pace of theoretical papers being published about such foundational theory.  
In the case of the LHC, there are facts suggesting that theory is evolving 
too rapidly to form a firm foundation for making risk assessments. CERN’s 
John Ellis has even said that physics relating to microscopic black holes is “a 
fast moving subject.”551
Indeed, Don Lincoln, particle physicist and steadfast LHC defender, is 
candid about science’s limitations. “We simply don’t know how gravity works 
in the realm of the ultrasmall,” he wrote.552 In forecasting what might result 
from the LHC’s experiments, Lincoln wrote, “Of course, there can always be 
surprises. This is the research frontier, after all.”553 Yet, when the specific 
question of LHC safety arises, Lincoln has resolute confidence, saying the LHC 
poses “precisely zero risk” and that a planetary disaster is “impossible.”554
Courts may, with some probing, determine that there is some unsettling 
inconsistency in the persistent duality whereby particle physicists espouse 
general skepticism of their craft yet maintain perfect, or nearly perfect, 
confidence on safety issues.  Whether this apparent contradiction should be 
troubling appears to be answered by a consideration of scientific precedent. The 
history of particle-collider safety assurances contains a quick succession of flip-
flops on theory that necessitated rethinking prior conclusions. This history 
suggests that there are good reasons to find the current round of safety 
 551. Ellis, supra note 83 (beginning at 10 min.). 
 552. LINCOLN, supra note 48, at 2. 
 553. Id. at 62.
 554. Id. at 2 (emphasis in original). 
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guarantees less than completely settling. A chart of the history of scientific 
conclusions and safety assurances is provided in Table 1.  
SAFETY ARGUMENT 
AGAINST BLACK-HOLE 
SCENARIO 
UNDERMINED BY 
EVOLVING THEORY
ULTIMATE 
DISPOSITION OF 
SAFETY 
ARGUMENT 
       
1999 Accelerators for the 
foreseeable future will 
not be powerful enough 
to create black holes.555
Æ 2001 Theorists demonstrate 
that with extra 
dimensions, the LHC 
has the energy 
required to synthesize 
black holes.556
Æ Abandoned: CERN 
acknowledged the need 
for a new examination of 
potential hazards,  since, 
under new theory, black 
holes “will be 
produced.”557
       
2003 Hawking radiation will 
cause accelerator-
produced black holes to 
evaporate.558
Æ 2004 Unruh, a respected 
pioneer of black-hole 
evaporation theory, 
calls the theory into 
question.559
Æ Abandoned: CERN 
declined to continue 
resting its safety 
argument on black-hole 
evaporation.560
    
2008 Under some scenarios, 
synthetic black holes 
will grow too slowly to 
be a threat. Under the 
remaining scenarios, 
dangerous black holes 
are excluded on the 
basis of empirical 
observation of 
specified white dwarf 
stars.561
Æ ??? Æ ???
    
Table 1: Chart of arguments advanced against black-hole disaster scenarios to demonstrate particle-
accelerator safety.  
The chronology belies the characterization by CERN’s Scientific Policy 
Committee that the basis for safety claims is “firmly established theory.”562 To 
the contrary, the sequence of quickly shifting theory and opinion within the 
scientific community would seem to indicate that the opinions reflected in the 
 555. See supra Part IV.B.
 556.  See supra Part IV.C.
 557.  See LSSG, supra note 180, at 11–12; see Part IV.D. 
558. See supra Part IV.D.
 559. See generally Unruh & Schützhold, supra note 206, at 2, 11; see supra Part IV.D. 
 560. See supra Part IV.G.
 561. See supra Part IV.F.
 562. See CERN Scientific Policy Committee, supra note 232, at 4. 
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LSAG report,563 along with the Giddings and Mangano paper564 upon which it 
is based, are too new to be relied upon for a real-world conclusion that there is 
no risk of catastrophe. In addition, the Giddings and Mangano paper appears to 
be complex even by particle-physics standards. Even if accepted at first by the 
scientific community, there would seem to be no guarantee that its layers of 
argument will stand the test of time—despite the unequivocal nature in which 
such arguments have been posited. 
Steven Giddings in particular has been cited for persistent mistaken 
understanding. Leonard Susskind, a friend of Giddings, has recounted 
Giddings’s “stubborn attachment to wrongheaded ideas” in the 1990s when 
Giddings and co-authors made a mistake of theory regarding Hawking 
radiation, despite having conducted an “elegant mathematical analysis.”565
“Certitude is not the test of certainty,” wrote Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. in 
his essay Natural Law.566 “We have been cock-sure of many things that were 
not so.”567
B. Analyzing the Potential for Faulty Scientific Work 
Even where the big picture of scientific theory is secure and justly relied 
upon, a broad spectrum of smaller-scale errors can arise in the course of 
scientific work, and these errors can drive researchers to make invalid 
conclusions. Examples of such micro-scale errors include calculation mistakes, 
observational errors, and unwarranted assumptions. Such fatal errors might be 
committed directly by the scientists writing the report under scrutiny, but such 
errors may also come from other sources. For instance, if scientists rely on data 
or conclusions provided by other scientists, then material mistakes in those 
underlying reports will invalidate any conclusions built upon them. Similarly, 
software bugs can undermine scientific claims—for example, conclusions 
drawn from computer models are undermined if the software used to construct 
those models contains defects. 
Thus, the potential for these kinds of scientific error forms a paradigm for 
meta-analysis of scientific claims that is distinct from the potential for defective 
theoretical groundings, as discussed above. 
So, when it comes to the black-hole case, we ought to ask how likely is it 
that the data relied upon for the safety assessment is inaccurate. This is not to 
suggest that experts should be hired to comb through underlying data to look
for flaws. It is a given that in a case like that of the LHC, because the science is 
so complex, no expert can be counted upon to uncover all possible mistakes—
after all, whatever mistakes were made, were made by experts themselves. 
 563. See generally LSAG, supra note 179. 
 564. See generally Giddings & Mangano, supra note 211.
 565. See SUSSKIND, supra note 153, at 235. 
 566. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 40 (1918). 
 567. Id.
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The point of considering the potential for small-scale error in scientific 
work is understanding that scientists’ conclusions about risk cannot be taken at 
face value. Their assurances must be discounted by the probability of their own 
error. For example, Giddings and Mangano conclude that there is no 
conceivable risk.568 But it does not follow that LHC risk is zero: An accurate 
assessment of risk must include the possibility that Giddings and Mangano 
themselves are mistaken.  
Such a meta-analysis has been proposed by a team of philosophers from 
Oxford University—Toby Ord, Rafaela Hillerbrand, and Anders Sandberg: 
“When an expert provides a calculation of the probability of an outcome, they 
are really providing the probability of the outcome occurring, given that their 
argument is watertight.”569
This line of inquiry might strike scientists as unfair. “If I’ve made a 
mistake,” a scientist might argue, “then point it out to me.” 
That retort is certainly fair in the context of a debate between scientists. 
Hypothesizing unspecified phantom flaws to introduce doubt into someone 
else’s work would surely be dubious at a roundtable of physicists. But the issue 
of LHC risk is not a purely academic debate —and the same rules do not apply. 
In the context of a policy debate or legal dispute where scientific arguments are 
used to justify a real-world course of action that is allegedly dangerous, it is 
improper to take all scientific arguments on their own terms without subjecting 
them to a higher level of scrutiny.  
Moreover, in the case of the Giddings and Mangano piece,570 meta-level 
scrutiny seems especially warranted because the complex, technical nature of 
the paper makes it largely opaque to all but a small community of highly trained 
scientists.571 And the need for scrutiny is reinforced when one considers that 
those qualified scientists are, as a general matter, invested in careers where 
there may be considerable pressure to fall in line with CERN’s safety 
assessments. 
In addition, there is a compelling mathematical reason that meta-level 
scrutiny of the scientific work is needed in the case of the LHC. Ord, 
Hillerbrand, and Sandberg demonstrated that when it comes to ultra-low 
probability risks where the harm alleged is catastrophic, the probability reported 
by the expert ends up being trivial when the probability of the expert’s error is 
taken into account.572 Why? The overall probability of disaster occurring is a 
product of the odds provided by the expert and the chance that the expert is 
wrong.573 Where the probability given by an expert is extremely low, for 
 568. See generally Giddings & Mangano, supra note 211. 
 569. See Ord et al., supra note 543, at 1. 
 570. See generally Giddings & Mangano, supra note 211. 
 571. See Ellis, supra note 83 (beginning at 3 min.). 
 572. See Ord et al., supra note 543, at 2–5. 
 573. See id. Note that I am simplifying. To be precise, the probability of disaster is the 
probability provided by the expert multiplied by the probability that the expert is right, plus the 
probability that the expert is wrong multiplied by the probability of disaster given that the expert 
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instance one in a billion, the chance of human error dwarfs the expert’s 
estimate of risk. 
Problems constituting faulty scientific work can be sorted into various 
categories: flawed arguments, flawed calculations, observational error, and 
errors in models, assumptions, and conceptual thinking. A consideration of 
each category illustrates the ways in which well-meaning scientists can produce 
defective conclusions. 
Flawed arguments—Ord, Hillerbrand, and Sandberg note that flawed 
arguments are not rare.574 They cite studies of the MEDLINE life-sciences 
database showing that more than 6.3 in 100,000 papers are retracted.575 This 
number may seem small, but when the downside of a mistake is the destruction 
of Earth, such a number is clearly quite significant.  
Further, the Ord team argues that this number is conservative for a number 
of reasons, including that researchers can be expected to resist issuing a 
retraction unless compelled to do so.576 Therefore, the number might provide a 
good floor for estimating the probability that Giddings and Mangano’s 
assessment of zero risk is wrong. On the other hand, CERN might argue that 
the MEDLINE retraction rate is a poor comparator because Giddings and 
Mangano’s work has received more scrutiny, because it is simpler than the 
average MEDLINE paper, or for any number of other reasons. Such arguments 
might be quite valid, and a court should carefully consider them.  
Flawed calculations—Separate from the issue of flawed arguments is a 
question of flawed calculations. Ord’s team uses statistics and examples  to 
show the importance of this category of error. Calculation mistakes in hospital 
drug charts cause dosage errors at a rate of about one to two percent—despite 
an obvious need to be careful when lives are on the line.577 Academicians, 
though they have more time to root out error, also make calculation errors. A 
study of Nature and the British Medical Journal uncovered flawed statistical 
results occurring at a rate of about 11%.578 Software problems are behind 
mathematical mishaps in many cases.579 A cascade failure caused by errant 
software code led to the 1996 explosion of an Ariane 5 rocket launched by the 
European Space Agency.580 NASA lost its Mars Climate Observer in 1999 
is wrong. Id. Put in mathematical terms: where X represents the occurrence of catastrophe, and A
represents the expert’s argument being sound, then the probability of catastrophe, P(X), is given 
by the formula:  
P(X) = P(X|A) P(A) + P(¬A) P(X|¬A)
The symbol “|” is read as “given” and the symbol “¬” is read as “not.” See id. at 3.  
 574. See id. at 4. 
 575. Id.
 576. See id.
 577. Id. at 7.  
 578. See id. at 7. 
 579. Id.
 580. Id.
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because a piece of software used English units of measurement while other 
software used metric.581 Another software problem led to retraction of five 
scientific papers on protein structure.582 And, strangely enough, physicist Don 
Lincoln, in his laudatory book about the LHC, was off by several orders of 
magnitude in translating light years to miles and kilometers.583
Observational error—Another issue, with special relevance for the LHC 
case, is the possibility of observational error. The ultimate conclusion that the 
black-hole scenario is  excludable rests upon the existence of eight white dwarf 
stars with certain attributes of age, mass, and magnetic field strength.584 Clearly, 
there is some chance that those astronomical observations are in error.  
For five of the eight white dwarfs, the only cited observational reference is 
a single paper published in 2007.585 Thus, if a flaw were found in that paper or 
that reference were somehow impeached, the LHC safety argument funnels 
down to reliance on only three observed stars. 
One reason to be somewhat skeptical of the star observations is a bedrock 
concept from the common law of torts: foreseeability. No astronomer would 
likely have understood that his or her reported telescope observations of white 
dwarf stars would be relied upon for judging the safety of humanity’s most 
ambitious particle experiment. Had astronomers been put on notice that their 
research results would be used as a foundation for real-world engineering safety 
analyses, it is quite possible they would have undertaken different or greater 
efforts to ensure reliability of the data. 
Errors in models, assumptions, and conceptual thinking—Also important 
is the potential for mistakes in the reasoning process of science—building 
models, making appropriate assumptions, and guarding against conceptual 
error. When trying to describe the physical world and predict its behavior, it is 
always necessary to make assumptions, use models, and make the analysis 
manageable by omitting the consideration of various factors. For example, to 
determine how long it would take a car to brake to a stop on dry pavement, a 
researcher would omit to take into account the effects of special relativity. Such 
an analytical tack is untroubling. But in more complicated scientific questions, 
there are potential pitfalls in deciding which models to use, how complex the 
models must be, and what can be safely assumed.  
 581. Id.
 582. Id. at 8. 
 583. See LINCOLN, supra note 48, at 17. In discussing the relative porosity of solid matter 
to a fast-traveling neutral particle, Lincoln wrote, “Although the penetrating power of neutrinos 
depends somewhat on their energy, neutrinos of the energies typically seen in radioactive decay 
could pass through five light-years of solid lead with just a 50% probability of being detected. 
Five light-years equals more than 48 million kilometers, or 30 million miles.” Id. In fact, five 
light years is approximately 47.3 trillion kilometers or 29.4 trillion miles. Thus Lincoln was off 
by six orders of magnitude and, even after the order of magnitude is adjusted, made a rounding 
error by saying “more than” instead of “slightly less than” or the equivalent.   
 584. See CERN Scientific Policy Committee, supra note 232, at 2–3. 
 585. Giddings & Mangano, supra note 211, at 23. 
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One example of incomplete modeling, pointed out by Ord, Hillerbrand, and 
Sandberg, is the Castle Bravo nuclear test of 1954.586 The thermonuclear “H-
bomb” device used a new kind of fusion fuel—lithium-6.587 The lithium in the 
bomb was enriched to 40% lithium-6 isotope, with the remainder being lithium-
7.588 In predicting bomb yield, Los Alamos scientists used a model that did not 
include the decay of lithium-7.589 As it turned out, lithium-7 reacted in 
unanticipated ways to neutron collisions, something for which the scientists 
were unprepared.590 Within the nuclear reaction, when a lithium-7 nucleus was 
hit with a neutron, the lithium-7 nucleus expelled two neutrons in return, 
furthering the chain reaction.591 The net loss of a neutron also converted the 
lithium-7 atom into lithium-6, which then provided additional fusion fuel.592 As 
a result, instead of the predicted five-megaton yield, Castle Bravo exploded 
with 15 megatons, making it the largest yielding bomb in U.S. history.593
Scientists were trapped in their experiment bunkers and ships placed outside 
the computed danger zone were forced to deal with Bravo’s wrath.594 A 
Japanese fishing vessel trawling outside the area cordoned off by the Navy was 
hit with fallout, killing one crew member.595
A subsequent thermonuclear device test, Castle Romeo, also created a 
runaway fireball.596 That test yielded 11 megatons—triple the predicted yield—
because of the same erroneous assumptions.597
Could the theoretical work done for the LHC safety argument be as flawed 
as the work of the Los Alamos scientists? There are reasons to think it might 
be. The Giddings and Mangano paper598 makes many assumptions. While 
presumably reasonable on their face, many of these assumptions are untested. 
For instance, in determining that under certain scenarios black holes would 
grow too slowly to be a threat, Giddings and Mangano constructed a model in 
which black holes are assumed only to consume protons and neutrons, not 
electrons.599 I am not specifically questioning the appropriateness of this or any 
other of their many assumptions. But it must be borne in mind that sometimes 
assumptions that seem reasonable at first turn out not to be so. Thus, a court 
faced with a case such as the LHC injunction should consider, in bulk, the 
 586. See Ord et al., supra note 543, at 9. 
 587. See RICHARD RHODES, DARK SUN: THE MAKING OF THE HYDROGEN BOMB 541 (1995). 
 588. Id.
 589. Id.
 590. Id.
 591. Id. 
 592. Id.
 593. Id.
 594. See id.
 595. Id. at 542. 
 596. Id. 
 597. Id.
 598. See generally Giddings & Mangano, supra note 211. 
 599. Id. at 8. 
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quantity and kind of assumptions made in the analysis and the complexity of 
the argument. These factors are thus relevant considerations in making a rough 
measure of the strength of a scientific paper’s overall conclusions. 
Looking specifically at the facts of the LHC case, it is worth considering 
that Rainer Plaga’s paper600 might well be the tip of the iceberg in terms of 
critiquing the models, methods, and conclusions of Giddings and Mangano. It 
seems to be the case that few people have the combination of training and 
incentive needed to undertake the detailed work of putting the Giddings and 
Mangano piece through its paces. If so, this cuts strongly against using the 
Giddings and Mangano paper as the sole foundation for judging that the LHC 
poses no risk whatsoever. 
Moreover, work done a few years ago provides precedent suggesting that it 
is not disingenuous to second guess the work of contemporary physicists in this 
manner. 
Cambridge physicist Adrian Kent pointed out in 2003 that the two papers 
written to address safety concerns about a potential strangelet disaster at the 
RHIC prior to its start contained rather striking conceptual math errors.601 Three 
theoretical physicists from CERN, Arnon Dar, A. De Rújula, and Ulrich Heinz, 
wrote a paper called “Will Relativistic Heavy-ion Colliders Destroy Our 
Planet?” and made, in their words, the “extremely conservative conclusion 
[that] it is safe to run RHIC for 500 million years.”602 Kent pointed out that 
Dar, De Rújula, and Heinz misapprehended the nature of their own 
calculations.603 Assuming them to be correct, the calculations meant only that 
there was a low probability that Earth would be destroyed very early on in such 
a run.604 In fact, the CERN team’s calculations were consistent with a high 
probability of planetary destruction over such a hypothetically long run.605
There was also error in the other major paper speaking to RHIC safety 
issues,606 Review of Speculative ‘Disaster Scenarios’ at RHIC.607 To 
recapitulate,608 this paper was the result of a request of the Brookhaven lab’s 
director to a committee of four physicists: Busza, Jaffe, and Wilczek of MIT 
and  Sandweiss of Yale.609 The authors commented that the Dar paper provided 
 600. See generally Plaga, supra note 304. 
 601. See Adrian Kent, A Critical Look at Risk Assessment for Global Catastrophes, 24 
RISK ANALYSIS 157, 161 (2004). 
 602. Dar, supra note 102, at 146. 
 603. See Kent, supra note 601, at 161. 
 604. Id.
 605. Id.
 606. Id.
 607. See R.L. Jaffe, W. Busza, J. Sandweiss, & F. Wilczek, Review of Speculative 
“Disaster Scenarios” at RHIC, 72 REV. MOD. PHYSICS 1125, 1126 (2000). See also BUSZA ET 
AL., supra note 87. 
 608. See Part III.A., supra.
 609. See Jaffe, supra note 607, at 1125 n.1. 
896 TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:819 
a ceiling on risk that was 100 million times the required safety margin.610
However, as Kent pointed out, this would imply that the RHIC would be “safe” 
even if it had a high probability of destroying the Earth after just five years of 
operation.611
The Busza team did its own independent analysis, concluding that under 
one set of assumptions, the probability of a catastrophe was less than 2 u 10-4,
which they astonishingly described as leaving “a comfortable margin of 
error.”612 The numerical quantity is more meaningful when taken out of 
scientific notation: 2 u 10-4 is just an alternative way of writing one in 5,000.
That is a level of risk that few average people would regard as “comfortable” 
when the downside is crushing the Earth down to a stadium-sized ball of 
strange matter. 
When Kent pointed out the analytical problems to the Busza team, the team 
revised their paper.613 In their revised paper, they refigured the probabilities to 
add an extra factor of ten, thus claiming that there is no worse than a 1 in 
50,000 risk of destroying the Earth—under their most conservative 
assumptions.614 The Busza team also retreated on their policy pronouncements, 
writing, “We do not attempt to decide what is an acceptable upper limit on [the 
probability of a disaster], nor do we attempt a ‘risk analysis,’ weighing the 
probability of an adverse event against the severity of its consequences.”615 The 
Busza team cordially thanked Kent in the acknowledgments section of the 
revised document.616
Certainly everyone can make mistakes—even in printed articles. But the 
Busza article was no ordinary piece of scholarship. It was advanced as the basis 
upon which the public should feel at ease with the pending start up of the 
RHIC. With the article’s real-world implications, and the fact that it had 
multiple authors and was reviewed by RHIC administrators for purposes of 
using it as a public-relations tool, the fallacious reasoning is astounding. 
Considering the conceptual errors found in the Dar and Busza papers, and 
the fact that those papers were relied upon for safety judgments about the 
RHIC, one must take seriously the possibility that the Giddings and Mangano 
paper contains material errors—not yet uncovered—that would undermine or 
alter its bottom-line conclusion. It is precisely in this manner that the litigation 
process could be so valuable—fleshing out the issues through discovery and 
testimony, thus providing a judge with the chance to determine if serious 
questions exist. 
 610. See id. at 1126. 
 611. Kent, supra note 601, at 161. 
 612. Id.
 613. See Jaffe, supra note 607, at 1125 n.1, 1126 n.2. 
 614. See id. at 1125, 1126. 
 615. Id. at 1126. 
 616. Id. at 1126 n.2, 1139. 
2009] THE BLACK HOLE CASE 897 
C. Analyzing the Potential for Credulity and Neglect 
The third mode of analysis that can be used in the LHC case to test for the 
existence of “serious questions” and Harris-Stanley-type negligence involves 
looking at the psychological and sociological factors at play. Does the social 
environment at CERN and in the particle-physics community encourage a full 
vetting of safety issues? Or, might concerns about safety be dismissed as fringe 
thinking, the expression of which becomes stifled? How might cognitive 
psychological effects shape the thinking and decision-making about potential 
risks? Is it plausible that scientists holding strong convictions in the LHC’s 
safety might be engaging in subtle forms of self-deception? How might the 
development of people’s opinions on matters of safety be affected by the fact 
that they have helped develop the LHC to this point? How might it affect their 
thinking that the LHC is so far along that the decision to operate it seems 
irreversible? 
This section focuses on mistake without malice and how the courts can use 
discovery and evidence-gathering to determine whether it is plausible that 
scientists, as individuals and in groups, might be susceptible to errors in 
judgment even when their intentions are pure. 
An essential step to understanding the vulnerability of the scientific process 
to these sources of error is realizing that science is a human enterprise, subject 
to human fallibility.  
“There is a popular misconception that science is an impersonal, 
dispassionate, and thoroughly objective enterprise,” wrote acclaimed physicist 
Paul Davies.617 “This is, of course, manifest nonsense. Science is a people-
driven activity like all human endeavor, and just as subject to fashion and 
whim.”618
Beginning with the understanding that science is a human activity and 
scientists are humans, it is clear that a number of paradigms from psychology 
and sociology may shed light on how it might be plausible that scientists may 
unwittingly build an experimental apparatus that threatens humanity.619
Cognitive dissonance—The concept of cognitive dissonance may explain 
why particle physicists could deceive themselves into thinking that an 
experiment is not dangerous. Social psychologist Leon Festinger of Stanford 
University used the label “cognitive dissonance” to describe a distressing 
mental state in which people “find themselves doing things that do not fit with 
what they know, or having opinions that do not fit with other opinions they 
hold.”620 For example, the idea that someone had spent a large part of their 
 617. Paul Davies, Introduction to RICHARD P. FEYNMAN, SIX EASY PIECES: ESSENTIALS OF 
PHYSICS EXPLAINED BY ITS MOST BRILLIANT TEACHER ix (1995). 
 618. Id.
 619. See id. 
 620. See LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 4 (1957); see also EM
GRIFFIN, A FIRST LOOK AT COMMUNICATION THEORY 206, available at http://www.afirstlook. 
com/docs/cogdiss.pdf (2006) (quoting Festinger). 
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career building a real-life doomsday machine would be dissonant with their 
self-view of being a caring person with a good heart.  
Moreover, the magnitude of the dissonance people feel increases with the 
importance of the issue and the amount of discrepancy between actions and 
privately held beliefs.621 Thus, we would expect maximal dissonance in the case 
where the threatening cognition is a realization that one has been working 
toward the destruction of humanity.622
In addition, the more difficult it is to reverse a decision once made, the 
greater the resulting dissonance and the greater the need for reassurance.623 At 
this point, halting the LHC would seem to be a practical impossibility since it 
represents sunk costs in the billions of dollars and the unrecoverable investment 
of large portions of many scientists’ careers. Thus, the pressure from cognitive 
dissonance to refuse to believe that the LHC could put the world at risk would 
be predicted to be enormous. 
In addition, cognitive dissonance can affect beliefs by indirect means of 
information filtering. Specifically, according to Festinger, people will seek 
information that is consistent with their beliefs and avoid information that is 
not.624 Likewise, people tend to seek the company of like-minded people, thus 
buffering themselves from dissonance-causing information and ideas.625
Following on the work of Festinger, University of California social 
psychologist Elliot Aronson explained that humans are not rational animals, but 
rationalizing animals who seek to see themselves as reasonable.626 With the 
specter of a planet-consuming black hole being so horrendous, the psyches of 
some scientists might simply reject the possibility—regardless of what the 
evidence is telling them. In this sense, it is interesting to recall that Einstein 
refused to believe in the existence of black holes.627
Psychologists have found that when a person is forced to do something 
contrary to his or her private opinion, under certain circumstances, that 
privately held opinion can actually change to more closely correspond with the 
person’s overt behavior.628
Discovery and trial testimony could unmask the effects of cognitive 
dissonance. Questioning could reveal what people thought when, and might 
help to uncover beliefs based on self-deception.  
Reputational cascades—Reputational cascades are phenomena where 
perceptions of risk build upon themselves as people tend to minimize risk in 
 621. GRIFFIN, supra note 620, at 206. 
 622. See generally id.
 623. Id. at 208. 
 624. Id. at 207.  
 625. Id.
 626. Id. at 211 (emphasis added). 
 627. See SUSSKIND, supra note 153, at 30. 
 628. See Leon Festinger & James M. Carlsmith, Cognitive Consequences of Forced 
Compliance, 58 J. OF ABNORMAL AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 203, 209 (1959). 
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order earn social approval and avoid social disapproval.629 Cass Sunstein points 
out two examples that illustrate how experts may be made to censor themselves: 
One medical researcher who was skeptical of a number of diagnoses of Lyme 
disease told the New York Times, “Doctors can’t say what they think anymore 
. . . . If you quote me saying these things, I’m as good as dead.”630 And a 
sociologist who challenged widely held beliefs about mad-cow disease 
explained that by making such doubts known, “You get made to feel like a 
pedophile.”631
One can imagine that in the small community of particle physicists, 
speaking out about LHC dangers could largely ruin someone’s standing in the 
view of the community. It may be telling that Francesco Calogero, in his article 
critical of RHIC/strangelet risk assessment, thanked several colleagues without 
naming them, not wanting to compel them to be associated with views that the 
RHIC might be dangerous.632
Confirmation bias—Confirmation bias is the tendency of scientists to 
bolster hypotheses whose truth is in question.633 Even when a scientist is 
engaged in an ostensibly unbiased effort to deduce truth, confirmation bias may 
unwittingly lead the scientist to selectively acquire and use evidence in a 
manner that supports the hypothesis.634
A great deal of empirical research in experimental psychology has shown 
that confirmation bias appears in many forms with strong effects.635
Confirmation bias works from both sides of the process of reasoning and 
investigation. People tend to seek evidence that supports a hypothesis, and 
people tend to avoid evidence that would undermine a hypothesis.636 Posner has 
noted that in areas of scientific uncertainty, career concerns can influence 
scientific judgments.637
Confirmation bias may help to explain what went wrong in the Space 
Shuttle Columbia disaster. The report of the Columbia Accident Investigation 
Board (“CAIB”) found that decision makers focused on information that tended 
to support their expected or desired result—that the foam strike that ultimately 
doomed Columbia did not represent a safety of flight issue.638
 629. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 531, at 87. 
 630. David Grann, Stalking Dr. Steere, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2001, § 6 (Magazine), at 52, 
56, quoted in SUNSTEIN, supra note 531, at 88.
 631. Andrew Higgins, It’s a Mad, Mad, Mad-Cow World, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 2001, at 
A13, quoted in SUNSTEIN, supra note 531, at 88.
 632. See Calogero, supra note 105, at 191. 
 633. See Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many 
Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 175 (1998). 
 634. See id.
 635. Id. at 177. 
 636. See id.
 637. See POSNER, supra note 109, at 189. 
 638. See CAIB, supra note 542, at 200. 
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Given what is on the line with the LHC, the desired result for particle 
physicists is clear. 
In terms of confirmation bias, another possible parallel between the 
Columbia flight and the LHC has to do with keeping to schedules. The CAIB 
report placed considerable emphasis on the shuttle program’s focus on keeping 
to a tight and unforgiving schedule and reported that mission managers tended 
to draw conclusions that minimized the risk of delaying future launches.639
One might imagine that similar pressures were on Giddings and Mangano, 
the LSAG, and the SPC, especially considering that they were doing their work 
in the last months before the LHC’s start up. A less than completely confident 
endorsement of the LHC on safety issues might have delayed or even doomed 
the project.  
The problems of confirmation bias are implicitly recognized in the NEPA 
legislative scheme, which requires environmental impact statements before 
projects are undertaken.640 The point was underscored by Justice Stephen 
Breyer in an opinion concerning NEPA, written when he was a judge on the 
First Circuit: “The way that harm arises may well have to do with the 
psychology of decision makers, and perhaps a more deeply rooted human 
psychological instinct not to tear down projects once they are built.”641
Although some might think that a “hard” science like physics would be 
immune from such bias, this is not so. Monwhea Jeng, a physicist at Southern 
Illinois University, has compiled a set of historical examples showing how the 
beliefs of physicists have influenced their results.642 While it may be easy to 
believe expectation bias could occur in modeling and choosing assumptions, 
expectation bias can even infect purely mathematical operations. Jeng relays an 
example from particle physics where researchers undertook complex 
calculations in the search for free quarks.643 The calculations matched up 
 639. Id.
 640. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(i) (requiring an environmental impact statement 
for “major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment”); 
Council on Environmental Quality Executive Office of the President, A Citizen’s Guide to the 
NEPA: Having Your Voice Heard 2 (2007), http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa/Citizens_Guide_Dec 
07.pdf (noting that “NEPA requires agencies to undertake an assessment of the environmental 
effects of their proposed actions prior to making decisions”); HOWARD GENESLAW, Cleanup of 
National Priorities List Sites, Functional Equivalence and the NEPA Environmental Impact 
Statement, 10 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 127, 127 (1994) (noting the requirement that an 
environmental impact statement be prepared before the federal government funds some 
projects). 
 641. Sierra Club v. Marsh, 872 F.2d 497, 504 (1st Cir. 1989); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
WORST-CASE SCENARIOS 195 (2007) ( “Judge Breyer argued that NEPA is meant to prevent a 
particular kind of injury, one that should play a central role in the decision whether to grant an 
injunction.”). 
 642. See generally Monwhea Jeng, A Selected History of Expectation Bias in Physics, 74 
AM. J. PHYSICS 578 (2006). 
 643. See id. at 579.  
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extremely well with the expected factional charges of quarks.644 But when the 
calculations were reworked on a “blind” basis—with the data subjected to a 
random offset that was only removed at the end after all calculations were 
complete, the results did not line up with models of quark charge at all.645
Groupthink— In trying to take seriously the question of whether the LHC 
really does present a planet-threatening danger, we are presented with a 
paradox. How could so many exceedingly smart people—particle physicists, no 
less, who make a cliché of genius—be capable of getting something so terribly 
wrong? 
Psychologist Irving L. Janis worked up his theory of groupthink when 
trying to resolve a paradox of his own.646 Reading a history on the 1961 Bay of 
Pigs fiasco, when U.S. operatives staged a spectacularly failed invasion of 
Cuba, Janis found himself asking, “How could bright, shrewd men like John F. 
Kennedy and his advisers be taken in by the CIA’s stupid, patchwork plan?”647
His answer was “groupthink.”648 The groupthink concept acknowledges that 
“smart people working collectively can be dumber than the sum of their 
brains.”649 According to Janis, groupthink is “a mode of thinking that people 
engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the 
members’ strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically 
appraise alternative courses of action.”650 It involves “a deterioration of mental 
efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgment that results from in-group 
pressures.”651
The effect can be insidious. The process allows individuals to maintain a 
worry-free outlook that is not justified by the facts. In such a dynamic, the 
existence of group consensus causes individuals to forego or dismiss their own 
independent thinking. A circularity develops: Group consensus justifies 
individual confidence, and individual confidence justifies group consensus. The 
result is flawed decision-making.  
The classical antecedents for groupthink are group cohesiveness, 
leadership’s existing preference for a certain decision, and insulation of the 
group from outside opinions.652 Considering these factors, CERN would appear 
highly vulnerable to groupthink.  
 644. Id. 
 645. See id.
 646. IRVING L. JANIS, VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF FOREIGN-
POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOES iii (1972). 
 647. Id.
 648. See id. at iii, 9. 
 649. John Schwartz & Matthew L. Wald, NASA's Curse?: ‘Groupthink’ Is 30 Years Old, 
and Still Going Strong, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2003 § 4, at 5. 
 650. JANIS, supra note 646, at 9. 
 651. Id.
 652. See Gregory Moorhead, Richard Ference, & Chris P. Neck, Group Decision Fiascoes 
Continue: Space Shuttle Challenger and a Revised Groupthink Framework, 44 HUM. REL. 539, 
541 (1991); see also JANIS, supra note 646, at 197. 
902 TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:819 
Group cohesiveness—Anthropologist Sharon Traweek, in an ethnography 
on particle physicists, wrote that the physics field forms “an extremely 
restricted community.”653 The most important communications are made by 
word of mouth, through means such as informal talks and seminars, with papers 
being less important.654 Those particle physicists who do not know each other 
well, want to.655
“Physicists seem to be in constant circulation, moving around the world 
from lab to lab, department to department, always talking, forming alliances 
and collaborations. Most important, they are bound together by a way of 
thinking, about the world and about knowledge and about themselves.”656
Leadership’s existing preference for a certain decision—This aspect of the 
particle-physics community, especially within CERN, seems very clear: The 
preferred outcome is a determination that the LHC is safe. In this respect, it 
should be remembered that the LHC is not a small part of CERN’s research 
program. In an agreement with the U.S. Department of Energy, CERN 
confirmed in a recital the “overriding priority and the vital importance of the 
LHC for the future of the laboratory.”657 Without the LHC, CERN would be 
reduced to nearly nothing.658
Insulation of the group from outside opinions—According to Traweek, 
particle physicists “construct their world and represent it to themselves as free 
of their own agency.”659  Theirs is “an extreme culture of objectivity: a culture 
of no culture, which longs passionately for a world without loose ends, without 
temperament, gender, nationalism, or other sources of disorder—for a world 
outside human space and time.”660
Discussing the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center (“SLAC”), Traweek 
noted that “disagreement with the lab’s policies is seen as a result of a lack of 
information, which SLAC will supply.”661 And in describing the process of 
training new physicists, Traweek reported, “At the major labs, they learn that 
outsiders are devalued and exactly how this is done and what justifications are 
given.”662
Traweek also described the “tremendous force of the division in the 
physicists’ cosmology between outsiders, no matter how well-informed, and 
 653. TRAWEEK, supra note 247, at 78. 
 654. See id. at 7. 
 655. Id. at 3. 
 656. Id. at xi. 
 657. U.S.-CERN, supra note 447, at *1. 
 658. See CERN, CERN Press Release—CERN Council Looks to Bright Future (Dec. 13, 
2002), http://press.web.cern.ch/press/PressReleases/Releases2002/PR17.02ECouncil.html (last 
visited Nov. 30, 2009) (”Most of CERN’s resources will be committed to the project, leaving 
only a very limited non-LHC programme.”). 
 659. TRAWEEK, supra note 247, at 162. 
 660. Id.
 661. Id. at 22. 
 662. Id. at 93. 
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insiders.”663 In the academic realm, particle physicists think particle physics 
requires the most intelligence and reasoning capacity, and humanities the 
least.664
Along these lines, it is interesting to consider the marginalization that 
Rainer Plaga—an astrophysicist by training—received in response to his article 
politely questioning the Giddings and Mangano paper.665
If a groupthink dynamic develops, Janis describes several symptoms that 
can lead to flawed decision-making, including: (1) “an illusion of 
invulnerability, shared by most or all the members, which creates excessive 
optimism and encourages taking extreme risks,” (2) “collective efforts to 
rationalize in order to discount warnings,” (3) “an unquestioned belief in the 
group’s inherent morality, inclining the members to ignore the ethical or moral 
consequences of their decisions,” (4) “stereotyped views of” the enemy as 
“evil,” “weak,” or “stupid,” (5) “direct pressure on any member who expresses 
strong arguments against any of the group’s stereotypes, illusions, or 
commitments, making clear that this type of dissent is contrary to what is 
expected of all loyal members,” (6) “self-censorship of deviations from the 
apparent group consensus, reflecting each member’s inclination to minimize to 
himself the importance of his doubts and counterarguments,” and (7) “a shared 
illusion of unanimity concerning judgments conforming to the majority view 
(partly resulting from self-censorship of deviations, augmented by the false 
assumption that silence means consent).”666
Court-compelled discovery would be an ideal vehicle for exploring the 
extent to which these symptoms are evident within the CERN community. For 
example, depositions and oral testimony could uncover examples of self-
censorship and shared illusions of unanimity. 
But even without discovery, for some of these symptoms, there is evidence 
to be found from publicly available sources. With regard to a disparaging 
characterization of enemies, recall that Ellis painted detractors as “nuts” and 
engaging in criticism for money667 and that Brian Cox used a vulgar slur to 
refer to people who gave credence to the black-hole scenario.668
As to having an unquestioned belief in the group’s inherent morality, 
Traweek notes: 
They have a passionate dedication to this vision of unchanging order: they are 
convinced that the deepest truths must be static, independent of human frailty 
and hubris. Simultaneously, they believe that this grand structure of physical 
 663. Id. at 14. 
 664. See id. at 79. 
 665. See discussion supra Part IV.H.
 666. JANIS, supra note 646, at 197–98. 
 667. Ellis, supra note 83 (beginning at 38, 49 min.). 
 668. See O’Neill, Anyone Who Thinks the LHC Will Destroy the World is a Twat, supra
note 356. 
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truth can be progressively uncovered, and that this is the highest and most 
urgent human pursuit.669
In terms of exerting direct pressure on members of the group who do not 
fall in line, a perhaps telling anecdote comes from Ellis’s talk at CERN about 
LHC/disaster issues.670 Holding a laser pointer for his presentation, Ellis asked 
people to put their hands up if they believed that, if microscopic black holes 
occur, they would be stable.671 Then, Ellis chided the audience, “Don’t forget, I 
got this laser here.”672
While he said this with a laugh, the message seemed to be clear—that 
dissent would not be looked upon kindly. “I remind you,” he continued, “that 
you expect them to decay because of Hawking radiation.”673
D. Analyzing the Potential for Bias and Influence 
The fourth category of analysis for a court in a case such as this involves 
looking at the potential for bias among those who have made pronouncements 
about safety, and the potential for influence to be brought to bear on that 
assessment process. The propriety of such an inquiry is clear, and it is closely 
tied to the historical role of judges and juries in evaluating evidence by using 
indicia of trustworthiness and by patiently listening to opposing parties’ 
attempts to impeach the credibility of witnesses. 
By way of previewing this analysis for the LHC case, I will say much less 
than I could. The public record of the controversy reveals for plaintiffs an 
embarrassment of riches in arguments to show bias among the assessors. 
It is remarkable to think for a moment how CERN’s situation might be 
viewed if, instead of operating a particle accelerator, CERN was a developer of 
pharmaceuticals. If a pharmaceutical firm attempted to take a drug to market 
based on the safety assessment of a panel of five of its employees, who in turn 
relied on the scientific work of one employee and one other scientist with a 
pending visiting position with the firm—it would be a scandal of epic 
proportions.  
In the small field of particle physics where everyone seems to know 
everyone,674 to demonstrate true independence, scientists rendering views on 
safety need more than the simple absence of formal institutional affiliations 
with the labs. Yet, the scientists rendering opinions on LHC safety lack even 
that. Indeed, every major paper relied upon for demonstrating the safety of the 
RHIC and the LHC has had a compromising institutional affiliation. For one 
paper on the RHIC, three of the four authors were experimental physicists 
 669. TRAWEEK, supra note 247, at 17. 
 670. Ellis, supra note 83. 
 671. Id. (beginning at 35 min.). 
 672. Id. (beginning at 35 min.). 
 673. Id. (beginning at 35 min.). 
 674. TRAWEEK, supra note 247, at 3. 
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planning to conduct experiments at RHIC, who then went on to do so.675 The 
other paper on RHIC safety was written by three theorists at CERN, whose 
ALICE experiment on the LHC would be subject to the same objections with 
regard to strangelet dangers.676 The 2003 report on LHC safety, concerning the 
heavy-ion ALICE experiment, while the least dominated by institutional 
insiders, still included a CERN scientist on the panel,677 even though CERN 
labeled the authors as a “group of independent scientists.”678 Moreover, the two 
major papers relevant to the current safety concerns—those regarding proton-
proton collisions and black holes—do not include a single non-CERN-affiliated 
author. 
We must ask if there is something special about particle physics that makes 
conflicts of interest untroubling. Indeed, CERN physicists seem to proceed as if 
conflicts of interest are immaterial. That much is implied by the open and 
unhidden nature of the conflicted interests found in LHC safety assessments. 
Yet the authors offer no arguments for why they ought to be exempt from the 
usual norms of establishing trustworthiness by avoiding self-dealing.  
In short, there is no reason not to accept the obvious: Conflicts of interest in 
judgments about particle physics are just as troubling as they are in any field.  
At least some physicists seem to agree with this assessment. Adrian Kent of 
Cambridge wrote:  
 Future policy on catastrophe risks would be more rational, and more 
deserving of public trust, if acceptable risk bounds were generally agreed 
upon ahead of time and if serious research on whether those bounds could 
indeed be guaranteed was carried out well in advance of any hypothetically 
risky experiment, with the relevant debates involving experts with no stake in 
the experiments under consideration.679
Likewise, Francesco Calogero wrote that “it is of course appropriate that, to 
the maximum extent possible, those who are assigned the task of making such 
evaluations should not be affected by any conflict of interest.”680 Calogero 
specifically recommended a “blue team” performing an analysis that is as 
objective as possible, and a “red team” working as devil’s advocates trying to 
prove that the experiment is dangerous.681
As a counter to these sorts of suggestions, LHC defenders sometimes pose 
this rhetorical question: How could particle physicists support a course of 
action that would destroy the Earth, given that they love their children and 
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value their own lives? The problem with the argument implied by this question 
is that it sets up a non-existent dilemma. Clearly, particle physicists are not 
intentionally attempting to destroy the Earth, nor are physicists engaging in a 
course of action where the probability of destroying the Earth is more likely 
than not. Instead, the issue of LHC risk is one of low probabilities—risks such 
as one in 5,000, one in 100,000, one in a million, or even lower. Thus, the 
relevant question to ask is, would particle physicists tolerate a higher risk of 
catastrophe from their experiments than the rest of humanity might?  
The answer is quite obvious. Of course they might. And that answer is not 
mere speculation. Physicists have actually published a hard number: Busza, 
Jaffe, Sandweiss, and Wilczek regarded a one-in-5,000 risk of destroying Earth 
as “comfortable.”682
It seems manifest that most people—that is, those having no involvement in 
physics experimentation—would not regard a one-in-5,000 risk of the 
destruction of Earth as a comfortable risk to assume for a science experiment—
especially one conducted for purely academic reasons.  
Keeping this precedent in mind, it is appropriate to scrutinize the bottom-
line conclusions of Giddings and Mangano. Those conclusions were that there 
is “no basis for concerns” about LHC-produced black holes and that “there is 
no risk of any significance whatsoever from such black holes.”683
What level of risk is significant to particle physicist with an interest in the 
experiments, and what level of risk is significant to an uninterested party, will 
undoubtedly be different. Thus, the ultimate conclusion of Giddings and 
Mangano’s work that there is “no risk of any significance” should be treated 
skeptically as a value judgment—that is, a subjective ethical pronouncement—
rather than as a hard scientific conclusion.  
On the basis of the above, I think one must conclude that it is plausible that 
particle physicists would be quite biased when it comes to assessments for low-
probability risks. But let’s take our analysis further and explore whether it is 
plausible that particle physicists might be biased when it comes to higher 
probability risks—something like one in five or one in twenty. There appears to 
be no indication that the actual risk posed by the LHC might approach such 
appalling odds. But for the sake of completeness, let’s consider, hypothetically, 
whether it is plausible that particle physicists might be willing to gamble the 
fate of the world under those circumstances. 
To begin with, it seems highly likely that particle physicists might fear 
serious reprisals and negative repercussions for their careers if they were to 
speak out about perceived dangers of the LHC. An academic in such a 
situation—even one not affiliated with CERN—might plausibly face denial of 
tenure, unaccepted manuscripts, and ostracism by peers. 
In mulling over whether to speak out, particle physicists with private 
doubts might well resign themselves to a fatalistic assessment. They might 
 682. See Kent, supra note 601, at 161. 
 683. Giddings & Mangano, supra note 211, at 27. 
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plausibly figure that they, as individuals, are powerless to overcome the 
momentum of a multinational multi-billion-dollar project. If that is their 
appraisal, then such individuals have nothing to gain, but much to lose, by 
making a public objection. Consider the possible outcomes: If a scientist speaks 
out and nothing bad happens, the scientist is a laughingstock. If a scientist 
speaks out and disaster does come to pass, professional vindication will be 
fleeting and bittersweet. If a scientist keeps mum or even extols the safety of 
the project, in a disaster scenario, embarrassment will be short-lived. 
On the other hand, suppose particle physicists with private doubts reach the 
opposite conclusion about the likely impact of their public dissent. Suppose a 
private doubter predicts that his or her voice could be the tipping point that 
leads to widespread public concern and a permanent shutdown of the LHC. In 
such a case, whether the objecting scientist is right or wrong, he or she can 
anticipate being blamed for ruining the most exciting opportunity for advancing 
fundamental physics in a generation. And there’s no hope of vindication in 
such an event: Naysayers cannot be proved right if the experiments are never 
run. 
The math-oriented are often fond of using matrices to elucidate decision-
making. A physicist creating such a matrix, using the logic detailed above, 
would be faced with a series of boxes in which all outcomes are quite bad, 
except one: to be a supporter of the LHC in the event that it turns out to be a 
benign scientific triumph. Even if one does so with fingers crossed for good 
luck. 
VIII. CONCLUSION
Am I fearful that the world will be destroyed by a lab-created black hole? 
No. Not really. It does not keep me awake at night. All things considered, the 
odds seem quite slim.  
But a seemingly slim possibility, even if it leaves me personally unanxious, 
does not indicate that the risk is insignificant. Even a tiny chance of a black-
hole catastrophe could be very significant as matter of equity before a court. 
The alleged downside, after all, is the disappearance of our planet down a 
cosmic drain.  
From my perspective as a lawyer, sizing up the merits of the case, I find the 
assurances provided by the particle-physics community to be quite lacking. In 
particular, I am struck by the fact that the safety assurances are based on 
scientific work that brazenly lacks independence.  
I have no reason to doubt that particle physicists are, generally speaking, 
good people. But I am not at all convinced that the field is so pristine, so 
cleansed of human foible, that it has no need for the ordinary indicia of 
verisimilitude. 
More specifically, the history of the black-hole debate leaves me uneasy. 
There is a repeating pattern of airtight assurances—presented with utter 
conviction—that are quietly abandoned later when the scientific bedrock upon 
which they are based suddenly erodes. The latest argument, unveiled in 2008 
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on the eve of the planned start up of the LHC, was offered with the usual sense 
of resolute confidence. But one naturally wonders whether history will repeat 
itself and time will reveal new scientific understanding that trumps the 
seemingly incontrovertible assumptions underlying this latest assurance of 
safety. 
All that being said, let me reiterate—the odds of doomsday seem very 
slight, even accepting most of the arguments of the LHC’s critics. But slim 
odds must be weighed against the grim downside. 
My motivation in writing is certainly not to engender fear. I have no 
apprehension to share. Nor is it my intent or my desire to shut down the LHC. 
Mine is not a policy argument. Frankly, my research for this article has 
intensified my armchair interest in seeing what results from the LHC’s novel 
experiments. My argument is one of law. My conviction is that, when a black-
hole case arrives on a docket, no court should abdicate its role as a bursar of 
equity, even where, as here, the socio-political pressure to abstain will be 
immense, the factual terrain will be intensely intellectually challenging, and the 
jurisprudential conundrums are legion. At the end of the day, whether the LHC 
represents an intolerable danger is, in my view, an open question. I have not 
endeavored to provide a definitive answer. But I think the courts should. 
It is part of our 21st Century reality that we must take seriously a number of 
surreal planetary disaster scenarios. In that sense, the synthetic-black-hole 
disaster is not unique. For some time now, we have been confronted with the 
possibility of nuclear war and global climate change. In the future, we may 
have to remove still more scenarios from the science fiction category and place
them on a list of real worries. Someday, we may need to seriously consider 
catastrophic threats from nanotechnology, genetic engineering, or artificial 
intelligence. Each one of these human-made global disaster scenarios involves 
incredibly complex questions of science, engineering, and mathematics. Courts 
must develop tools to deal meaningfully with such complexity. Otherwise, the 
wildly expanding sphere of human knowledge will overwhelm the institution of 
the courts and undo the rule of law—just when we need it most. 
